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National level statistics indicate that unemployment payment recipients who identify as indigenous
are ‘breached’ more frquently than other recipients for not complying with the ‘activity test’ or other
administrative requirements. This monograph attempts to understand why this is so and what can be
done about it. It does so by further interrogating the administrative statistics, by age, gender and sub-
national geographic levels and by drawing on discussion sessions convened in 20 localities across
Australia.
The research observes consistently higher indigenous breach rates across age groups and genders,
but some degree of regional and State/Territory variation. It argues that this geographic variation is to
be expected given the different operating environments and economies of various areas. It argues
that there are inevitable tensions and ambiguities, as well as different office cultures and roles within
income support administration, and that there is a cultural and social content to all social security
rules and procedures, plus a great diversity of unemployed people; all of which may contribute to
differences in breach rates.
The analysis identifies a number of issues raised by participants in discussion sessions which may be
contributing to higher indigenous breach rates, such as literacy and mobility, confidence in and with
government bureaucracies and CDEP scheme administrative arrangements. It also identifies
adaptations to the circumstances of indigenous people which have already been made within social
security administration, in particular the appointment of indigenous-identified staff and the use of
third-party intermediaries in service delivery. The research makes a number of suggestions for further
adaptations which may help lower indigenous breach rates, including a ‘no correspondence client’
facility, more of a case officer approach, more small satellite offices and greater use of more individually-
tailored activity test agreements.
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Foreword
 
This monograph is the result of a two-year collaborative research effort between the Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at The Australian National University
and the Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services (formerly the
Department of Social Security). While CAEPR has a multi-year agreement-based
relationship with the Department, this research was commissioned as a special project in
1997 and undertaken entirely by Dr Will Sanders, a senior researcher at CAEPR.
The research described here analyses statistical information from the social security
administrative database which has not previously been put in the public domain. The
work demonstrates the usefulness of this statistical information for analysing issues of
great policy significance for indigenous Australians; it demonstrates the importance of
having an indigenous identifier for comparative research and policy evaluation. However,
this research is not just based on statistical analysis: it is multi-pronged. On the one hand,
the quantitative analysis is combined with extremely important contextualising field-
based discussions and observations undertaken by Dr Sanders in a diversity of settings
Australia-wide. This more qualitative work provides a means to qualify, ground and draw
out important issues of policy and administration at the regional level. On the other hand,
the research is informed by Dr Sanders’s extensive research on the incorporation of
indigenous people in the Australian social security system that extends over nearly two
decades.
CAEPR is particularly pleased to have been given the opportunity to carry out this applied
research for the Department of Family and Community Services, with great support from
Centrelink. I look forward to further collaboration resulting in such significant research
outputs and potential policy outcomes in the future.
Professor Jon Altman
Director, CAEPR
Canberra
August 1999
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IX
 
Summary
 
• This research was commissioned because the Activity Test Section of the
Department of Social Security national administration in Canberra noted differences
in breach rates at the national level between indigenous-identifiers and non-
identifiers within its unemployment payments administrative database.
• The research was conducted at two levels. Further statistical analysis of two
unemployment payments data sets drawn from the administrative record at June
1997 and March 1998 were broken down into indigenous identifiers and non-
identifiers. Contextualising discussion sessions and interviews were held in 20
localities between March and June 1998.
• The research confirms that national breach rates do seem to be consistently higher
among indigenous identifiers by a factor of about one-and-a-half in relation to
activity test breaching and a factor of two in relation to administrative breaching. It
finds that indigenous breach rates were higher by about these factors across age
groups, genders, income unit/family types and payment durations. It also finds that
activity test exemption rates and jobsearch diary issue exemption rates were higher
among indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers at the national level, and that
jobsearch diary issue rates were lower. These latter differences should arguably help
keep indigenous breach rates down, making actual differences in breach rates
perhaps even more significant than the raw data alone would suggest.
• The issue of breaches being overturned by original decision makers was examined
and evidence found to suggest that administrative breaches do get overturned at a
far higher rate than activity test breaches. However, no evidence was found to
suggest that the rate at which breaches get overturned is any higher in relation to
indigenous identifiers compared to non-identifiers.
• Local/regional statistical analysis was conducted focusing on 50 Centrelink offices
with more than 200 indigenous identifying unemployment payments customers.
This found distinctive breach and activity test exemption patterns among various
clusters of offices. Northern Territory offices, other than Tennant Creek, were
observed to have low indigenous breach rates which are in fact lower than their
non-identifier breach rates. This Northern Territory pattern is built on high activity
test exemption rates which derive from remote area provisions and procedures.
Western Australian offices were observed to have relatively high indigenous breach
rates, but also high non-identifier breach rates. Some New South Wales offices
appeared to have relatively low indigenous and non-identifier breach rates.
• State/Territory statistical analysis confirmed the Northern Territory’s low
indigenous identifier breach rates, built on high activity test exemption rates. It also
pointed to high non-identifier breach rates in the Northern Territory and, in rural/
remote areas at least, indigenous identifier breach rates which are clearly lower than
non-identifier breach rates. In Northern Territory urban areas, non-identifier and
indigenous breach rates are close to equal.
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• State/Territory statistical analysis also confirmed the relatively high Western
Australian breach rates, both among indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, but
refined the observed New South Wales low breach rate pattern to being essentially
a coastal country phenomenon.
• Issues raised in discussion sessions provided useful contextualisation for the
statistical analysis. They both sought to explain breach rate and activity test
exemption differentials between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers and
pointed to adaptations that already existed within income support administration to
the circumstances of indigenous people. Major issues raised were literacy and
mobility, confidence in, and with, government bureaucracies, propensity to appeal
or seek review, underpayment following breach decisions due to substantial periods
of reliance on family and community support networks, labour market
discrimination and expectations and compliance/review units, employment service
providers and Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme
administrative arrangements as sources of breaching. Indigenous identified staff and
third-party intermediaries were acknowledged as significant system adaptations
playing major roles in keeping down what may otherwise be far higher indigenous
breach rates. Access to Disability Support Pension was seen as, in different
circumstances, either pushing down or pushing up local indigenous breach rates.
• An analytic schema is developed which suggests the inevitablity of high levels of
indeterminacy, discretion and judgment involved in unemployment payments
administration. This focuses on tensions and ambiguities and different office
cultures and roles within income support administration. It also focuses on the
cultural and social content of rules and procedures and the diversity of the
unemployed.
• In light of this analytic schema, it is argued that the extent of difference observed in
breach and activity test exemption statistics, between indigenous identifiers and
non-identifiers, between Centrelink offices, and also over time, is not that
surprising. Indeed, apart from the Northern Territory, the statistics may arguably
be more notable for their lack of variability than for the greatness of differences.
This partly reflects the adaptations to indigenous peoples’ circumstances already
built into income support administration, which generally tend to lessen statistical
differences. Adaptation can, however, occasionally exaggerate statistical differences
and this seems to be the case in the Northern Territory. 
• The ideal of statistical equality within income support administrative processes
between indigenous-identifiers and non-identifiers is defended as worthwhile
pursuing. However, it is also acknowledged that some differences in statistics will
prove intractable and difficult to change. 
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XI
 
• Some ideas for further action within income support administration are offered
which may help to better manage indigenous peoples’ relations with unemployment
payments and reduce statistical differences, while building on existing adaptations.
These ideas include greater recognition of the diversity of the unemployed and the
tailoring of activity test requirements accordingly, a No Correspondence Client
facility, more of a case officer approach to unemployment payments administration
and several more as well (see Chapter 8).
• The research is seen as demonstrating the useful way in which the indigenous
identifier in the income support administrative database can be used for policy and
administrative purposes. Some minor issues about the identification procedures are
raised in passing.
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1.
 
Introduction
 
Within the Australian income support or social security system, it is not sufficient just to
be unemployed in order to receive an unemployment payment. Applicants must also
demonstrate that they are willing to undertake, and are actively seeking, suitable paid
work. These latter eligibility criteria are referred to as the ‘activity test’ and failing to
meet them is referred to in social security parlance as ‘breaching’ the activity test.
Breaching the activity test normally relates to a particular event occurring on a particular
day. Technically, from that day unemployment payments become ‘non-payable’ to the
applicant. However, eligibility for unemployment payments may be re-established
immediately, if applicants demonstrate anew that they are both unemployed and
available for, and are actively seeking, suitable paid work. In recent years, penalties have
been introduced where applicants re-establish eligibility for unemployment payments
within two years of an earlier activity test breach or breaches. As of July 1997, penalties
are an 18 per cent rate reduction for 26 weeks after the first breach, a 24 per cent rate
reduction for 26 weeks after the second breach and an eight-week non-payment period
after the third breach in a two-year period.
Administrative requirements outlined in the legislation can also be breached by
unemployment payment recipients. These breaches may relate to matters such as not
attending interviews, not replying to correspondence or not notifying changes of
circumstance. This leads to a second category of breaching, which is slightly different
from activity test breaching. This is called administrative breaching and it too leads to
unemployment payments becoming technically non-payable. In recent years, penalties
have also been imposed where applicants successfully re-apply for unemployment
payments after an administrative breach. As of March 1997, the penalty for an
administrative breach or breaches is a 16 per cent rate reduction for 13 weeks. 
Because breaching leads to unemployment payments becoming non-payable and to
penalties being imposed if applicants subsequently successfully reclaim payments,
breach rates among unemployment payment recipients are an increasingly important
administrative and policy issue. The Department of Social Security (DSS) has, in recent
times, begun to investigate rates of breaching among its clientele, by interrogating its
administrative database.
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 The Department has observed that breach rates among those of
its clientele identifying as indigenous Australians (that is, Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander) seem to be significantly higher than among those not so identifying.
To further investigate this basic observation, the DSS commissioned the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), at the Australian National University, to
undertake research on unemployment payment breach rates and related issues among
indigenous Australians. The research has been conducted at two levels. The first has been
a statistical analysis of DSS records, interrogating breach rates among indigenous
identifiers in comparison to those among the non-identifying clientele, at national,
regional and other geographic levels. The second level of analysis has been more
qualitative and contextual. It has been conducted through focused interviews and
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discussion sessions convened in approximately 20 localities, with Centrelink staff, non-
government welfare intermediaries and occasionally also individual clients. Access to
individual clients was not always achievable, given that DSS judged it inappropriate to
utilise the administrative database to directly access breached clients. However,
considerable appreciation of local operating environments was gained through the
interviews and discussion sessions that were able to be convened. A list of localities
visited appears in Appendix A.
This monograph reports on both levels of the research. It analyses two data sets derived
from the DSS administrative system at 20 June 1997 and 20 March 1998 and it attempts
to relate findings from these data sets to the more qualitative, contextual, locality-based
discussions and interviews. Chapter 2 details the national statistical analysis, while
Chapter 3 moves to local/regional statistical analysis. Chapter 4 looks at State/Territory
statistical analysis, including an urban/rural division. These statistical chapters include
some insights gained from the locality visits. However, more comprehensive canvassing
of the issues raised in locality-based interviews and discussion sessions is deferred until
Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 attempts to provide a more general analytic schema, or framework, within
which to understand the many issues raised by both the statistical and more qualitative
contextual analysis in earlier chapters. This schema focuses on tensions and ambiguities
in income support administration, office cultures and roles, the cultural content of rules
and procedures, and the diversity of the unemployed. Combining all these elements, the
analytic schema notes the high levels of indeterminacy, discretion and judgment
inevitably involved in unemployment payments administration. Chapter 7 turns to the
underlying issues of difference and equality which appear to have concerned the
Activity Test Section within DSS national administration in commissioning this research.
Chapter 8 explores ideas for further action which may assist in better managing the
activity test, breach rates and related issues among indigenous people.
This is, to our knowledge, the first time that DSS has utilised the indigenous identifier in
its administrative database for research purposes. The identification facility has only
been in place for about a decade and, until now, DSS has been concerned about the
incompleteness of indigenous identification. This issue is still current and is the reason
those not identified as indigenous in the database are referred to as the ‘non-identifying’
or ‘not-identified’, rather then the ‘non-indigenous’. More precise aspects of the issue of
indigenous identification procedures will be returned to later. However, CAEPR’s
judgment is that the level of indigenous identification within the social security
administrative system is now sufficient to allow utilisation of data for research purposes.
This current research should help demonstrate that sufficiency.
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2.
 
National statistical analysis
 
The national data sets derived from the DSS administrative system at 20 June 1997 and
20 March 1998 contain records relating to slightly over 1.2 million unemployment
payment recipients, almost 40,000 of whom have identified as either Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander. Approximately two-thirds of these clients are current unemployment
payment recipients, while one-third are cancelled recipients who have been current
within the previous six months and whose records remain on the data set in the social
security administrative system. Tables 2.1a and 2.1b provide current, cancelled and total
recipient numbers from the June 1997 and March 1998 data sets respectively, broken
down into Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander and non-identifiers.
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 The percentage of
Aboriginal clients who are current, as opposed to cancelled unemployment payment
recipients, is slightly higher than for the non-identifying clientele, with Torres Strait
Islanders occupying a middle position. This difference will be returned to later.
Not all the unemployment payment recipients in these two data sets receive the major
payment, Newstart Allowance. Some are Youth Training Allowance recipients and some
are Special Benefit recipients paid under Newstart or Youth Training Allowance
conditions. Tables 2.2a and 2.2b break down the two national data sets into these three
unemployment payment types. Newstart Allowance clearly accounts for the vast
majority of unemployment payments; over 90 per cent in all three identification
categories. This reflects the fact that, at the time of the study, Newstart Allowance
covered ages from 18 to 64, whereas Youth Training Allowance covered only ages 16 to
18. It is, however, notable that the proportions of Youth Training Allowance recipients
among clients identifying as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander are significantly higher
than among the non-identifiers; around 8 per cent compared to 4 per cent. This probably
reflects the younger age distribution of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
populations, but could also reflect lower school retention rates among indigenous youth.
It should perhaps be noted here, that the divisions between Newstart Allowance, Youth
Training Allowance and other income support payments, such as Austudy and Abstudy
have been substantially re-worked since the derivation of these data sets. From 1 July
1998, a more general Youth Allowance has replaced both Youth Training Allowance and
Newstart Allowance for unemployed people up to age 21 years. Youth Allowance has also
replaced Austudy, but not Abstudy, for students up to 25 years. These changes should
not, however, greatly affect the findings of this research. Newstart Allowance and Youth
Allowance are still administered within the social security system in much the same way
as previously. The findings of this research should, therefore, remain relevant.
 
Breach rates by identification category
 
Tables 2.3a and 2.3b present breach figures, nationwide, for Aboriginal, Torres Strait
Islander and non-identifying unemployment payment recipients. These tables identify
customers with at least one, two or three activity test or administrative breaches placed
on their record in the last two years. Breach rates are calculated by dividing these figures
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of customers with breaches on their record by the total numbers of customers in each
identification category. These tables can be viewed in a number of different ways, each
of which brings out important different findings. 
First, Tables 2.3a and 2.3b show significant differences in the breach rates of indigenous
identifiers and non-identifiers. Looking at clients with at least one activity test breach on
their record, these differences are of the order of a factor of one-and-a-half times; 9.2 per
cent of indigenous identifiers had at least one activity test breach on their file compared
to 6.0 per cent of non-identifiers at June 1997 and 13.4 per cent compared to 8.9 per cent
at March 1998. Looking at clients with at least one administrative breach on their record,
the differences are of the order of a factor of two; 10.9 per cent of indigenous identifiers
had at least one administrative breach on their file compared to 5.4 per cent of non-
identifiers in June 1997 and 19.7 per cent as compared to 10.5 per cent in March 1998.
These differentials between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers become
considerably greater if we focus on the much smaller number of clients with at least two
and at least three breaches on their records, where numbers permit. For example, the
percentage of indigenous identifiers with at least three administrative breaches on their
record in March 1998 was of the order of four times the rate for non-indigenous
identifiers; 0.8 per cent compared to 0.2 per cent in March 1998.
Second, it is notable that the breach rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
identifying clients appear to be fairly similar. Percentages of Torres Strait Islander
identifiers with at least one breach on their file are in fact slightly higher than for
Aboriginal identifiers, for both activity test and administrative breaches and in both data
sets. But this difference is probably insignificant and disappears, or is even reversed, as
we move down the tables to the much smaller percentages of clients with at least two and
at least three breaches on their record. However, at the three breach level of analysis, the
number of Torres Strait Islanders becomes so small (one, two, six and 14) as to make talk
of rates extremely dubious. Similarity of breach rates between Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander identifiers is the dominant impression.
This similarity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander breach rates to some extent
justifies the collapsing of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander categories into a
combined indigenous category in the right hand column of Tables 2.3a and 2.3b. Much
of the subsequent statistical analysis will use this combined indigenous category to avoid
problems with small numbers of Torres Strait Islander identifiers. However, at times,
when it is feasible, a distinction between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander identifiers
will be maintained. This will enable the hypothesis of the essential similarity of the
breach rates of these two groups of indigenous identifiers to be further tested.
A third perspective on Tables 2.3a and 2.3b points to a significant increase in the numbers
of clients with breaches on their records between the time of the first data set in June 1997
and the second data set in March 1998. Reasons for this increase canvassed in discussion
sessions related to new breachable actions being added, system changes which enhanced
the ability of officers to both impose and overturn breaches, and a shift to rate reductions,
as opposed to non-payment periods, as the penalty for single and double activity test
breaching and all administrative breaching. All of these changes, introduced in the latter
 
N
 
ATIONAL
 
 
 
STATISTICAL
 
 
 
ANALYSIS
 
 
 
♦
 
 5
 
half of 1997, may have made some contribution to increasing breach rates. It was also
suggested in discussion sessions that the effects of these changes may still be working their
way through the administrative system and that breach rates and breach penalties may
increase further with time.
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 It was further suggested that as histories of breaching built up
in the system more clients than at present would reach the more substantial levels of
penalty imposed following two and three activity test breaches in a two year period. These
changes in breach rates over time are of considerable interest and could be explored
further. However they are somewhat peripheral to the current research which focuses
more on differentials between indigenous and non-identifier breach rates. 
 
Activity test alternatives and exemptions
 
There are provisions within the social security legislation for unemployment payment
recipients to be allowed to meet the activity test through a broader range of activities than
just job search, and in some cases even to be exempted from the activity test while
maintaining eligibility for an unemployment payment.
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 Tables 2.4a and 2.4b show
numbers of indigenous and non-identifying clients exempt from activity test conditions.
The percentage of indigenous clients that are exempt is somewhat higher than among the
non-identifying clientele; 15.1 per cent as compared to 11.6 per cent in June 1997 and
18.9 per cent as compared to 11.6 per cent in March 1998. More will be said about rates
of exemption from the activity test and how these relate to breach rates in the local/
regional and State/Territory statistical analysis. Suffice it to say at this stage, that a higher
activity test exemption rate should, in principle, lead to lower breach rates, since
exemption removes requirements which might otherwise be breached. Hence breach rate
differentials between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers are perhaps even more
significant than the raw figures suggest, given the higher rate of activity test exemptions
among indigenous identifiers. 
Tables 2.4a and 2.4b also show that rates of exemption from the activity test are lower
among Torres Strait Islander identifiers than among either Aboriginal identifiers or non-
identifiers. This may contribute to higher Torres Strait Islander breach rates and will also
be returned to in the local/regional and State/Territory statistical analysis.
 
Breaches overturned by original decision makers
 
Breaches imposed on a client can be subsequently overturned by the original decision
maker. This aspect of unemployment payments administration, which was made much
easier during the latter half of 1997 through computer system changes, was seen as an
important part of understanding breach rates in many group discussion sessions. It was
suggested that administrative breaching, in particular, could be used simply as a way of
‘getting in contact’ with clients and that once contact was made a breach may be
overturned. The hypothesis in discussion sessions was that this administrative technique
may be being applied disproportionately to indigenous identifiers, with high levels of
mobility and low levels of literacy, and would be reflected in higher proportions of
administrative breaches among indigenous identifiers subsequently being overturned. 
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It was not possible to test this hypothesis using the June 1997 data set, when overturning
a breach was not as straightforward a procedure as it later became. However, it was
possible to test it using the March 1998 data set and Table 2.5 presents the results. It is
clear from this table that a far more substantial proportion of administrative breaches
than activity test breaches do subsequently get overturned by original decision makers;
of the order of 40 per cent as compared to 10 per cent. Hence there may be considerable
truth in the idea that administrative breaching is used by decision makers simply as a way
of getting the client to make contact. However, there appears to be no difference in the
rate at which administrative breaches get overturned among the indigenous and non-
identifying clienteles. Both seem to have their administrative breaches overturned at a
rate of around 40 per cent. So as an explanation of higher overall indigenous breach rates,
the hypothesis that a disproportionate number of administrative breaches among the
indigenous identifiers are subsequently overturned does not seem to be sustained. 
In deference to this line of argument and to further test the hypothesis arising from it,
wherever possible in the local/regional and State/Territory statistical analysis in the next
two chapters, net breach rates, after overturned breaches have been excluded, will be
calculated from the March 1998 data set, as well as total or gross breach rates.
 
Breach rates by identification category, age and gender
 
Tables 2.6a and 2.6b, in their top two panels, break down activity test and administrative
breach rates by age and gender for indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers. The figures
show clear and consistent age/gender patterns which can be observed from both data sets
among both non-identifiers and indigenous identifiers. Moderate rates of breaching
among those under 18 rise to higher breach rates among 18–21 year olds, which then
gradually decline with increasing age. Within this general age profile, male breach rates
are higher than female breach rates and indigenous identifier breach rates are higher than
non-identifier breach rates. 
What is perhaps most striking about the top two panels of Tables 2.6a and 2.6b is the
consistency with which indigenous breach rates are higher than the breach rates of non-
identifiers across age groups and genders. This can be observed from the ratio figures,
which divide the indigenous identifier breach rate for each age and gender group by the
non-identifier breach rate. In only three instances does this ratio fall to 1 or below – that
being for activity test breach rates for females over age 55 in both data sets and for females
under 18 in the June 1997 data set. And in only one instance does the ratio rise above 3
– that being the administrative breach rate for males over 55 in the June 1997 data set.
The ratio of administrative breach rates among older age groups does seem to rise a little
and to be partly offset by a lower ratio among younger age groups. However overall,
higher breach rates among indigenous identifiers appear to be a very consistent
phenomenon across age groups and genders. 
The bottom panels in Tables 2.6a and 2.6b provide the denominators for the rates in the
top two panels, comprising all unemployment payment clients in the relevant age, gender
and indigenous identification category. In their right hand columns, these panels
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calculate percentage age group shares for total unemployment payments clientele within
each age/gender and indigenous identification category and indigenous/non-identifier
ratios of shares. Indigenous age group shares tend to be larger than the non-identifying
age group shares at younger ages (ratios >1) and smaller at older ages (ratios <1). This
probably reflects shorter indigenous life expectancy, the younger indigenous population
structure and possibly again, in the under 18 age group, lower indigenous school
retention rates. One variation on this pattern is that indigenous female age group shares
drop below non-identifying female age group shares in the 18–21 and 22–24 ages (ratios
<1), probably reflecting younger indigenous child bearing and eligibility for other forms
of income support.
 
Breach rates by identification category and income unit/family type
 
Tables 2.7a and 2.7b, in their top two panels, break down activity test and administrative
breach rates by income unit/family type; that is, whether unpartnered or partnered and
by number of dependent children. Among partnered income units/families, breach rates
are fairly similar across numbers of dependent children and indigenous breach rates are
fairly consistently higher than non-identifier breach rates by about a factor of two.
Among unpartnered income units/families, there are some statistically aberrant and non-
significant results arising from small numbers of recipients with larger numbers of
children. (Unemployed, unpartnered people with dependent children would normally
qualify for Parenting Payment Single, formerly Sole Parent Pension, and hence are
unlikely to be on Newstart or Youth Training Allowance payments.) However,
unpartnered recipients with no dependent children, for whom numbers of recipients are
not a statistical problem, appear to have higher breach rates than other income unit/
family types and this appears to be the case both among indigenous identifiers and among
non-identifiers. 
This one instance of higher breach rates among income unit/family types takes on added
significance when it is realised that unpartnered income units with no dependent
children are, in fact, the substantial majority of all unemployment payment recipients.
This can be seen from the bottom panels of Table 2.7a and 2.7b, which list the total
numbers of unemployment payment customers in the unpartnered and partnered income
unit/family types by indigenous identification category and, in their right hand columns,
express these figures as percentage shares of all customers. Slightly over 70 per cent of all
unemployment payment recipients in both data sets and in both the indigenous and non-
identifying categories were unpartnered income units with no dependent children.
Newstart Allowance is predominantly a payment made to single people with no
dependent children and it is these people who have the highest breach rates.
Another way of presenting the data in the top two panels of Tables 2.7a and 2.7b is as
numbers of customers with breaches by income unit/family type as a share of all
customers with breaches. This is done in Tables 2.8a and 2.8b. Due to their higher breach
rates, unpartnered unemployment payment recipients with no dependent children
account for over 80 per cent of all customers with breaches in all but the indigenous
identifier activity test breach category; and even in this category the figure only drops to
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77.5 per cent in March 1998 and 78.4 per cent in June 1997. Unpartnered recipients with
no dependent children are the predominant clients of unemployment payments and an
even more predominant element within breaching.
 
Breach rates by identification category and payment duration 
 
Tables 2.9a and 2.9b present breach rates broken down by the duration of time for which
customers have been on unemployment payments. Table 2.9a, for the June 1997 data set,
shows little difference in breach rates by payment duration, but consistently higher
indigenous breach rates across all payment durations (see ratio figures in far right
column). Table 2.9b, for the March 1998 data set, shows breach rates rising with duration
on payment up to about 9–12 months and then appearing to stabilise, or even beginning
to fall for those on payment over 24 months. This pattern is clear among both indigenous
identifiers and non-identifiers and across both activity test and administrative breaching.
Higher indigenous breach rates are again evident across all payment durations, as
evidenced in the ratio figures in the far right column.
This change of breach patterns by payment duration between June 1997 and March 1998
raises interesting, but at this stage perhaps unanswerable, questions. Were changes to
breaching practices introduced in the latter half of 1997, like the rate reduction penalties,
the larger range of breachable actions and the system changes which gave officers an
increased ability to overturn breaches, having a disproportionate effect at March 1998 on
people with payment durations between four and 12 months, and will this effect extend
in time to longer durations or not?
The bottom panel of Tables 2.9a and 2.9b provide the denominators for the rates in the
top two panels and also, in their right hand columns, calculate shares and indigenous/
non-identifier ratios of customers with different payment durations. The proportion of
indigenous identifiers who have been on payment for over 24 months is significantly
higher than among non-identifiers; 25.5 per cent as compared to 20.3 per cent in June
1997 and 28.4 per cent as compared to 23.8 per cent in March 1998. Most of the offsetting
reduction in proportions of indigenous identifiers on payment for shorter durations is in
the under 12 months categories, reflected in ratios less than 1 for these payment
durations. It is clear, therefore, that indigenous identifiers tend to be on unemployment
payments for greater durations than non-identifiers and, by March 1998 at least, that this
may be contributing slightly to higher breach rates.
 
Finer analysis of breach types
 
Tables 2.10a and 2.10b divide clients with activity test and administrative breaches by
type of latest breach.
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 The greatest limitation of these tables is the large numbers of clients
with breaches for whom no finer breach type is recorded, beyond whether they were
activity test or administrative breaches. This relates primarily to old breaches entered on
the system before December 1996. As time passes, and these old breaches fall out of the
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administrative record, the numbers of breaches for which there is no finer breach type
recorded should decrease. This can be seen in the substantial decrease in the ‘no type
recorded’ figures in Table 2.10b compared to Table 2.10a. 
On examining clients with breaches for whom a finer categorisation of latest breach type
is recorded, in Tables 2.10a and 2.10b, it is evident that indigenous and non-identifying
clients do not always incur the various finer types of activity test and administrative
breaches in quite the same proportions. In the activity test area, breaching because of
misconduct at work seems to be lower among indigenous identifiers compared to non-
identifiers; 6.4 per cent as compared to 11.1 per cent in June 1997 and 3.0 per cent as
compared to 4.6 per cent in March 1998. This may relate to indigenous people moving in
and out of work less frequently than non-indigenous people; which may also account for
the slightly higher percentage of ‘current’ and lower percentage of ‘cancelled’ recipients
among indigenous identifiers revealed in Tables 2.1a and 2.1b and also the longer
duration on payment among indigenous identifiers revealed in Tables 2.9a and 2.9b. The
hypothesis here would be that, if indigenous people are indeed moving in and out of
work less frequently than non-identifiers, then they will stay on payment longer, they
will have less cause to move between ‘current’ and ‘cancelled’ status as unemployment
payment recipients and they will have less chance of being seen to have breached the
activity test through misconduct at work.
In the administrative breaching area, one instance in which shares seem to vary
significantly and consistently across the data sets is in the higher percentage of indigenous
identifiers incurring an administrative breach for failure to attend an interview; 11.8 per
cent as compared to 6.1 per cent in June 1997 and 46.0 per cent as compared to 39.8 per
cent in March 1998. Failure to reply to correspondence is the next biggest finer type of
administrative breaching, but interestingly, does not show up as a consistently greater
source of breaching for indigenous identifiers, compared to non-identifiers. This is
contrary to expectations raised in discussion sessions and may simply reflect the finer
categorisation of breaches which client processing officers are most utilising. Failure to
turn up for an interview which was requested in correspondence could, for example, be
coded in either of two different ways.
One other thing to note from Table 2.10b is the addition from June 1997 to March 1998
of a new type of breaching relating to the work-for-the-dole scheme.
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 Although
participation in work-for-the-dole is generally voluntary, participants must sign up for
an agreed period (usually three or six months) and can be breached for failing to meet
work-for-the-dole obligations during that period. This is clearly one instance of a new
breachable action being added to the unemployment payments system between the time
of these two data sets, which may be contributing to rising breach rates over the time
period. 
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Jobseeker diary issue and exemption
 
Tables 2.11a and 2.11b present two final variables at the national level of statistical
analysis. These are whether customers have been issued a jobseeker diary and whether
they are currently exempt from diary issue.
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 Indigenous identifiers have been issued
diaries at significantly lower rates than non-identifiers and are currently exempt from
diary issue at significantly higher rates than non-identifiers. Like exemption from the
activity test, as explored in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b, this should arguably lead to lower
breach rates among indigenous identifiers than would otherwise be the case, since lower
rates of diary issue and higher rates of exemption should lessen opportunities for
breaching to occur. So again the actual differentials in breach rates between indigenous
identifiers and non-identifiers are perhaps more significant than the raw data alone might
seem to indicate.
 
Summary of major findings
 
Major findings of the national statistical analysis can be summarised as follows:
• Indigenous breach rates are consistently higher than non-identifier breach rates
across age groups, genders and income unit/family types.
• Exemption from the job search aspects of the activity test and exemption from
jobseeker diary issue is higher among indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers,
while levels of jobseeker diary issue are lower. As these differences should all
arguably lead to lower breach rates among indigenous identifiers, differentials in
breach rates may be more significant than the raw figures alone tend to indicate.
• There is some evidence to suggest that administrative breaching may be used as a
device to contact clients, leading to high proportions of administrative breaches
subsequently being overturned by original decision makers. However, there is no
evidence yet to suggest that this practice is any more prevalent in relation to
indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers.
• There is some evidence to suggest that indigenous identifiers may be on
unemployment payments for longer durations than non-identifiers, with fewer
moves on and off. This is reflected in different proportions of finer breach types and
different proportions of current and cancelled recipients. Duration may contribute
slightly to higher indigenous breach rates, as by March 1998 breaching did appear
to increase slightly with payment duration up to 12 months. 
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Note:
a. N–I = indigenous/not identified.
Table 2.6a. Customers with breaches and total customers by age, gender and indigenous
identification category, 20 June 1997  
Customers 
with:
Gender/indigenous identifier
Female Male
Not identified Indigenous I/N–I Not identified Indigenous I/N–Ia
Number % rate Number % rate Ratio Number % rate Number % rate Ratio
Activity test breaches
Under 18 1,155 5.2 69 5.0 1.0 1,694 6.3 119 7.4 1.2
18–21 7,238 7.1 315 10.5 1.5 14,499 11.5 651 13.7 1.2
22–24 3,832 6.3 144 9.8 1.6 10,372 10.2 489 13.0 1.3
25–34 4,122 4.8 182 6.0 1.3 18,121 7.4 981 10.3 1.4
35–44 1,337 2.5 87 4.6 1.9 6,990 4.2 386 8.1 2.0
45–54 1,062 1.9 22 2.2 1.2 2,770 2.5 100 5.7 2.3
55 and over 295 1.9 2 1.1 0.6 986 1.5 19 3.4 2.3
Total all ages 19,041 4.8 821 6.9 1.4 55,432 6.6 2,745 10.3 1.6
Administrative breaches
Under 18 1,431 6.4 156 11.3 1.8 2,120 7.8 245 15.3 2.0
18–21 7,293 7.1 433 14.5 2.0 13,390 10.6 881 18.5 1.7
22–24 3,376 5.5 143 9.7 1.8 8,972 8.8 526 13.9 1.6
25–34 3,801 4.4 238 7.8 1.8 15,522 6.3 997 10.5 1.7
35–44 1,280 2.4 116 6.1 2.6 5,782 3.5 347 7.3 2.1
45–54 920 1.6 34 3.5 2.1 2,347 2.1 91 5.2 2.4
55 and over 170 1.1 5 2.7 2.5 744 1.1 20 3.5 3.2
Total all ages 18,271 4.6 1,125 9.4 2.1 48,877 5.8 3,107 11.6 2.0
Total 
customers Number % share Number % share Number % share Number % share
Under 18 22,408 5.6 1,380 11.5 2.1 27,047 3.2 1,600 6.0 1.9
18–21 102,620 25.8 2,997 25.1 1.0 125,797 14.9 4,767 17.8 1.2
22–24 61,267 15.4 1,473 12.3 0.8 101,856 12.1 3,772 14.1 1.2
25–34 86,162 21.6 3,035 25.4 1.2 246,333 29.1 9,527 35.6 1.2
35–44 54,483 13.7 1,911 16.0 1.2 167,723 19.8 4,745 17.8 0.9
45–54 56,034 14.1 980 8.2 0.6 109,663 13.0 1,761 6.6 0.5
55 and over 15,474 3.9 184 1.5 0.4 67,125 7.9 567 2.1 0.3
Total all ages 398,448 100.0 11,960 100.0 845,544 100.0 26,739 100.0
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Note:
a. N–I = indigenous/not identified. 
Table 2.6b. Customers with breaches and total customers by age, gender and indigenous
identification category, 20 March 1998  
Customers 
with:
Gender/indigenous identifier
Female Male
Not identified Indigenous I/N–I Not identified Indigenous I/N–Ia
Number % rate Number % rate Ratio Number % rate Number % rate Ratio
Activity test breaches
Under 18 1,321 5.9 101 6.9 1.2 1,845 7.4 136 8.2 1.1
18–21 9,594 9.9 442 14.7 1.5 18,452 15.7 908 19.3 1.2
22–24 5,455 9.6 206 13.7 1.4 15,041 15.8 715 19.7 1.3
25–34 5,996 7.2 315 10.0 1.4 27,803 11.8 1,469 15.0 1.3
35–44 2,053 3.8 146 7.2 1.9 10,684 6.6 581 12.3 1.9
45–54 1,538 2.8 42 4.0 1.4 4,201 3.9 171 9.3 2.4
55 and over 341 2.1 4 1.9 0.9 1,191 1.9 27 4.5 2.4
Total all ages 26,298 6.8 1,256 10.1 1.5 79,217 9.8 4,007 14.9 1.5
Administrative breaches
Under 18 2,681 12.0 283 19.3 1.6 3,255 13.0 349 21.0 1.6
18–21 13,182 13.6 755 25.1 1.9 22,291 19.0 1,416 30.1 1.6
22–24 6,357 11.2 306 20.3 1.8 16,919 17.8 900 24.8 1.4
25–34 7,323 8.8 520 16.5 1.9 30,472 12.9 1,950 19.9 1.5
35–44 2,734 5.1 252 12.5 2.5 11,572 7.1 689 14.5 2.0
45–54 2,007 3.6 94 8.9 2.5 4,647 4.3 193 10.5 2.5
55 and over 356 2.2 10 4.8 2.2 1,517 2.4 30 5.0 2.1
Total all ages 34,640 9.0 2,220 17.9 2.0 90,673 11.2 5,527 20.5 1.8
Total 
customers Number % share Number % share Number % share Number % share
Under 18 22,271 5.8 1,464 11.8 2.0 24,990 3.1 1,663 6.2 2.0
18–21 97,017 25.2 3,005 24.2 1.0 117,221 14.5 4,710 17.5 1.2
22–24 57,002 14.8 1,508 12.1 0.8 95,273 11.8 3,636 13.5 1.1
25–34 82,985 21.6 3,160 25.4 1.2 235,683 29.2 9,789 36.3 1.2
35–44 53,812 14.0 2,023 16.3 1.2 162,402 20.1 4,744 17.6 0.9
45–54 55,678 14.5 1,056 8.5 0.6 107,988 13.4 1,832 6.8 0.5
55 and over 16,103 4.2 208 1.7 0.4 63,252 7.8 595 2.2 0.3
Total all ages 384,868 100.0 12,424 100.0 806,809 100.0 26,969 100.0
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Table 2.7a. Customers with breaches and total customers by income unit/family type and
indigenous identification category, 20 June 1997  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous I/N-I
Number % rate Number % rate Ratio
Customers with activity test breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 61,078 6.9 2,795 10.0 1.5
1 child 406 4.0 77 6.8 1.7
2 children 61 3.0 9 3.2 1.1
3 children 21 3.4 8 7.1 2.1
4 children 5 2.8 1 2.0 0.7
5 children 1 3.5 0 0.0 0.0
more than 5 children 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 5,438 3.4 235 7.3 2.2
1 child 2,838 4.4 139 6.7 1.5
2 children 2,682 3.9 131 8.3 2.1
3 children 1,287 3.6 88 7.8 2.2
4 children 469 3.7 39 5.4 1.5
5 children 128 3.5 23 8.1 2.3
more than 5 children 59 3.8 21 9.2 2.4
Total customers with activity test breaches 74,473 6.0 3,566 9.2 1.5
Customers with administrative breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 56,954 6.5 3,457 12.4 1.9
1 child 509 5.0 111 9.8 2.0
2 children 71 3.5 26 9.4 2.7
3 children 24 3.9 4 3.6 0.9
4 children 7 4.0 2 4.0 1.0
5 children 2 6.9 0 0.0 0.0
more than 5 children 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 4,119 2.6 263 8.2 3.2
1 child 2,178 3.4 134 6.5 1.9
2 children 1,881 2.7 92 5.8 2.1
3 children 926 2.6 75 6.6 2.5
4 children 316 2.5 33 4.6 1.9
5 children 108 3.0 15 5.3 1.8
more than 5 children 53 3.4 20 8.7 2.6
Total customers with 
administrative breaches
67,148 5.4 4,232 10.9 1.6
(continued)
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Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
All customers
Unpartnered with: 0 children 882,284 70.9 27,888 72.1
1 child 10,164 0.8 1,131 2.9
2 children 2,048 0.2 278 0.7
3 children 624 0.1 112 0.3
4 children 177 0.0 50 0.1
5 children 29 0.0 6 0.0
more than 5 children 14 0.0 7 0.0
Partnered with:  0 children 160,782 12.9 3,214 8.3
1 child 64,909 5.2 2,061 5.3
2 children 69,409 5.6 1,587 4.1
3 children 35,516 2.9 1,132 2.9
4 children 12,811 1.0 720 1.9
5 children 3,654 0.3 284 0.7
more than 5 children 1,571 0.0 229 0.6
Total customers 1,243,992 100.0 38,699 100.0
Table 2.7a. Customers with breaches and total customers by income unit/family type and
indigenous identification category, 20 June 1997  (continued)
Indigenous identifier
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Table 2.7b. Customers with breaches and total customers by income unit/family type and
indigenous identification category, 20 March 1998  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous I/N-I
Number % rate Number % rate Ratio
Customers with activity test breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 86,895 10.2 4,079 14.3 1.4
1 child 785 7.1 134 11.2 1.6
2 children 109 5.4 15 5.9 1.1
3 children 30 5.0 4 3.4 0.7
4 children 5 3.2 2 4.7 1.5
5 children 5 11.1 1 10.0 0.9
more than 5 children 3 17.7 0 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 7,097 4.7 330 10.1 2.1
1 child 3,963 6.6 207 10.3 1.6
2 children 3,695 5.8 184 11.4 2.0
3 children 1,921 5.8 154 13.5 2.3
4 children 710 5.8 83 11.9 2.1
5 children 204 5.9 40 12.7 2.2
more than 5 children 93 5.9 30 14.3 2.4
Total customers with activity test breaches 105,515 8.9 5,263 13.4 1.5
Customers with administrative breaches 
Unpartnered with: 0 children 105,012 12.3 6,258 22.0 1.8
1 child 1,195 10.8 232 19.5 1.8
2 children 140 6.9 36 14.2 2.1
3 children 45 7.5 17 14.5 1.9
4 children 10 6.4 8 18.6 2.9
5 children 5 11.1 2 20.0 1.8
more than 5 children 1 5.9 0 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 7,784 5.2 459 14.0 2.7
1 child 4,311 7.2 258 12.8 1.8
2 children 3,811 5.9 207 12.8 2.2
3 children 1,928 5.8 153 13.5 2.3
4 children 736 6.0 73 10.5 1.7
5 children 223 6.4 21 6.7 1.0
more than 5 children 112 7.1 23 11.0 1.6
Total customers with administrative breaches 125,313 10.5 7,747 19.7 1.9
(continued)
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Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
All customers
Unpartnered with: 0 children 852,396 71.5 28,510 72.4
1 child 11,051 0.9 1,192 3.0
2 children 2,023 0.2 254 0.6
3 children 601 0.1 117 0.3
4 children 157 0.0 43 0.1
5 children 45 0.0 10 0.0
more than 5 children 17 0.0 4 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 150,983 12.7 3,277 8.3
1 child 59,969 5.0 2,017 5.1
2 children 64,164 5.4 1,612 4.1
3 children 33,033 2.8 1,137 2.9
4 children 12,193 1.0 696 1.8
5 children 3,463 0.3 314 0.8
more than 5 children 1,582 0.1 210 0.5
Total customers 1,191,677 100.0 39,393 100.0
Table 2.7b. Customers with breaches and total customers by income unit/family type and
indigenous identification category, 20 March 1998  (continued)
Indigenous identifier
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Table 2.8a. Customers with breaches by income unit/family type as a share of total
customers with breaches, 20 June 1997  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
Customers with activity test breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 61,078 82.0 2,795 78.4
1 child 406 0.6 77 2.2
2 children 61 0.1 9 0.3
3 children 21 0.0 8 0.2
4 children 5 0.0 1 0.0
5 children 1 0.0 0.0
more than 5 children 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 5,438 7.3 235 6.6
1 child 2,838 3.8 139 3.9
2 children 2,682 3.6 131 3.7
3 children 1,287 1.7 88 2.5
4 children 469 0.6 39 1.1
5 children 128 0.2 23 0.6
more than 5 children 59 0.1 21 0.6
Total customers with activity test breaches 74,473 100.0 3,566 100.0
Customers with administrative breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 56,954 84.8 3,457 81.7
1 child 509 0.8 111 2.6
2 children 71 0.1 26 0.6
3 children 24 0.0 4 0.1
4 children 7 0.0 2 0.1
5 children 2 0.0 0.0
more than 5 children 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 4,119 6.1 263 6.2
1 child 2,178 3.2 134 3.2
2 children 1,881 2.8 92 2.2
3 children 926 1.4 75 1.8
4 children 316 0.5 33 0.8
5 children 108 0.2 15 0.4
more than 5 children 53 0.1 20 0.5
Total customers with administrative breaches 67,148 100.0 4,232 100.0
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Table 2.8b. Customers with breaches by income unit/family type as a share of total
customers with breaches, 20 March 1998  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
Customers with activity test breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 86,895 82.4 4,079 77.5
1 child 785 0.7 134 2.6
2 children 109 0.1 15 0.3
3 children 30 0.0 4 0.1
4 children 5 0.0 2 0.0
5 children 5 0.0 1 0.0
more than 5 children 3 0.0 0.0
Partnered with: 0 children 7,097 6.7 330 6.3
1 child 3,963 3.8 207 3.9
2 children 3,695 3.5 184 3.5
3 children 1,921 1.8 154 2.9
4 children 710 0.7 83 1.6
5 children 204 0.2 40 0.8
more than 5 children 93 0.1 30 0.6
Total customers with activity test breaches 105,515 100.0 5,263 100.0
Customers with administrative breaches
Unpartnered with: 0 children 105,012 83.8 6,258 80.8
1 child 1,195 1.0 232 3.0
2 children 140 0.1 36 0.5
3 children 45 0.0 17 0.2
4 children 10 0.0 8 0.1
5 children 5 0.0 2 0.0
more than 5 children 1 0.0 0.0
Partnered with:  0 children 7,784 6.2 459 5.9
1 child 4,311 3.4 258 3.3
2 children 3,811 3.0 207 2.7
3 children 1,928 1.5 153 2.0
4 children 736 0.6 73 0.9
5 children 223 0.2 21 0.3
more than 5 children 112 0.1 23 0.3
Total customers with administrative breaches 125,313 100.0 7,747 100.0
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Note:
a. N–I = indigenous/not identified.
Table 2.9a. Customers with breaches and total customers by payment duration and
indigenous identification category, 20 June 1997  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous I/N-Ia
Number % rate Number % rate  Ratio
Customers with activity test breaches with a payment duration of:
Up to 3 months 14,332 7.2 529 9.5 1.3
4 to 6 months 14,382 6.0 516 8.4 1.4
7 to 9 months 10,209 6.7 469 10.1 1.5
10 to 12 months 7,154 6.1 322 8.8 1.5
12 to 18 months 9,700 5.4 483 8.9 1.6
19 to 24 months 5,893 5.7 326 9.7 1.7
Over 24 months 12,803 5.1 921 9.4 1.8
Total customers with activity test breaches 74,473 6.0 3,566 9.2 1.5
Customers with administrative breaches with a payment duration of:
Up to 3 months 10,458 5.3 586 10.5 2.0
4 to 6 months 13,229 5.5 626 10.2 1.9
7 to 9 months 9,128 6.0 504 10.9 1.8
10 to 12 months 6,699 5.7 392 10.7 1.9
12 to 18 months 10,208 5.7 644 11.8 2.1
19 to 24 months 5,934 5.7 416 12.3 2.1
Over 24 months 11,492 4.6 1,064 10.8 2.4
Total customers with administrative breaches 67,148 5.4 4,232 10.9 2.0
Total customers with a payment duration of: Number % share Number % share
Up to 3 months 198,330 15.9 5,576 14.4 0.9
4 to 6 months 240,592 19.3 6,122 15.8 0.8
7 to 9 months 152,268 12.2 4,646 12.0 1.0
10 to 12 months 117,985 9.5 3,669 9.5 1.0
12 to 18 months 179,565 14.4 5,457 14.1 1.0
19 to 24 months 103,313 8.3 3,378 8.7 1.1
Over 24 months 251,939 20.3 9,851 25.5 1.3
Total customers 1,243,992 100.0 38,699 100.0
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Note:
a. N-I = indigenous/not identified.
Table 2.9b. Customers with breaches and total customers by payment duration and
indigenous identification category, 20 March 1998  
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous I/N-Ia
Number % rate Number % rate  Ratio
Customers with activity test breaches with a payment duration of:
Up to 3 months 20,975 7.7 947 11.7 1.5
4 to 6 months 13,422 8.7 570 11.9 1.4
7 to 9 months 12,260 9.5 523 14.3 1.5
10 to 12 months 9,607 10.8 365 13.6 1.3
12 to 18 months 14,838 9.6 727 14.2 1.5
19 to 24 months 10,187 9.4 567 14.7 1.6
Over 24 months 24,226 8.5 1,564 14.0 1.6
Total customers with activity test breaches 105,515 8.9 5,263 13.4 1.5
Customers with administrative breaches with a payment duration of:
Up to 3 months 21,349 7.8 1,263 15.6 2.0
4 to 6 months 14,721 9.6 860 18.0 1.9
7 to 9 months 15,426 12.0 859 23.5 2.0
10 to 12 months 12,136 13.7 592 22.1 1.6
12 to 18 months 20,492 13.3 1,093 21.4 1.6
19 to 24 months 13,599 12.5 936 24.3 2.0
Over 24 months 27,589 9.7 2,144 19.2 2.0
Total customers with administrative breaches 125,312 8.7 7,747 19.7 2.3
Total customers with a payment duration of: Number % share Number % share
Up to 3 months 273,073 22.9 8,118 20.6 0.9
4 to 6 months 154,037 12.9 4,782 12.1 0.9
7 to 9 months 128,667 10.8 3,658 9.3 0.9
10 to 12 months 88,820 7.5 2,677 6.8 0.9
12 to 18 months 154,470 13.0 5,115 13.0 1.0
19 to 24 months 108,854 9.1 3,849 9.8 1.1
Over 24 months 283,756 23.8 11,194 28.4 1.2
Total customers 1,191,677 100.0 39,393 100.0
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Note:
System changes were introduced in December 1996 to record breach type. These tables show the latest breach type,
of those breaches incurred since December 1996. It is a sample to show the mix of breach types likely to occur.
a. AT = activity test breach.
b. Ad. = administrative breach. 
Table 2.10a. Customers with breaches by type of latest breach and indigenous
identification category, 20 June 1997
Indigenous identifier
Type of latest breach Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
ATa failed activity test 7,014 9.4 504 14.1
AT misconduct at work 8,227 11.1 228 6.4
AT voluntarily unemployed 25,521 34.3 1,126 31.6
No type recorded 33,711 45.3 1,708 47.9
Customers with activity test breaches 74,473 100.0 3,566 100.0
Ad.b failed to attend interview 4,098 6.1 498 11.8
Ad. failed to notify circumstances 634 0.9 22 0.5
Ad. failed to reply to correspondence 1,176 1.8 141 3.3
Ad. failed to attend training 62 0.1 4 0.1
No type recorded 61,178 91.1 3,567 84.3
Customers with administrative breaches 67,148 100.0 4,232 100.0
Table 2.10b. Customers with breaches by type of latest breach and indigenous
identification category, 20 March 1998
Indigenous identifier
Type of latest breach Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
ATa failed activity test 62,365 59.1 3,117 59.2
AT misconduct at work 4,846 4.6 160 3.0
AT voluntarily unemployed 12,449 11.8 656 12.5
AT Work for the Dole 728 0.7 32 0.6
No type recorded 25,127 23.8 1,298 24.7
Customers with activity test breaches 105,515 100.0 5,263 100.0
Ad.b failed to attend interview 49,867 39.8 3,567 46.0
Ad. failed to notify circumstances 2,692 2.2 85 1.1
Ad. failed to reply to correspondence 29,304 23.4 1,117 14.4
Ad. failed to attend training 12 0.0 1 0.0
Ad. Work for the Dole 1,159 0.9 57 0.7
No type recorded 42279 33.7 2920 37.7
Customers with administrative breaches 125,313 100.0 7,747 100.0
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Table 2.11a. Customers by whether issued a jobseeker diary and whether exempt from
diary issue by indigenous identification category, 20 June 1997 
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
Diary issued
Yes 339,491 27.3 6,469 16.7
No 904,501 72.7 32,230 83.3
Total customers 1,243,992 100.0 38,699 100.0
Currently exempt from diary issue
Yes 159,078 12.8 8,976 23.2
No 1,084,914 87.2 29,723 76.8
Total customers 1,243,992 100.0 38,699 100.0
Table 2.11b. Customers by whether issued a jobseeker diary and whether exempt from
diary issue by indigenous identification category, 20 March 1998 
Indigenous identifier
Not identified Indigenous
Number % share Number % share
Diary issued
Yes 496,292 41.7 8,928 22.7
No 695,385 58.4 30,465 77.3
Total customers 1,191,677 100.0 39,393 100.0
Currently exempt from diary issue
Yes 339,107 28.5 18,510 47.0
No 852,570 71.5 20,883 53.0
Total customers 1,191,677 100.0 39,393 100.0
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3. Local/regional statistical analysis
Income support administration is carried out through slightly over 300 Centrelink
Customer Service Centres which were formerly, until mid 1997, regional and smaller local
satellite offices of DSS. Since there were a little under 40,000 indigenous identifiers in each
of the two national administrative data sets, the mean number of indigenous identifying
unemployment payment recipients per Centrelink office was around 130. However, many
offices have far more indigenous identifiers than this and many far less. A sorting of the
data sets by Centrelink offices and numbers of indigenous identifying unemployment
payment clients revealed that about 100 offices had more than 100 indigenous identifying
clients and almost 50 offices had more than 200.
To avoid small numbers problems, it seemed prudent to focus local/regional statistical
analysis of indigenous breach rates on the almost 50 Centrelink offices with more than
200 indigenous identifying unemployment payment recipients. While this is a prudent
statistical strategy, it does have some costs, such as the possibility of missing out on issues
arising in areas with small numbers (and proportions) of indigenous identifiers in office
area populations. As a preliminary precaution, therefore, Tables 3.1a and 3.1b compare
breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics by indigenous identifiers and
non-identifiers for Centrelink office locations with more than, and less than,
200 indigenous identifying unemployment payment recipients. Table 3.1c adjusts the
March 1998 data by deleting breaches subsequently overturned by original decision
makers, thereby producing net rather than gross breach rates.8 
Tables 3.1a–c are somewhat equivocal on whether there are significant differences in
breach rates between Centrelink offices with less than and more than 200 indigenous-
identifying unemployment payment recipients. The June 1997 data set seemed to suggest
that indigenous breach rates were higher in the offices with more than 200 indigenous-
identifying clients compared to those with less than 200. However, by March 1998, the
opposite seemed to be the case, both in terms of net and gross breaching measures. This
turnaround may be related to changing rates of exemption from the activity test, which
had risen sharply between June 1997 and March 1998 among indigenous identifiers in
offices with more than 200 such customers (up from 10.0 per cent to 24.6 per cent) and
fallen sharply among indigenous identifiers in offices with less than 200 such customers
(down from 22.4 per cent to 8.3 per cent). Perhaps, the clearest finding of these tables,
then, is that higher activity test exemption rates do seem to significantly lessen breach
rates among indigenous identifiers. 
What is clearer from Tables 3.1a–c is that indigenous breach rates are significantly higher
than non-identifier breach rates across both offices with more than, and less than,
200 indigenous-identifying unemployment payment customers, across both breach types
and for both gross and net breaching. The differences between indigenous and non-
identifier breach rate figures, given in the far right columns of these tables, are in all cases
significantly positive. Another interesting, and perhaps predictable, finding from these
tables is that the shares of indigenous identifiers among all unemployment payment
30 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
recipients in these two categories of office vary significantly; from around 10–12 per cent
in offices with more than 200 indigenous identifiers to around 1.5 per cent in offices with
less than 200 (see second column from right).
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b present breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics
for the almost 50 Centrelink offices with over 200 indigenous identifying unemployment
payment recipients in the two data sets.9 Offices are ordered by the size of their
‘combined’ indigenous breach rate; a statistic derived by adding activity test and
administrative breach rates among indigenous identifiers. This ordering reveals a wide
range of local/regional indigenous breach rates; from combined figures of 40.1 per cent
to 8.5 per cent in June 1997 and from 57.8 to 11.9 per cent in March 1998. However, most
offices have combined indigenous breach rates within a much narrower range than this;
29 of the offices had rates in June 1997 of between 17 per cent and 29 per cent and 26 had
gross rates in March 1998 of between 30 per cent and 41 per cent. 
Table 3.2c adjusts the March 1998 data set by removing breaches subsequently
overturned by original decision makers, thereby producing net rather than gross breach
rates for local/regional offices. The range of combined indigenous breach rates across
offices is still wide, from 51.6 per cent to 8.8 per cent. But again, most offices have breach
rates in a much narrower band, with 23 offices in Table 3.2c having combined indigenous
breach rates of between 20 and 30 per cent.
Further examination of Tables 3.2a–c reveals some interesting patterns in the ordering of
these Centrelink offices by their combined indigenous breach rate. A group of Western
Australian offices, covering both rural/remote and urban areas, comes out consistently
near the top of the order with the highest indigenous breach rates.10 A group of Northern
Territory offices comes out consistently at the bottom of the order with the lowest
indigenous breach rates and with indigenous breach rates which are as low as, or even
lower than, their non-identifier breach rates. One Northern Territory office however,
Tennant Creek, has high indigenous breach rates. Towards the bottoms of these tables,
there also seems to be another cluster of offices in country New South Wales with
relatively low indigenous breach rates.11 These patterns begged explanation and made it
imperative that some Western Australian, country New South Wales and Northern
Territory offices, including Tennant Creek, were included in locality visits and
discussion sessions. 
In the middle of Tables 3.2a–c between these Western Australian, country New South
Wales and Northern Territory clusters, there are a wide range of Centrelink offices
covering urban, rural and remote sparsely settled areas of Australia. Almost all these
offices have higher breach rates among indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers, as can
be seen from the indigenous minus non-identifier breach rate difference figures in the far
right column. However, a few offices have indigenous and non-identifier breach rates
that are more nearly equal. This suggested that locality visits and discussion sessions
ought to cover urban, rural and sparsely settled remote areas, a range of States and
Territories, and some offices where indigenous and non-identifier breach rate were more
nearly equal as well as some where they were significantly different. What follows is an
analysis of the local/regional statistics, in light of the locality visits. The analysis raises
some specific issues canvassed in discussion sessions, though the task of more
comprehensively reviewing such issues is deferred until Chapter 5.
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The Northern Territory offices
The low indigenous breach rates of the group of Northern Territory offices at the bottoms
of Tables 3.2a–c would appear to be built on a number of things, some of which are evident
from the tables and some of which are not. First, it should be noted from the second
column from the right in these tables that the proportions of unemployment clientele who
identify as indigenous in these Northern Territory offices are high, in some cases over
50 per cent. Issues relating to indigenous people loom large within the Northern Territory
social security administration in a way which is not the case in many other areas. The
Northern Territory social security administration has a long and proud tradition of
promoting issues relating to indigenous people within DSS, often in the process
confronting the Department’s central office with issues about the workability and
appropriateness of rules and procedures in relation to the indigenous portion of the
clientele (see DSS 1978; Sanders 1987; DSS 1990). Nowadays, the Northern Territory social
security administration also has a strong consciousness of s.1296 of the Social Security Act,
which was added at the time of a major legislative re-write in 1991. This section states that
in administering the Act, the Secretary is to have regard to, among other things, ‘the need
to be responsive to Aboriginality and to cultural and linguistic diversity’.12 The Northern
Territory administration sees this provision as both legitimating and as calling for an
empathetic approach to issues relating to indigenous people.
The Northern Territory social security administration also has a tradition of developing
non-standard procedures in order to cope with indigenous servicing issues. In the 1970s,
for example, when unemployment benefit first began to be paid to indigenous people in
remote areas (see Sanders 1985), the Northern Territory social security administration
devised a separate non-positive-stimulus procedure for reviewing remote area recipients,
known as UBNT. Although this procedure has now disappeared, its legacy may well be
evident in the second statistic about Northern Territory offices that can be read from the
third column from the right in Tables 3.2a–c. This is the much higher than usual
exemption rate from the activity test among indigenous identifiers; up to 40 per cent or
even 70 per cent compared to generally less than 10 per cent elsewhere. 
This rate of exemption is built on provisions of the Social Security Act relating to how
the activity test may be satisfied in remote localities where there are no locally accessible
labour markets, labour market programs or vocational training courses. S.603(2) states
that where a ‘person’ is ‘present’ in such an area during the period for which payment is
being sought and:
…having regard to all relevant factors, including:
(i) the location of offices of the Department; and
(ii) difficulties with transport and communication: and
(iii) the educational and cultural background of the person; 
it would be unreasonable to expect the person to comply with the activity test in
order to be qualified for Newstart Allowance for that period…then, unless the
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person has been notified of a requirement under subsection 601(2) in relation to the
period, then the person is taken to comply with the activity test during that period. 
The Northern Territory social security administration appears to use these remote locality
provisions far more extensively than elsewhere and effectively exempts from the activity
test large numbers of people outside the Northern Territory’s main urban centres.
Northern Territory offices have separate regional office codes for the remote area portion
of their clientele (see far left column of tables) and they issue a different application form
for continuation of unemployment payments in these areas; an RA1 rather than an SU19.
Unlike the SU19, the RA1 does not ask recipients for the names of two employers that
they have contacted seeking employment during the period for which continuation of
payment is being claimed. 
These higher exemption rates from the activity test granted under 603(2) would seem to
underpin the lower indigenous breach rates of the Northern Territory offices. Indeed, the
third statistic to note from the far right hand columns of Tables 3.2a–c is that the
Northern Territory offices at the bottoms of these tables actually have lower indigenous
breach rates than non-identifier breach rates. This occurs only very occasionally outside
the Northern Territory (see difference figures for other offices in far right columns).
Tennant Creek office and the issue of leaving CDEP
The Tennant Creek Centrelink office stands out clearly from the other Northern Territory
offices as having a much higher indigenous breach rate, being placed towards the tops of
Tables 3.2a–c. Investigation of why this might be pointed to the issue of leaving the
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme as a possible source of
activity test breaching. 
CDEP is an indigenous-specific employment creation program which was devised in the
mid-1970s as an alternative to making large numbers of unemployment payments to
Aboriginal people in remote communities where there was very little work available.
From the mid 1980s, the scheme was extended to non-remote Aboriginal communities. 
Until early 1998, DSS guidelines treated people leaving CDEP and applying for
unemployment payments as if they were leaving any other form of employment. This
could lead to any one of three eligibility outcomes:
i. If the cessation of employment was judged to be for ‘compelling personal reasons’
and the normal unemployment payments eligibility criteria were met, then the
person would be eligible. 
ii. If the cessation of employment was not judged to be for ‘compelling personal
reasons’ and suitable work on the CDEP was still available, then the person would
be ineligible for unemployment payment. As the guidelines put it, an ‘individual is
expected to participate in CDEP’. 
iii. If the cessation of employment was not judged to be for ‘compelling personal
reasons’ but suitable work on the CDEP was not still available (perhaps because
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someone else in the community had taken up the vacant place on the CDEP or the
place had been reassigned to another community), then the person would be judged
eligible for unemployment payment, but may have an activity test breach imposed
for contributing to their own unemployment.13
The one concession that was made to the rather different status of CDEP employment in
these guidelines was that where CDEP wages were less than what the participant’s
unemployment payments entitlement would be, the client could withdraw from the
CDEP and claim unemployment payments.14
During early 1998, in consultation with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Commission
(ATSIC), these guidelines for DSS’s treatment of CDEP participants were changed. A
distinction was introduced between participants who left CDEP during, as opposed to at
the end of, a quarterly funding period. The latter could become eligible for
unemployment payments without having to demonstrate ‘compelling personal reasons’
for leaving and without an activity test breach being imposed. The former, on the other
hand and with some exceptions, would still have to demonstrate compelling personal
reasons for leaving CDEP employment in order to gain unemployment payments
eligibility and could also still have an activity test breach imposed.15
Locality visits for this research covered the time when these new guidelines were
introduced. However, even by the last of the locality visits, there seemed little if any
awareness within Centrelink offices of the new guidelines and the new distinction within
them between those leaving CDEP during and at the end of a quarterly funding period.
Assessments of the eligibility for unemployment payments of people leaving CDEP
appeared to be continuing as under the old guidelines, and certainly these were the
guidelines in place when the breaching recorded in the June 1997 and March 1998 data
sets was occurring.
In the Tennant Creek Centrelink office there seemed to be a tendency to treat people
leaving CDEP under the third possible course of action outlined above; that is, to grant
them eligibility for unemployment payments while imposing an activity test breach for
contributing to their own unemployment. The adoption of this course of action as
predominant office practice had the effect of pushing up the activity test breach rate
among indigenous identifiers, since there was quite a lot of coming and going from CDEP
in the Tennant Creek area. Another issue was that CDEPs in the Tennant Creek area were
generally under-subscribed and that those running them did not want Centrelink to be
too easy on people leaving CDEP. However, Centrelink also recognised that there were
reasons why applicants might not want to work on CDEP and might legitimately regard
CDEP work as unsuitable, even if places were available. 
Elsewhere in the Northern Territory, and in a number of other Centrelink offices, staff
had a slightly different approach to people leaving CDEP employment. In these offices,
staff were conscious of the fact that CDEP is subject to a multiple entitlement exclusion
in relation to Newstart Allowance at s.614A of the Social Security Act, making it appear
an alternative form of Commonwealth income support. In light of this, staff were more
inclined to find that applicants did, in fact, have ‘compelling personal reasons’ for leaving
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CDEP and hence would grant eligibility without imposing an activity test breach; that is
possibility (i), above. The adoption of this course of action as predominant office practice
would mean that CDEP leavers were not contributing at all to activity test breach rates
among indigenous identifiers. A 1997 review of the CDEP scheme noted and was critical
of this regional variation in social security administration in relation to CDEP
(Spicer 1997: 8).
Whether all of Tennant Creek’s higher indigenous breach rate in comparison to the other
Northern Territory offices can be explained by this issue of how it treated those leaving
CDEP under the old guidelines must remain an open question. It is possible that other
factors also came into play, such as a slightly less empathetic attitude towards indigenous
clients among key decision making staff. But, with the issue of leaving CDEP removed,
the differential between indigenous breach rates in the Tennant Creek office and other
Northern Territory offices would certainly have been greatly reduced. Perhaps of more
importance now, is bringing the new guidelines for the treatment of unemployment
payment applicants who have left CDEP to the attention of all Centrelink offices affected
by the scheme, as they were clearly not being acted on even towards the end of the
locality visits.
The Western Australian and country New South Wales offices and 
ordering by non-identifier breach rates
The Western Australian and New South Wales country clusters of offices at the tops and
near the bottoms of Tables 3.2a–c are not so easily understood or explained as the
Northern Territory group of offices. They appear to be generally just higher and lower
breaching offices than the average, and to be so in relation to both indigenous and non-
indigenous recipients. This latter point can be seen from Tables 3.3a–c which reorder the
offices in the previous three tables by the combined breach rates of their non-identifier
clientele. The country New South Wales offices stay near the bottoms of these tables,
while the Western Australian offices stay near the tops. In Table 3.3a, five out of nine
Centrelink offices with combined non-identifier breach rates above 20 per cent are in
Western Australia,16 while six out of eight offices with combined non-identifier breach
rates below 10 per cent are in country New South Wales. In Table 3.3b, five out of seven
offices with combined non-identifier breach rates above 30 per cent are in Western
Australia, while eight out of 11 offices with combined non-identifier breach rates below
18 per cent are in country New South Wales. In Table 3.3c, Western Australia accounts
for four out of ten offices with combined non-identifier breach rates above 22 per cent,
while country New South Wales accounts for eight out of 11 offices with combined non-
identifier breach rates below 13 per cent. 
The biggest change which is apparent through the reordering by non-identifier breach
rates in Tables 3.3a–c is the dispersal of the Northern Territory offices away from the
bottoms of the tables up towards the tops. These Northern Territory offices appear to
have quite high non-identifier breach rates, combined with low indigenous breach rates.
This frequently leads to the difference between indigenous and non-identifier breach
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rates in these offices being negative; a pattern which, as already noted, is only rarely the
case elsewhere (see far right column of tables). This aspect of Northern Territory office
breach rates will be returned to in the next chapter. 
Small local satellite offices
Among the almost 50 Centrelink offices with more than 200 indigenous identifying
unemployment payment recipients there are a number of small local offices which operate
as satellites of larger regional offices. It is notable in Tables 3.2a–c and 3.3a–c that these
small satellite offices, designated with a DO, are over-represented at the tops and bottoms
of these tables where variations in breach rates from the average are more pronounced.17
In Table 3.2a, which contains 11 DOs and 39 larger ROs, six of the top seven offices
ordered by combined indigenous breach rate are DOs. In Table 3.3a, which reorders these
50 offices by non-identifier breach rates, these same six DOs occur in the top 11 offices.
In Table 3.2b, with nine DOs and 40 ROs, five of the top 14 offices with combined
indigenous breach rates above 41 per cent are DOs and three of the bottom nine offices
with combined indigenous breach rates below 30 per cent are DOs, leaving just one DO
in the middle 26 offices. In Table 3.2c, which re-orders these 49 offices by net indigenous
breach rates, four of the top five and five of the top nine offices are DOs and three of the
bottom 14 offices are DOs, again leaving just one DO in the middle 26 offices. In Tables
3.3b and 3.3c, three of the top four and four of the top ten and 11 offices, respectively,
are DOs and two of the bottom seven offices are DOs. 
This tendency for small satellite offices to be at the tops and bottoms of tables ordering
regional and local offices by breach rates is, to some extent, to be expected simply on
mathematical grounds. Small units in any mathematical distribution tend to display
greater variation than larger units. In this specific context, small office breach statistics
reflect the practices and judgements of just one or two unemployment payment decision
makers, whereas the statistics of larger offices average the practices and judgements of
perhaps ten or more unemployment payment decision makers. Hence, a degree of
individual variation is lost in larger offices’ statistics, but not in smaller offices’ statistics.
Beyond the simple mathematics of smaller unit size, it also became evident during locality
visits that there were at least two different patterns of small office operations within the
unemployment payments area. One pattern involved small office staff assessing initial
unemployment payment applications and doing basic continuation decision making, but
leaving more major compliance and review work to regional office staff. This pattern of
operations raised the issue of where precisely, in the administrative processes, breaching
was occurring and whether it was in fact the associated regional office which was
contributing to, and largely determining, local satellite office breach rates. The other
pattern of operations involved local office staff taking fuller responsibility for compliance
and review work and hence contributing more fully and more clearly to their own office
breach rates. The clearest example of this latter pattern of operations was in Normanton,
Queensland, which had a quite unusual breach rate pattern. 
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The Normanton office administrative breach rate for indigenous identifiers is quite close
to the administrative breach rate for non-identifiers. In June 1997, it was 2.9 per cent
above and in March 1998, it was 0.1 per cent below the gross non-identifier breach rate
and 2.7 per cent above the net non-identifier breach rate. This lack of any great difference
seemed explicable in terms of a small office which knew both its indigenous and non-
identifying unemployment payments clients fairly closely and was able to keep a track of
both equally well. Normanton’s activity test breach rates were not, however, so similar
between indigenous and non-identifiers. As in Tennant Creek and some other small
offices with high activity test breach rates among indigenous identifiers, this may have
been related in part to indigenous people leaving CDEP incurring activity test breaches. 
Local/regional Torres Strait Islander analysis
Early in Chapter 2, it was noted that Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal identifier
breach rates appeared roughly similar at the national level, although Islanders did appear
to have slightly higher breach rates at the single breach level and a significantly lower
activity test exemption rate. These findings suggest that it may be useful to do some local/
regional analysis of Torres Strait Islander breach rates in areas where Islanders are known
to be concentrated.
Tables 3.4a–c give breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics from the
June 1997 and March 1998 data sets for eight Centrelink offices in north Queensland with
more than 40 Torres Strait Islander identifying unemployment payment customers. The
tables are broken down into Torres Strait Islander identifiers, Aboriginal identifiers and
non-identifiers, and are ordered by combined Torres Strait Islander breach rates.
Table 3.4a includes 1,333 Torres Strait Islander identifiers from a national total of 2,194
in the June 1997 data set (60.8 per cent), while Tables 3.2b and 3.2c include 1,289 Torres
Strait Islander identifiers from a national total of 2,280 in the March 1998 data set
(56.6 per cent). The far right columns of the tables give difference figures between Torres
Strait Islander and Aboriginal activity test and administrative breach rates, not
indigenous minus non-indigenous differences.
It is notable that the Thursday Island office, where Torres Strait Islander identifiers
constitute almost two-thirds of the unemployment payments clientele, is consistently the
lowest breaching of these eight north Queensland offices for Torres Strait Islander
identifiers. It appears at the bottom of all three tables. Many of the other offices, where
Torres Strait Islanders constitute much smaller shares of total office customers (see second
column from right), have significantly higher Torres Strait Islander breach rates. This is
somewhat like the Northern Territory phenomenon in relation to Aboriginal identifiers.
The Thursday Island office is conscious that Torres Strait Islanders are a large proportion
of its unemployment payment customers and is reasonably understanding of, and
sympathetic to, the difficulties they experience in negotiating unemployment payments
administration.
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This understanding and sympathy does not, however, in the Thursday Island office,
extend to granting large-scale exemption from the activity test on grounds of remoteness;
despite the fact that the Thursday Island is itself, at one level, remote, and that a
significant portion of the unemployment payments clientele live in still more remote
island communities. The Thursday Island office appears to have a rather low activity test
exemption rate for all its customers. Given that the Thursday Island office accounts for
almost one-sixth of all Torres Strait Islander identifiers in the national unemployment
payments database, this may well go some way towards explaining the lower national
activity test exemption figure for Torres Strait Islander identifiers noted in Tables 2.4a
and 2.4b.
The other seven north Queensland areas show a variety of activity test exemption rates
for Torres Strait Islander identifiers which do not differ in any consistent way from those
for either Aboriginal identifiers or non-identifiers in the same area.
It is also notable, from the far right columns of Tables 3.4a–c, that Torres Strait Islander
identifier breach rates in these north Queensland areas do appear generally to be a little
bit higher than for Aboriginal identifiers in the same office area. Only three or four of the
16 difference figures in these far right columns of the three tables are negative, rather
than positive, and the positive differences tend to be larger than the few negative
differences. Given the small numbers of customers involved, however, these figures may
not be of any great statistical significance.
Summary of major findings
Major findings of the local/regional statistical analysis of Centrelink offices with more
than 200 indigenous identifying unemployment payment customers may be summarised
as follows:
• Northern Territory offices, except for Tennant Creek, stand out as having low
indigenous breach rates built on high activity test exemption rates. These Northern
Territory offices often have lower breach rates among indigenous identifiers than
non-identifiers, a pattern which is extremely rare elsewhere.
• Some Western Australian offices stand out as having high breach rates among both
indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, while some country New South Wales
offices stand out as having low breach rates among both indigenous identifiers and
non-identifiers.
• The Thursday Island office does seem to have fairly low breach rates for Torres
Strait Islander identifiers, but also rather low activity test exemption rates. This
latter may help explain the low national activity test exemption rate for Torres Strait
Islander identifiers.
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4. State/Territory and urban/rural 
statistical analysis
Given the rather different findings of the national statistical analysis in Chapter 2 and the
local/regional statistical analysis in Chapter 3, it seemed advisable to also carry out some
intermediate State/Territory and urban/rural statistical analysis. Would State/Territory
breach rates and activity test exemption rates be close to the national average, or would
they reflect the greater diversity of statistics evident among the clusters of offices
identified in the local/regional analysis? Do breach rates in urban and rural areas differ?
These are the questions that this chapter seeks to address by engaging in some analysis
of the data sets broken down by State/Territory and by urban/rural areas.
National averages, local/regional office clusters and State/Territory analysis
Tables 4.1a–c present breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics by
State/Territory, along with the Australian total. Some significant variations from the
national averages are evident, particularly for the Northern Territory but also for other
States/Territories. In some instances these variations can be related to the office clusters
observed in the local/regional analysis, but in other instances they cannot.
The Northern Territory statistics in Tables 4.1a–c are clearly very different from the
national averages. The Northern Territory stands out as being the only State or Territory
where indigenous breach rates are significantly lower, rather than higher, than non-
identifier breach rates (see difference figures in far right column). It also stands out as
having a much higher than national average activity test exemption rate among its
indigenous identifying unemployment payments clientele; 39.6 per cent compared to
15.1 per cent in June 1997 and 58.3 per cent compared to 18.9 per cent in March 1998 (see
third column from right). However, this is not the case among its non-identifying
clientele, which had an activity test exemption rate of 10.0 per cent compared to 11.6 per
cent national average in June 1997 and 12.7 per cent compared to 11.6 per cent in March
1998 (again see third column from right). Finally, The Northern Territory stands out as
having up towards half of its unemployment payments clientele identifying as
indigenous, whereas no other State or Territory has above 5 per cent (see customer share
figures in second column from right).
This degree of difference in Northern Territory statistics from the national averages
could, to some extent, have been anticipated from the cluster of Northern Territory
offices at the bottoms of the tables in the local/regional analysis. What was not evident
from the local/regional analysis was that the Northern Territory would come out as
having the highest non-identifier breach rates of any State or Territory, together with the
lowest indigenous identifier breach rates. This unanticipated finding of the State/
Territory analysis can, like the greater variability of small local satellite office statistics
discussed in Chapter 3, to some extent be explained mathematically. The Northern
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Territory is a very small unit within the national unemployment payments distribution,
accounting for less than 2 per cent of the total clientele, and can as such vary much more
from the national average than larger units. 
However, the Northern Territory’s high non-identifier breach rates are more than just a
mathematical artefact and do raise some important substantive issues. One Centrelink
officer in a Northern Territory discussion session expressed concern that, by effectively
exempting large numbers of mainly indigenous people in remote areas from the activity
test and by attempting to apply the activity test appropriately to indigenous people in
urban areas, the Northern Territory offices may be coming down hard on the non-
indentifying half of their clientele in order to meet certain compliance and review targets.
This, they argued, may be contributing to the Northern Territory’s high non-identifier
breach rates. This raises issues about how targets for compliance and review work are set
nationally and whether they can, or should, be adjusted in the light of specific, known
local/regional or State/Territory conditions. 
One other unanticipated finding of the State/Territory analysis is that the supposed
national pattern of higher activity test exemption rates among indigenous identifiers,
compared to non-identifiers, is not in fact a pattern at all outside the Northern Territory.
None of the other States or Territories have higher activity test exemption rates among
indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers and indeed by March 1998 some seemed to be
developing considerably lower activity test exemption rates among indigenous
identifiers than non-identifiers (compare third column from right in Table 4.1a with that
in Tables 4.1b and 4.1c). The Northern Territory’s activity test exemption practices for
remote areas drive up the national average activity test exemption rate for indigenous
identifiers and make comparison with national non-identifier activity test exemption
rates quite misleading.
The Western Australian cluster of offices evident in the local/regional statistical analysis,
with high indigenous and non-identifier breach rates in comparison to offices elsewhere,
seems to be reinforced as a discernable pattern in the State/Territory analysis. Western
Australia consistently has the highest indigenous identifier breach rates of any State or
Territory in Tables 4.1a–c and, behind the Northern Territory, consistently has the
second highest non-identifier breach rates. What is perhaps most striking within these
generally high Western Australian breach rates is the very high administrative breach
rates among the indigenous clientele in comparison to the non-identifier clientele. The
Western Australian administrative breach rate difference figures of 9.5 per cent, 15.4 per
cent and 9.0 per cent in the far right columns of Tables 4.1a–c respectively, are clearly
and consistently the highest figures in these columns. It is in administrative breaching,
rather than activity test breaching, that Western Australia stands out from the other
States and Territories as a higher breacher of indigenous identifiers; though South
Australia is not far behind.
The pattern evident in the local/regional statistical analysis of some country New South
Wales offices having relatively low indigenous and non-identifier breach rates in
comparison to offices elsewhere, is not at all borne out by this State/Territory analysis.
As a State, New South Wales sits fairly consistently in the middle of the State/Territory
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breach rate ranges, close to the national average. To some extent, again, this can be
explained mathematically. New South Wales is a large unit within the national
unemployment payments distribution, contributing about one-third of the total clientele.
As such, New South Wales contributes very significantly to the national average and,
unlike smaller units, cannot logically diverge too far from that average.
There may, however, be more to the New South Wales State statistics not reflecting the
findings of the local/regional analysis in the previous chapter than just mathematics. If
we return to Tables 3.2a–c and Tables 3.3a–c, it is evident that as well as there being a
cluster of country New South Wales offices towards the bottoms of these tables with
relatively low indigenous and non-identifier breach rates, there are also a number of both
country and city New South Wales offices further up the tables with higher indigenous
and non-identifier breach rates. Four New South Wales offices, Bourke, Dubbo, Moree
and Mt Druitt, are consistently in the top one-third to one-half of those local/regional
office tables. The country New South Wales pattern is not, therefore, so clear and indeed
there may be an argument to be made that it is more a coastal New South Wales pattern.
The low breaching New South Wales offices towards the bottoms of these local/regional
tables are predominantly coastal country areas, such as Nowra, Kempsey, Taree and
Casino. They are sometimes joined near the bottoms of these tables by some more inland
New South Wales country offices, such as Armidale, Wagga, Walgett, and in particular
Broken Hill.18 They are also sometimes joined by the inner urban Redfern office. But there
are, as we have now noted, other New South Wales inland country and urban offices
further up these tables which effect the State average. What is notable is that there are no
coastal country New South Wales offices in the tops of these tables. The New South Wales
local/regional pattern would seem, therefore, to be more precisely specified as a tendency
towards lower indigenous and non-identifier breach rates in coastal country areas. Inland
country offices and urban offices in New South Wales would seem, by contrast, to spread
across the range of both indigenous and non-identifier breach rates. 
It can also be noted, in passing, that in these lower breaching New South Wales coastal
areas, indigenous identifiers are consistently a small proportion of the total local/regional
unemployment clientele (see second column from right in Tables 3.2a–c and 3.3a–c). In
higher breaching inland New South Wales areas, like Dubbo and Bourke, the proportion
of the unemployment payments clientele identifying as indigenous is somewhat higher. 
Urban/rural State/Territory analysis
Using postcode and address information, DSS has some capacity to divide its clientele into
urban and rural categories of residence as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Tables 4.2a–c give breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics for this
urban/rural breakdown, Australia wide. The process divides the non-identifying
unemployment payment recipients in the two data sets into roughly 700,000 urban
dwellers and 500,000 rural dwellers. Among indigenous identifiers, however, the
proportions of the split are markedly different, with roughly 9,000 in urban areas and
30,000 in rural areas (see second column from right in Tables 4.2a–c).
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These tables seem to suggest that urban breach rates may be slightly higher than rural
breach rates, both among indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, and that activity test
exemption rates may be higher among indigenous identifying rural residents. They also
seem to suggest that indigenous breach rates are significantly higher than non-identifier
breach rates across both urban and rural areas; all the indigenous minus non-identifier
difference figures in the far right columns of the tables are positive. However, given what
has already been revealed about diversity of statistics among local/regional offices and
among States and Territories in both activity test exemption rates and breach rates, it may
be prudent to break down these urban/rural figures by State and Territory before
attempting any further analysis.
Tables 4.3a–c give breach rates and activity test exemption rates by urban and rural
categories within each State/Territory. It is evident from all three tables that indigenous
identifier breach rates are significantly and consistently higher than non-identifier breach
rates across urban and rural categories in all State and Territories, except the Northern
Territory (see indigenous minus non-identifier difference figures in far right columns).19
In Northern Territory rural areas, the reverse is the case; non-identifier breach rates are
significantly and consistently higher than indigenous breach rates. While in Northern
Territory urban areas, indigenous and non-identifier breach rates are close to equal.
It is also evident from the Tables 4.3a–c that the urban/rural differences in breach and
activity test exemption rates, which seemed to be suggested at the national level in Tables
4.2a–c, are not in fact national patterns at all. Rather, there are State and Territory specific
patterns. New South Wales is the only State, which shows any evidence of consistently
higher urban than rural breach rates among both its indigenous and non-identifying
clienteles. Other States have generally similar urban and rural breach rates among
indigenous and non-identifying clienteles, with some variability away from similarity
evident in both directions. The Northern Territory has higher urban than rural breach
rates among indigenous identifiers. This is driven, to some extent, by large-scale
exemption from the activity test of indigenous people in remote Northern Territory
localities; 44.2 per cent in June 1997 and 63.9 per cent in March 1998. However, even in
the Northern Territory’s urban areas, activity test exemption rates among indigenous
people were becoming well above the national average by March 1998; 24.3 per cent
compared to 11.3 per cent (see Tables 4.3b and 4.3c for the first and Tables 4.2b and 4.2c
for the second of these figures). The Northern Territory’s urban and rural breach rates
among the non-identifying clientele are close to equal.
State/Territory urban/rural Torres Strait Islander analysis
Tables 4.4a–c give breach, activity test exemption and total customer statistics broken
down into Torres Strait Islander identifiers, Aboriginal identifiers and non-identifiers
by Queensland and other States and Territories combined and by area of residence. 
It is notable that by far the majority of Torres Strait Islander identifying customers are
in Queensland; 1,739 compared to 455 in the combined other States and Territories in
June 1997 (79.3 per cent) and 1,775 compared to 505 in March 1998 (77.9 per cent). It is
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also notable that around 1,500 of these Torres Strait Islander unemployment payment
customers in Queensland are categorised as resident in rural areas, leaving only about
230 categorised as in urban areas. This is quite different from the rural/urban division
of Torres Strait Islander identifying unemployment payment customers in the other
States and Territories combined, which is closer to half/half, albeit on the basis of much
smaller numbers.
In relation to breach rates and activity test exemption rates, the Queensland figures
reinforce the findings of the local/regional analysis involving individual north
Queensland offices. Torres Strait Islander breach rates across Queensland do seem to be
just slightly higher than Aboriginal identifier breach rates. This can be read from the far
right columns of Tables 4.4a–c, which again give Torres Strait Islander minus Aboriginal
identifier breach rate difference figures, rather than indigenous minus non-identifier.
Sixteen of these 18 difference figures for urban, rural and all residential areas in
Queensland are positive and only one is negative. Also Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander activity test exemption rates across Queensland urban and rural areas of
residence do not seem to differ in any consistent way. This again reinforces the local/
regional North Queensland analysis, which suggested that one reason for a low activity
test exemption rate among Torres Strait Islanders nationally may be the contribution of
the Thursday Island office as a relatively low area for activity test exemptions. Another
reason Torres Strait Islander identifiers may have low activity test exemption rates in
comparison to Aboriginal identifiers in the national statistics given in Chapter 2 is that
they are under-represented compared to Aboriginal identifiers in the high activity test
exemption jurisdiction of the Northern Territory.
Outside Queensland, among the relatively small numbers of Torres Strait Islander
identifying unemployment payment customers in other States and Territories, breach
and activity test exemption rates in comparison to those of Aboriginal identifiers look
somewhat different. Breach rates seem, if anything, to be slightly lower among Torres
Strait Islander identifiers than Aboriginal identifiers (see breach rate difference figures
far right column, all 18 of which are negative). Activity test exemption rates seem to be
slightly higher among Torres Strait Islanders than among Aboriginal identifiers for urban
areas in the other States and Territories, though perhaps not significantly; 14.0 per cent
compared to 10.1 per cent in June 1997 and 13.5 per cent compared to 11.9 per cent in
March 1998. In rural areas in these other States and Territories combined, activity test
exemption rates among Torres Strait Islanders are significantly lower than among
Aboriginal identifiers; 9.2 per cent compared to 21.1 per cent in June 1997 and 12.6 per
cent compared to 27.5 per cent in March 1998. This last probably again reflects the
under-representation of Torres Strait Islander identifiers in Northern Territory rural
areas, which contribute so significantly to the higher national Aboriginal identifier
activity test exemption rates.
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Summary of major findings
The major findings of this State/Territory and urban/rural statistical analysis can be
summarised as follows:
• A Northern Territory pattern of low indigenous breach rates, built on high activity
test exemption rates, and high non-indigenous breach rates is discerned.
• A Western Australian pattern of high indigenous and non-indigenous breach rates
is confirmed.
• The New South Wales pattern of low indigenous and non-indigenous breach rates
for some country offices suggested in the local/regional analysis is not confirmed. It
is refined to be seen more as a coastal country area pattern.
• Through urban/rural analysis, the Northern Territory’s pattern is refined to be seen
as one of lower breach rates and higher activity test exemption rates among
indigenous identifiers compared to non-identifiers in rural areas, but of roughly
equal breach rates among indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers in urban areas.
• New South Wales is the only State or Territory which displays any evidence of
significantly higher urban than rural breach rates. 
• All jurisdictions outside the Northern Territory have significantly higher breach
rates among indigenous identifiers compared to non-identifiers across both urban
and rural residential areas.
• Torres Strait Islander identifiers in Queensland seem to have slightly higher breach
rates than Aboriginal identifiers, but this is not related to any significant difference
in activity test exemption rates.
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  79
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
s/
Te
rr
ito
rie
s 
ca
n 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t o
ffi
ce
 c
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
an
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
ito
ry
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.1
a.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
 a
n
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
, 
20
 J
u
n
e 
19
97
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
91
8
9.
9
1,
09
1
11
.8
2,
00
9
21
.7
82
7
8.
9
9,
26
2
2.
4
3.
6
5.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
24
,2
62
6.
3
22
,4
49
5.
9
46
,7
11
12
.2
49
,1
17
12
.8
38
2,
89
3
97
.6
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
20
10
.9
13
7.
1
33
17
.9
21
11
.4
18
4
1.
0
6.
1
2.
7
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
87
4
4.
8
80
9
4.
4
1,
68
3
9.
2
2,
26
6
12
.3
18
,3
77
99
.0
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
12
9
8.
6
15
8
10
.5
28
7
19
.1
15
3
10
.2
1,
50
5
0.
5
3.
6
5.
7
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
15
,3
07
5.
0
14
,8
55
4.
8
30
,1
62
9.
8
34
,9
64
11
.4
30
7,
23
8
99
.5
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
1,
15
9
10
.7
1,
26
3
11
.7
2,
42
2
22
.4
81
0
7.
5
10
,8
36
4.
0
4.
0
6.
3
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
17
,4
97
6.
7
13
,9
34
5.
3
31
,4
31
12
.1
29
,6
04
11
.4
26
0,
68
3
96
.0
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
49
9
5.
7
52
8
6.
1
1,
02
7
11
.8
3,
44
0
39
.6
8,
69
1
44
.0
–3
.5
–3
.1
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
02
5
9.
3
1,
01
7
9.
2
2,
04
2
18
.5
1,
10
1
10
.0
11
,0
51
56
.0
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
18
7
9.
3
24
1
12
.0
42
8
21
.3
14
7
7.
3
2,
00
9
1.
8
3.
8
7.
4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
6,
19
0
5.
5
5,
18
6
4.
6
11
,3
76
10
.1
11
,6
73
10
.4
11
2,
59
8
98
.2
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
62
0
11
.2
89
1
16
.1
1,
51
1
27
.3
40
1
7.
2
5,
54
4
4.
7
4.
2
9.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
7,
74
5
6.
9
7,
30
7
6.
5
15
,0
52
13
.5
12
,5
65
11
.3
11
1,
56
7
95
.3
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
34
5.
1
46
6.
9
80
12
.0
57
8.
5
66
7
1.
7
1.
1
2.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
57
1
4.
0
1,
58
5
4.
0
3,
15
6
8.
0
3,
35
8
8.
5
39
,5
39
98
.3
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
3,
56
6
9.
2
4,
23
2
10
.9
7,
79
8
20
.2
5,
85
6
15
.1
38
,6
99
3.
0
3.
2
5.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
74
,4
73
6.
0
67
,1
48
5.
4
14
1,
62
1
11
.4
14
4,
65
2
11
.6
1,
24
3,
99
2
97
.0
80 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
s/
Te
rr
ito
rie
s 
ca
n 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t o
ffi
ce
 c
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
an
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
ito
ry
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.1
b
.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
 a
n
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
, 
20
 M
ar
ch
 1
99
8
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
1,
37
7
14
.5
2,
11
0
22
.2
3,
48
7
36
.6
81
7
8.
6
9,
51
9
2.
5
5.
8
11
.1
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
31
,7
67
8.
7
40
,6
37
11
.1
72
,4
04
19
.7
45
,1
43
12
.3
36
6,
78
3
97
.5
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
23
12
.5
28
15
.2
51
27
.7
18
9.
8
18
4
1.
1
5.
9
6.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
05
4
6.
6
1,
33
5
8.
3
2,
38
9
14
.9
1,
82
9
11
.4
16
,0
48
98
.9
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
22
5
14
.5
34
3
22
.1
56
8
36
.5
13
3
8.
6
1,
55
5
0.
5
6.
9
12
.2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
22
,2
24
7.
6
29
,0
26
9.
9
51
,2
50
17
.4
33
,3
96
11
.4
29
3,
80
9
99
.5
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
1,
72
3
15
.7
2,
30
4
21
.0
4,
02
7
36
.7
81
9
7.
5
10
,9
84
4.
2
5.
5
10
.9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
25
,8
32
10
.2
25
,4
08
10
.1
51
,2
40
20
.3
30
,1
81
11
.9
25
2,
62
7
95
.8
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
69
0
7.
9
80
1
9.
2
1,
49
1
17
.1
5,
07
5
58
.3
8,
71
1
45
.6
–5
.0
–6
.0
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
33
9
12
.9
1,
58
0
15
.2
2,
91
9
28
.1
1,
32
3
12
.7
10
,3
90
54
.4
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
28
0
13
.0
49
9
23
.2
77
9
36
.1
14
0
6.
5
2,
15
5
2.
0
4.
3
13
.0
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
9,
29
0
8.
7
10
,8
07
10
.1
20
,0
97
18
.8
10
,5
25
9.
9
10
6,
75
9
98
.0
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
88
0
16
.0
1,
54
4
28
.1
2,
42
4
44
.1
38
9
7.
1
5,
49
1
4.
9
4.
8
15
.4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
11
,8
66
11
.2
13
,4
37
12
.7
25
,3
03
24
.0
12
,4
62
11
.8
10
5,
59
2
95
.1
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
65
8.
2
11
8
14
.9
18
3
23
.0
55
6.
9
79
4
2.
0
2.
8
7.
1
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
2,
14
3
5.
4
3,
08
3
7.
8
5,
22
6
13
.2
3,
27
2
8.
2
39
,6
69
98
.0
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
5,
26
3
13
.4
7,
74
7
19
.7
13
,0
10
33
.0
7,
44
6
18
.9
39
,3
93
3.
2
4.
5
9.
2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
10
5,
51
5
8.
9
12
5,
31
3
10
.5
23
0,
82
8
19
.4
13
8,
13
1
11
.6
1,
19
1,
67
7
96
.8
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  81
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
s/
Te
rr
ito
rie
s 
ca
n 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t o
ffi
ce
 c
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
an
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
ito
ry
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.1
c.
N
et
 b
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
 a
n
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
, 
20
 M
ar
ch
 1
99
8
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
1,
20
8
12
.7
1,
19
7
12
.6
2,
40
5
25
.3
81
7
8.
6
9,
51
9
2.
5
5.
0
5.
8
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
28
,1
83
7.
7
24
,6
84
6.
7
52
,8
67
14
.4
45
,1
43
12
.3
36
6,
78
3
97
.5
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
19
10
.3
14
7.
6
33
17
.9
18
9.
8
18
4
1.
1
4.
6
2.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
92
1
5.
7
75
6
4.
7
1,
67
7
10
.4
1,
82
9
11
.4
16
,0
48
98
.9
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
18
4
11
.8
17
9
11
.5
36
3
23
.3
13
3
8.
6
1,
55
5
0.
5
5.
2
6.
0
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
19
,5
79
6.
7
16
,2
70
5.
5
35
,8
49
12
.2
33
,3
96
11
.4
29
3,
80
9
99
.5
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
1,
57
7
14
.4
1,
37
7
12
.5
2,
95
4
26
.9
81
9
7.
5
10
,9
84
4.
2
5.
1
6.
4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
23
,4
52
9.
3
15
,5
87
6.
2
39
,0
39
15
.5
30
,1
81
11
.9
25
2,
62
7
95
.8
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
64
0
7.
3
50
3
5.
8
1,
14
3
13
.1
5,
07
5
58
.3
8,
71
1
45
.6
–4
.4
–3
.8
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
21
8
11
.7
99
6
9.
6
2,
21
4
21
.3
1,
32
3
12
.7
10
,3
90
54
.4
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
24
9
11
.6
29
1
13
.5
54
0
25
.1
14
0
6.
5
2,
15
5
2.
0
3.
6
7.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
8,
44
7
7.
9
5,
98
3
5.
6
14
,4
30
13
.5
10
,5
25
9.
9
10
6,
75
9
98
.0
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
77
8
14
.2
91
9
16
.7
1,
69
7
30
.9
38
9
7.
1
5,
49
1
4.
9
4.
2
9.
0
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
10
,5
46
10
.0
8,
20
9
7.
8
18
,7
55
17
.8
12
,4
62
11
.8
10
5,
59
2
95
.1
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
56
7.
1
53
6.
7
10
9
13
.7
55
6.
9
79
4
2.
0
2.
3
2.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
1,
89
8
4.
8
1,
63
8
4.
1
3,
53
6
8.
9
3,
27
2
8.
2
39
,6
69
98
.0
A
us
tr
al
ia
: t
ot
al
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
4,
75
2
12
.1
4,
71
2
12
.0
9,
46
4
24
.0
7,
44
6
18
.9
39
,3
93
3.
2
4.
1
5.
6
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
95
,1
54
8.
0
76
,4
00
6.
4
17
1,
55
4
14
.4
13
8,
13
1
11
.6
1,
19
1,
67
7
96
.8
82 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.2
a.
B
re
ac
h
, 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 t
es
t 
ex
em
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 a
n
d
 u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l 
ar
ea
,
20
 J
u
n
e 
19
97
 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
83
4
9.
7
1,
03
0
12
.0
1,
86
4
21
.7
87
2
10
.2
8,
57
6
0.
7
3.
5
6.
2
Ru
ra
l
2,
63
5
9.
1
3,
11
5
10
.7
5,
75
0
19
.8
4,
87
1
16
.7
29
,1
13
2.
3
3.
3
5.
8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
2,
56
6
6.
6
4,
23
2
10
.9
7,
79
8
20
.2
5,
85
6
15
.1
38
,6
99
3.
0
0.
6
5.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
43
,8
42
6.
2
40
,7
77
5.
8
84
,6
19
12
.0
89
,5
96
12
.7
70
6,
68
0
55
.1
Ru
ra
l
28
,2
62
5.
7
24
,1
49
4.
9
52
,4
11
10
.6
50
,0
16
10
.1
49
3,
35
3
38
.5
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
74
,4
73
6.
0
67
,1
48
5.
4
14
1,
69
3
11
.4
14
4,
65
2
11
.6
1,
24
3,
99
2
97
.0
Ta
b
le
 4
.2
b
.
B
re
ac
h
, 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 t
es
t 
ex
em
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 a
n
d
 u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l 
ar
ea
,
20
 M
ar
ch
 1
99
8
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
1,
25
7
14
.3
2,
11
1
24
.0
3,
36
8
38
.3
99
3
11
.3
8,
79
9
0.
7
5.
2
12
.7
Ru
ra
l
3,
88
8
13
.1
5,
45
2
18
.4
9,
34
0
31
.5
6,
32
2
21
.3
29
,6
81
2.
4
4.
6
8.
9
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
5,
26
3
13
.4
7,
74
7
19
.7
13
,0
10
33
.0
7,
44
6
18
.9
39
,3
93
3.
2
4.
5
9.
2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
60
,9
14
9.
1
75
,3
46
11
.3
13
6,
26
0
20
.4
84
,7
60
12
.7
66
8,
89
3
54
.3
Ru
ra
l
41
,0
24
8.
5
45
,5
34
9.
5
86
,5
58
18
.0
48
,3
39
10
.1
48
0,
16
7
39
.0
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
10
5,
51
5
8.
9
12
5,
31
3
10
.5
23
0,
82
8
19
.4
13
8,
13
1
11
.6
1,
19
1,
67
7
96
.8
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  83
Ta
b
le
 4
.2
c.
N
et
 b
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 a
n
d
 u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a,
20
 M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
1,
06
3
12
.1
1,
13
9
12
.9
2,
20
2
25
.0
99
3
11
.3
8,
79
9
0.
7
4.
0
6.
2
Ru
ra
l
3,
54
3
11
.9
3,
29
0
11
.1
6,
83
3
23
.0
6,
32
2
21
.3
29
,6
81
2.
4
4.
2
5.
6
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
4,
71
1
12
.0
4,
53
3
11
.5
9,
24
4
23
.5
7,
44
6
18
.9
39
,3
93
3.
2
4.
1
5.
3
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
54
,0
31
8.
1
45
,1
08
6.
7
99
,1
39
14
.8
84
,7
60
12
.7
66
8,
89
3
54
.3
Ru
ra
l
36
,9
92
7.
7
26
,4
46
5.
5
63
,4
38
13
.2
48
,3
39
10
.1
48
0,
16
7
39
.0
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
94
,2
44
7.
9
74
,1
23
6.
2
16
8,
36
7
14
.1
13
8,
13
1
11
.6
1,
19
1,
67
7
96
.8
84 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 Ta
b
le
 4
.3
a.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
Ju
n
e 
19
97
  
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
25
7
10
.5
30
2
12
.3
55
9
22
.8
27
7
11
.3
2,
45
5
0.
6
3.
1
5.
1
Ru
ra
l
65
3
9.
8
77
3
11
.6
1,
42
6
21
.3
53
7
8.
0
6,
68
3
1.
7
4.
6
7.
3
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
15
,3
11
7.
4
14
,9
18
7.
2
30
,2
29
14
.6
30
,3
04
14
.6
20
7,
72
4
54
.0
Ru
ra
l
8,
62
4
5.
1
7,
14
1
4.
3
15
,7
65
9.
4
17
,8
63
10
.6
16
8,
04
9
43
.7
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
17
10
.8
13
8.
3
30
19
.1
16
10
.2
15
7
0.
9
6.
2
4.
0
Ru
ra
l
3
13
.0
0
0.
0
3
13
.0
3
13
.0
23
0.
1
7.
4
–5
.3
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
75
4
4.
6
69
3
4.
3
1,
44
7
8.
9
2,
06
1
12
.7
16
,2
55
88
.9
Ru
ra
l
10
5
5.
7
97
5.
3
20
2
11
.0
16
5
9.
0
1,
84
4
10
.1
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
39
8.
4
52
11
.2
91
19
.5
58
12
.5
46
6
0.
2
3.
3
6.
1
Ru
ra
l
88
8.
8
10
4
10
.4
19
2
19
.3
86
8.
6
99
6
0.
3
4.
0
6.
3
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
10
,4
83
5.
1
10
,6
09
5.
1
21
,0
92
10
.2
25
,0
42
12
.1
20
7,
78
0
69
.6
Ru
ra
l
4,
33
4
4.
9
3,
71
5
4.
2
8,
04
9
9.
0
8,
84
2
9.
9
89
,4
46
29
.9
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
18
6
9.
9
21
7
11
.6
40
3
21
.5
19
0
10
.1
1,
87
6
0.
7
3.
5
6.
4
Ru
ra
l
92
7
10
.7
1,
01
8
11
.8
1,
94
5
22
.5
58
6
6.
8
8,
64
0
3.
3
3.
8
6.
3
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
6,
14
5
6.
4
4,
94
2
5.
1
11
,0
87
11
.5
12
,2
81
12
.8
96
,2
01
37
.2
Ru
ra
l
10
,5
54
7.
0
8,
32
7
5.
5
18
,8
81
12
.5
15
,6
28
10
.3
15
1,
63
0
58
.7
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
74
8.
0
83
9.
0
15
7
17
.0
96
10
.4
92
3
5.
1
–1
.2
0.
4
Ru
ra
l
39
9
5.
3
42
0
5.
6
81
9
11
.0
3,
29
8
44
.2
7,
46
9
41
.2
–4
.1
–4
.1
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
52
6
9.
2
49
5
8.
6
1,
02
1
17
.8
52
2
9.
1
5,
72
6
31
.6
Ru
ra
l
38
2
9.
5
39
0
9.
7
77
2
19
.2
48
0
11
.9
4,
02
9
22
.2
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  85
N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 a
nd
 th
e 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
ito
ry
 to
ta
ls
 in
 T
ab
le
 4
.1
a 
ca
n 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
as
 e
ith
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
60
7.
6
93
11
.8
15
3
19
.4
72
9.
1
78
8
0.
7
2.
0
7.
2
Ru
ra
l
12
4
10
.4
14
3
12
.0
26
7
22
.4
73
6.
1
1,
19
0
1.
1
5.
1
7.
3
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
4,
44
0
5.
6
3,
68
6
4.
6
8,
12
6
10
.2
8,
65
8
10
.9
79
,7
17
72
.2
Ru
ra
l
1,
51
9
5.
3
1,
34
2
4.
7
2,
86
1
10
.0
2,
58
3
9.
0
28
,7
00
26
.0
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
19
4
11
.0
26
2
14
.9
45
6
25
.9
14
1
8.
0
1,
76
4
1.
5
4.
2
8.
7
Ru
ra
l
42
0
11
.3
62
4
16
.8
1,
04
4
28
.1
25
5
6.
9
3,
72
2
3.
2
3.
9
9.
1
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
5,
61
5
6.
8
5,
11
7
6.
2
10
,7
32
13
.0
9,
80
2
11
.9
82
,6
89
71
.5
Ru
ra
l
2,
01
8
7.
4
2,
09
2
7.
6
4,
11
0
15
.0
2,
56
6
9.
4
27
,4
21
23
.7
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
7
4.
8
8
5.
4
15
10
.2
22
15
.0
14
7
0.
4
–0
.6
2.
5
Ru
ra
l
21
5.
4
32
8.
2
53
13
.6
33
8.
5
38
9
1.
2
2.
1
3.
5
N
ot
 id
en
t.
U
rb
an
56
6
5.
4
31
1
3.
0
87
7
8.
3
92
2
8.
7
10
,5
47
31
.7
Ru
ra
l
72
6
3.
3
1,
04
5
4.
7
1,
77
1
8.
0
1,
88
9
8.
5
22
,2
31
66
.7
Ta
b
le
 4
.3
a.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
Ju
n
e 
19
97
  (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
86 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 Ta
b
le
 4
.3
b
.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
35
8
14
.6
63
7
25
.9
99
5
40
.5
30
8
12
.5
2,
45
6
0.
7
4.
6
13
.0
Ru
ra
l
1,
00
6
14
.5
1,
44
5
20
.9
2,
45
1
35
.4
49
7
7.
2
6,
92
6
1.
9
7.
3
12
.0
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
19
,3
94
10
.0
25
,2
99
13
.0
44
,6
93
22
.9
27
,5
63
14
.1
19
4,
96
1
52
.8
Ru
ra
l
11
,8
96
7.
2
14
,6
26
8.
9
26
,5
22
16
.1
16
,6
55
10
.1
16
4,
89
8
44
.7
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
22
13
.0
25
14
.8
47
27
.8
17
10
.1
16
9
1.
1
6.
5
6.
5
Ru
ra
l
1
7.
1
3
21
.4
4
28
.6
1
7.
1
14
0.
1
–1
.0
13
.8
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
1,
00
4
6.
5
1,
27
5
8.
3
2,
27
9
14
.8
1,
74
1
11
.3
15
,3
64
95
.9
Ru
ra
l
38
8.
1
36
7.
7
74
15
.8
58
12
.4
46
9
2.
9
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
66
13
.6
11
9
24
.4
18
5
38
.0
47
9.
7
48
7
0.
2
5.
9
14
.0
Ru
ra
l
15
6
15
.2
22
1
21
.5
37
7
36
.7
82
8.
0
1,
02
8
0.
4
7.
8
13
.2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
15
,0
19
7.
6
20
,6
32
10
.5
35
,6
51
18
.1
24
,1
19
12
.3
19
6,
81
1
68
.9
Ru
ra
l
6,
41
5
7.
4
7,
22
3
8.
3
13
,6
38
15
.6
8,
17
2
9.
4
87
,2
60
30
.6
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
28
2
14
.8
45
0
23
.7
73
2
38
.5
17
1
9.
0
1,
90
0
0.
8
4.
9
13
.3
Ru
ra
l
1,
39
8
15
.8
1,
79
1
20
.3
3,
18
9
36
.1
62
0
7.
0
8,
83
2
3.
5
5.
4
10
.5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
9,
24
8
9.
9
9,
70
3
10
.4
18
,9
51
20
.4
12
,4
59
13
.4
93
,1
39
37
.1
Ru
ra
l
15
,3
56
10
.4
14
,4
19
9.
8
29
,7
75
20
.2
16
,0
75
10
.9
14
7,
14
2
58
.6
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
12
6
12
.8
14
0
14
.3
26
6
27
.1
23
8
24
.3
98
1
5.
6
–0
.5
–1
.2
Ru
ra
l
53
0
7.
1
60
7
8.
1
1,
13
7
15
.3
4,
76
6
63
.9
7,
45
4
42
.5
–5
.1
–6
.2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
71
5
13
.3
82
7
15
.4
1,
54
2
28
.8
53
7
10
.0
5,
35
8
30
.6
Ru
ra
l
45
7
12
.2
53
5
14
.3
99
2
26
.5
65
7
17
.6
3,
73
8
21
.3
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  87
N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 a
nd
 S
ta
te
/T
er
rit
or
y 
to
ta
ls
 in
 T
ab
le
 4
.1
b
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t 
p
os
tc
od
es
 t
ha
t 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
10
8
12
.5
19
1
22
.1
29
9
34
.6
70
8.
1
86
5
0.
8
3.
8
11
.8
Ru
ra
l
16
4
13
.1
29
5
23
.5
45
9
36
.6
69
5.
5
1,
25
4
1.
2
4.
3
13
.9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
6,
53
7
8.
7
7,
77
0
10
.3
14
,3
07
19
.0
7,
70
7
10
.2
75
,3
43
71
.8
Ru
ra
l
2,
40
4
8.
8
2,
64
7
9.
6
5,
05
1
18
.4
2,
40
8
8.
8
27
,4
47
26
.2
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
28
2
16
.0
52
7
29
.9
80
9
45
.9
13
0
7.
4
1,
76
1
1.
6
5.
3
18
.1
Ru
ra
l
59
0
16
.0
1,
00
9
27
.4
1,
59
9
43
.4
25
5
6.
9
3,
68
2
3.
4
3.
4
12
.1
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
8,
31
6
10
.8
9,
15
8
11
.8
17
,4
74
22
.6
9,
71
1
12
.6
77
,3
91
70
.6
Ru
ra
l
3,
38
4
12
.6
4,
10
9
15
.3
7,
49
3
28
.0
2,
55
7
9.
5
26
,7
94
24
.4
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
13
7.
2
22
12
.2
35
19
.4
12
6.
7
18
0
0.
5
0.
8
5.
7
Ru
ra
l
43
8.
8
81
16
.5
12
4
25
.3
32
6.
5
49
1
1.
5
4.
0
7.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
68
1
6.
5
68
2
6.
5
1,
36
3
13
.0
92
3
8.
8
10
,5
26
31
.3
Ru
ra
l
1,
07
4
4.
8
1,
93
9
8.
7
3,
01
3
13
.4
1,
75
7
7.
8
22
,4
19
66
.7
Ta
b
le
 4
.3
b
.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
o
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
 (c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
88 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 Ta
b
le
 4
.3
c.
N
et
 b
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 to
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
N
SW
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
30
2
12
.3
34
3
14
.0
64
5
26
.3
30
8
12
.5
2,
45
6
0.
7
3.
5
5.
7
Ru
ra
l
89
5
12
.9
83
9
12
.1
1,
73
4
25
.0
49
7
7.
2
6,
92
6
1.
9
6.
5
7.
2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
17
,1
61
8.
8
16
,1
01
8.
3
33
,2
62
17
.1
27
,5
63
14
.1
19
4,
96
1
52
.8
Ru
ra
l
10
,6
10
6.
4
8,
16
0
4.
9
18
,7
70
11
.4
16
,6
55
10
.1
16
4,
89
8
44
.7
A
C
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
19
11
.2
12
7.
1
31
18
.3
17
10
.1
16
9
1.
1
5.
5
2.
4
Ru
ra
l
0
0.
0
2
14
.3
2
14
.3
1
7.
1
14
0.
1
–7
.2
9.
4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
87
6
5.
7
71
8
4.
7
1,
59
4
10
.4
1,
74
1
11
.3
15
,3
64
95
.9
Ru
ra
l
34
7.
2
23
4.
9
57
12
.2
58
12
.4
46
9
2.
9
Vi
c
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
54
11
.1
61
12
.5
11
5
23
.6
47
9.
7
48
7
0.
2
4.
4
6.
6
Ru
ra
l
12
7
12
.4
11
6
11
.3
24
3
23
.6
82
8.
0
1,
02
8
0.
4
5.
8
6.
7
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
13
,1
40
6.
7
11
,6
06
5.
9
24
,7
46
12
.6
24
,1
19
12
.3
19
6,
81
1
68
.9
Ru
ra
l
5,
75
3
6.
6
4,
03
9
4.
6
9,
79
2
11
.2
8,
17
2
9.
4
87
,2
60
30
.6
Q
ld
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
24
0
12
.6
25
5
13
.4
49
5
26
.1
17
1
9.
0
1,
90
0
0.
8
3.
7
7.
1
Ru
ra
l
1,
29
7
14
.7
1,
08
2
12
.3
2,
37
9
26
.9
62
0
7.
0
8,
83
2
3.
5
5.
2
6.
2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
8,
32
3
8.
9
5,
90
6
6.
3
14
,2
29
15
.3
12
,4
59
13
.4
93
,1
39
37
.1
Ru
ra
l
13
,9
97
9.
5
8,
88
2
6.
0
22
,8
79
15
.5
16
,0
75
1.
1
14
7,
14
2
58
.6
N
T
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
10
5
10
.7
76
7.
7
18
1
18
.5
23
8
24
.3
98
1
5.
6
–1
.4
–1
.8
Ru
ra
l
50
3
6.
7
39
6
5.
3
89
9
12
.1
4,
76
6
63
.9
7,
45
4
42
.5
–4
.3
–4
.1
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
65
0
12
.1
51
2
9.
6
1,
16
2
21
.7
53
7
10
.0
5,
35
8
30
.6
Ru
ra
l
41
2
11
.0
35
3
9.
4
76
5
20
.5
65
7
17
.6
3,
73
8
21
.3
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  89
N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 a
nd
 S
ta
te
/T
er
rit
or
y 
to
ta
ls
 in
 T
ab
le
 4
.1
c 
ca
n 
b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t 
p
os
tc
od
es
 t
ha
t 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
SA
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
91
10
.5
10
3
11
.9
19
4
22
.4
70
8.
1
86
5
0.
8
2.
6
6.
2
Ru
ra
l
15
3
12
.2
18
0
14
.4
33
3
26
.6
69
5.
5
1,
25
4
1.
2
4.
3
8.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
5,
94
2
7.
9
4,
28
2
5.
7
10
,2
24
13
.6
7,
70
7
10
.2
75
,3
43
71
.8
Ru
ra
l
2,
18
1
7.
9
1,
49
0
5.
4
3,
67
1
13
.4
2,
40
8
8.
8
27
,4
47
26
.2
W
A
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
24
1
13
.7
28
1
16
.0
52
2
29
.6
13
0
7.
4
1,
76
1
1.
6
4.
2
8.
6
Ru
ra
l
53
1
14
.4
63
5
17
.2
1,
16
6
31
.7
25
5
6.
9
3,
68
2
3.
4
3.
1
8.
2
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
7,
35
0
9.
5
5,
67
5
7.
3
13
,0
25
16
.8
9,
71
1
12
.6
77
,3
91
70
.6
Ru
ra
l
3,
04
2
11
.4
2,
43
6
9.
1
5,
47
8
20
.4
2,
55
7
9.
5
26
,7
94
24
.4
Ta
s
In
d
ig
en
ou
s
U
rb
an
11
6.
1
8
4.
4
19
10
.6
12
6.
7
18
0
0.
5
0.
5
1.
5
Ru
ra
l
37
7.
5
40
8.
1
77
15
.7
32
6.
5
49
1
1.
5
3.
2
3.
4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
58
9
5.
6
30
8
2.
9
89
7
8.
5
92
3
8.
8
10
,5
26
31
.3
Ru
ra
l
96
3
4.
3
1,
06
3
4.
7
2,
02
6
9.
0
1,
75
7
7.
8
22
,4
19
66
.7
Ta
b
le
 4
.3
c.
N
et
 b
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 to
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
 in
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
ca
te
g
o
ry
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
 (c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 
(n
et
)
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s/
N
o
t 
id
en
ti
fie
d
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
.
90 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.4
a.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 to
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
Q
u
ee
n
sl
an
d
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 S
ta
te
s 
an
d
 T
er
ri
to
ri
es
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
To
rr
es
 S
tr
ai
t 
Is
la
n
d
er
, 2
0 
Ju
n
e 
19
97
  
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
TS
I/
A
b
o
ri
g
in
al
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
Q
ld
TS
I
U
rb
an
26
11
.3
30
13
.0
56
24
.2
17
7.
4
23
1
0.
1
1.
5
1.
6
Ru
ra
l
16
3
10
.9
18
8
12
.6
35
1
23
.6
11
4
7.
7
1,
49
0
0.
5
0.
3
1.
0
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
19
3
11
.1
22
0
12
.7
41
3
23
.8
13
2
7.
6
1,
73
9
0.
6
0.
5
1.
2
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
16
0
9.
7
18
7
11
.4
34
7
21
.1
17
3
10
.5
1,
64
5
0.
6
Ru
ra
l
76
4
10
.7
83
0
11
.6
1,
59
4
22
.3
47
2
6.
6
7,
15
0
2.
6
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
96
6
10
.6
1,
04
3
11
.5
2,
00
9
22
.1
67
8
7.
5
9,
09
7
3.
4
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
6,
14
5
6.
4
4,
94
2
5.
1
11
,0
87
11
.5
12
,2
81
12
.8
96
,2
01
35
.4
Ru
ra
l
10
,5
54
7.
0
8,
32
7
5.
5
18
,8
81
12
.5
15
,6
28
10
.3
15
1,
63
0
55
.8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
17
,4
97
6.
7
13
,9
34
5.
4
31
,4
31
12
.1
29
,6
04
11
.4
26
0,
68
3
96
.0
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
Te
rr
ito
rie
s
TS
I
U
rb
an
17
8.
8
17
8.
8
34
17
.6
27
14
.0
19
3
0.
02
–0
.9
–3
.4
Ru
ra
l
16
6.
7
18
7.
6
34
14
.3
22
9.
2
23
8
0.
02
–1
.6
–2
.7
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
34
7.
5
37
8.
1
71
15
.6
49
10
.8
45
5
0.
04
–1
.2
–2
.6
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
63
1
9.
7
79
6
12
.2
1,
42
7
21
.9
65
5
10
.1
6,
50
7
0.
6
Ru
ra
l
1,
69
2
8.
4
2,
07
9
10
.3
3,
77
1
18
.6
4,
26
3
21
.1
20
,2
35
2.
0
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
2,
37
3
8.
7
2,
93
2
10
.7
5,
30
5
19
.4
4,
99
7
18
.2
27
,4
08
2.
7
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
37
,6
97
6.
2
35
,8
35
5.
9
73
,5
32
12
.0
77
,3
15
12
.7
61
0,
47
9
60
.4
Ru
ra
l
17
,7
08
5.
2
15
,8
22
4.
6
33
,5
30
9.
8
34
,3
88
10
.1
34
1,
72
3
33
.8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
56
,9
76
5.
8
53
,2
14
5.
4
11
0,
19
0
11
.2
11
5,
04
8
11
.7
98
3,
30
9
97
.2
STATE/TERRITORY AND URBAN/RURAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ♦  91
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.4
b
.
B
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 to
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
Q
u
ee
n
sl
an
d
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 S
ta
te
s 
an
d
 T
er
ri
to
ri
es
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a 
an
d
To
rr
es
 S
tr
ai
t 
Is
la
n
d
er
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
  
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
TS
I/
A
b
o
ri
g
in
al
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
Q
ld
TS
I
U
rb
an
40
17
.0
59
25
.0
99
42
.0
22
9.
3
23
6
0.
1
2.
4
1.
5
Ru
ra
l
24
0
15
.8
32
0
21
.1
56
0
36
.9
10
3
6.
8
1,
51
8
0.
6
0.
0
1.
0
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
28
6
16
.1
38
2
21
.5
66
8
37
.6
12
9
7.
3
1,
77
5
0.
7
0.
5
0.
6
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
24
2
14
.5
39
1
23
.5
63
3
38
.0
14
9
9.
0
1,
66
4
0.
6
Ru
ra
l
1,
15
8
15
.8
1,
47
1
20
.1
2,
62
9
35
.9
51
7
7.
1
7,
31
4
2.
8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
1,
43
7
15
.6
1,
92
2
20
.9
3,
35
9
36
.5
69
0
7.
5
9,
20
9
3.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
9,
24
8
9.
9
9,
70
3
10
.4
18
,9
51
20
.4
12
,4
59
13
.4
93
,1
39
35
.3
Ru
ra
l
15
,3
56
10
.4
14
,4
19
9.
8
29
,7
75
20
.2
16
,0
75
10
.9
14
7,
14
2
55
.8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
25
,8
32
10
.2
25
,4
08
10
.1
51
,2
40
20
.3
30
,1
81
12
.0
25
2,
62
7
95
.8
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
Te
rr
ito
rie
s
TS
I
U
rb
an
32
13
.5
41
17
.3
73
30
.8
32
13
.5
23
7
0.
02
–0
.6
–7
.0
Ru
ra
l
28
11
.7
40
16
.7
68
28
.5
30
12
.6
23
9
0.
02
–0
.2
–0
.8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
62
12
.3
86
17
.0
14
8
29
.3
65
12
.9
50
5
0.
05
–0
.2
–2
.2
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
94
3
14
.2
1,
62
0
24
.3
2,
56
3
38
.5
79
0
11
.9
6,
66
2
0.
7
Ru
ra
l
2,
46
2
12
.0
3,
62
1
17
.6
6,
08
3
29
.5
5,
67
2
27
.5
20
,6
10
2.
1
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
3,
47
8
12
.5
5,
35
7
19
.2
8,
83
5
31
.7
6,
56
2
23
.5
27
,9
04
2.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
51
,6
66
9.
0
65
,6
43
11
.4
11
7,
30
9
20
.4
72
,3
01
12
.6
57
5,
75
4
59
.5
Ru
ra
l
25
,6
68
7.
7
31
,1
15
9.
3
56
,7
83
17
.1
32
,2
64
9.
7
33
3,
02
5
34
.4
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
79
,6
83
8.
5
99
,9
05
10
.6
17
9,
58
8
19
.1
10
7,
95
0
11
.5
93
9,
05
0
97
.1
92 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
 N
ot
e:
Th
e 
d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l a
re
as
 a
nd
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f r
ur
al
 a
nd
 u
rb
an
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
cu
st
om
er
s 
re
co
rd
ed
 a
g
ai
ns
t p
os
tc
od
es
 th
at
 c
an
no
t b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d
 a
s 
ei
th
er
 ru
ra
l o
r u
rb
an
.
Ta
b
le
 4
.4
c.
N
et
 b
re
ac
h
, a
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 e
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 to
ta
l c
u
st
o
m
er
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
b
y 
Q
u
ee
n
sl
an
d
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 S
ta
te
s 
an
d
 T
er
ri
to
ri
es
, u
rb
an
/r
u
ra
l a
re
a
an
d
 T
o
rr
es
 S
tr
ai
t 
Is
la
n
d
er
, 2
0 
M
ar
ch
 1
99
8 
  
St
at
e/
Te
rr
it
o
ry
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s 
id
en
ti
fie
r
U
rb
an
/
ru
ra
l
A
ct
iv
it
y 
te
st
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 (n
et
)
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
b
re
ac
h
es
 (n
et
)
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 
b
re
ac
h
es
 (n
et
)
Ex
em
p
t 
fr
o
m
 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 te
st
To
ta
l 
cu
st
o
m
er
s
%
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 
TS
I/
A
b
o
ri
g
in
al
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 ra
te
N
u
m
b
er
%
 s
h
ar
e
A
ct
. t
es
t
A
d
m
in
Q
ld
TS
I
U
rb
an
33
14
.0
36
15
.3
69
29
.2
22
9.
3
23
6
0.
1
1.
5
2.
1
Ru
ra
l
22
2
14
.6
19
3
12
.7
41
5
27
.3
10
3
6.
8
1,
51
8
0.
6
–0
.1
0.
6
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
25
5
14
.4
22
9
12
.9
48
4
27
.3
12
9
7.
3
1,
77
5
0.
7
0.
5
0.
9
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
20
7
12
.4
21
9
13
.2
42
6
25
.6
14
9
9.
0
1,
66
4
0.
6
Ru
ra
l
1,
07
5
14
.7
88
9
12
.2
1,
96
4
26
.9
51
7
7.
1
7,
31
4
2.
8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
1,
28
2
13
.9
1,
10
8
12
.0
2,
39
0
26
.0
69
0
7.
5
9,
20
9
3.
5
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
8,
32
3
8.
9
5,
90
6
6.
3
14
,2
29
15
.3
12
,4
59
13
.4
93
,1
39
35
.3
Ru
ra
l
13
,9
97
9.
5
8,
88
2
6.
0
22
,8
79
15
.6
16
,0
75
10
.9
14
7,
14
2
55
.8
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
22
,3
20
8.
8
14
,7
88
5.
9
37
,1
08
14
.7
30
,1
81
12
.0
25
2,
62
7
95
.8
O
th
er
 
St
at
es
 a
nd
 
Te
rr
ito
rie
s
TS
I
U
rb
an
28
11
.8
28
11
.8
56
17
.6
32
13
.5
23
7
0.
02
–0
.1
–1
.0
Ru
ra
l
25
10
.5
17
7.
1
42
23
.6
30
12
.6
23
9
0.
02
–0
.3
–3
.5
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
55
10
.9
47
9.
3
10
2
20
.2
65
12
.9
50
5
0.
05
–0
.1
–1
.8
A
b
or
ig
in
al
U
rb
an
79
5
11
.9
85
6
12
.9
1,
65
1
21
.4
79
0
11
.9
6,
66
2
0.
7
Ru
ra
l
2,
22
1
10
.8
2,
19
1
10
.6
4,
41
2
24
.8
5,
67
2
27
.5
20
,6
10
2.
1
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
3,
07
9
11
.0
3,
10
9
11
.1
6,
18
8
22
.2
6,
56
2
23
.5
27
,9
04
2.
9
N
ot
 id
en
tifi
ed
U
rb
an
45
,7
08
7.
9
39
,2
02
6.
8
84
,9
10
12
.2
72
,3
01
12
.6
57
5,
75
4
59
.5
Ru
ra
l
22
,9
95
6.
9
17
,5
64
5.
3
40
,5
59
14
.8
32
,2
64
9.
7
33
3,
02
5
34
.4
A
ll 
ar
ea
s
70
,7
92
7.
5
58
,5
36
6.
2
12
9,
32
8
13
.8
10
7,
95
0
11
.5
93
9,
05
0
97
.1
 ♦  93
5. Issues raised in discussion sessions
Some basic statistical analysis of indigenous and non-identifier breach rates at national and
local/regional levels was used during locality visits as a way of introducing the research
and beginning discussion sessions. Issues raised in discussion sessions covered a broad
range of topics and provided useful contextualisation of statistics. Many issues raised
sought to explain higher breach rates among indigenous identifiers. Some, however, also
pointed to adaptations that already existed within income support administration to the
circumstances of indigenous people. The implication, from these issues, was that breach
rate differentials between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers could be far greater
were it not for such existing adaptations. This chapter elaborates on issues raised in
discussion sessions.
Literacy and mobility
The two issues most commonly raised in discussion sessions as explanations of higher
breach rates among indigenous identifiers were literacy and mobility. 
Low literacy among the indigenous clientele, it was suggested, led to difficulties in
understanding and responding to Centrelink letters, or ‘advices’ as they are technically
known. Advices do, without doubt, demand quite high literacy skills. They often not
only inform clients of decisions made regarding their payments, but also, because of
administrative law requirements, advise of client’s rights in relation to those decisions,
such as rights to seek review. This introduces a complexity and ambiguity into social
security correspondence. On the one hand clients are being informed of often adverse
decisions already made, while on the other they are being provided with information
relating to the possibility of having those decisions reviewed. Some Centrelink offices
dealing with low literacy indigenous clients had developed ways of coping with these
issues, such as more verbal contact and simple advices which just ask clients to make
contact with a particular officer in order to have some matter clarified. But these were
generally seen as resource intensive adaptations which could not always anticipate or
pre-empt standard advices generated automatically, which might not in the particular
circumstance be very appropriate.
It was frequently noted in discussion sessions that there is a literacy indicator in the social
security administrative database, but that it does not show up on the computer work
screens more commonly used in daily decision making and that it seems little used in any
way to modify correspondence procedures or contents. It was also suggested, however,
that the quality of information in the administrative record relating to client literacy, and
particularly indigenous client literacy, may not be very good or useful. Clients were seen
as often less than fully forthcoming on literacy issues, for a variety of reasons.
High levels of mobility among the indigenous clientele were also seen as contributing to
higher breach rates, through correspondence not reaching people, being held by third
parties awaiting a person’s return or being returned to sender. Mobility was seen as
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occurring between residences within local areas and on several larger geographic scales
as well. All these forms of mobility were seen as contributing in various ways to higher
indigenous breach rates and, ironically, were often seen as stimulated by tensions in
residential arrangements arising, in part, from lack of income.
As with literacy, some Centrelink offices were conscious of adaptations that had been
made to try and cope with high levels of mobility among indigenous clients, such as
utilising community information networks to keep in contact with people. However,
again, these were seen as resource intensive adaptations which could not always anticipate
how client mobility might affect standard, automatic, computer-generated payment and
review procedures. One particular problem for clients with high levels of mobility was
seen to be the unanticipated letter or review. Whereas regular reviews, such as SU19s,
could be anticipated and managed by mobile clients, unanticipated reviews could not. 
One indicator of mobility that many offices noted, was the level of duplicate SU19s
lodged by clients, rather than those mailed out to them. In some areas this level was
reported to be very high. Though not necessarily a problem in itself, this was seen as
indicating the likelihood of other correspondence also not getting through to clients. 
Confidence in and with government bureaucracies
Another related issue frequently raised was indigenous people’s lack of confidence in
government bureaucracies. This was seen as having historical roots, when government
‘welfare’ bureaucracies were something that indigenous people often avoided or feared.
Even today, it was suggested, indigenous people often have little confidence in the ability
of government bureaucracies to deal with them fairly and appropriately in ways which
are sympathetic and responsive to their cultural and social circumstances.
It was frequently also suggested in discussion sessions that dealing with income support
administration requires a certain level of confidence and assertiveness, without which
clients might not receive the best available entitlements for their circumstances. Many
indigenous people were seen as lacking such confidence and assertiveness and not,
therefore, making claims for payment in the best manner. Not all relevant information may
be revealed by indigenous people and not all information that is revealed may be relevant.
Where indigenous clients do try to be more assertive in their dealings with income support
administrators, particularly among indigenous males, this was often seen as being
interpreted as inappropriate aggressiveness. 
Hence, confidence in government bureaucracies and confidence in dealing with
government bureaucracies were both seen as something which indigenous clients did not
share equally with non-identifying clients. This was seen as potentially pushing up
indigenous identifiers’ breach rates.
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Propensity to appeal or seek review
The propensity to appeal or seek review of adverse income support decisions was
commonly seen as much lower among indigenous clients than among the non-identifying
clientele and this too was seen as possibly driving up breach rates. Explanations for this
low propensity to appeal or seek review related back to indigenous people’s relative lack
of confidence in government bureaucracies and their processes. Why would anyone, it
was suggested, return to an official who had just made an adverse decision in an attempt
to have that decision reviewed and overturned? Being knocked back once was seen as
being quite enough of an affront to bear. It was also suggested that, in the case of breach
decisions which incur a rate reduction penalty, indigenous clients may simply decide to
put up with or ‘wear’ the reduction in income in order to avoid further bureaucratic
contact, or may even in some instances think that the reduced rate was their full
entitlement for the period. ‘Appealing’ was also sometimes seen as ‘something like going
to court’, which was to be avoided if at all possible.
In the course of interviews and discussion sessions, several instances were referred to in
which indigenous-identified Centrelink officers, or other Centrelink staff, had encouraged
indigenous clients to seek review of decisions. In virtually every instance, the story ended
with the indigenous client not wanting the hassle and not proceeding, even with the
encouragement of a Centrelink officer. 
Welfare Rights Centre staff in Sydney asserted that they have a fairly high rate of success
in getting adverse breach and other decisions overturned. The implication of this was
that a lower propensity to seek review or appeal among indigenous clients would have
an impact on rates of breaching and other adverse decisions. If few appeals and reviews
were successful, a lack of propensity to appeal or seek review would not be so significant.
But if significant numbers of decisions are being overturned on review or appeal, then a
lack of propensity to appeal or seek review is significant. 
It was also suggested by one departmental officer that the lack of any apparent difference
between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers in the rate of having breaches over-
turned by original decision makers (see Table 2.5) may also relate to the lack of propensity
to appeal or seek review among indigenous identifiers: that is, if indigenous identifiers did
appeal or seek review with the same propensity as non-identifiers then the rate at which
breach decisions were overturned among indigenous identifiers would be higher.
There is clearly room for a whole other research project on indigenous people’s utilisation
of appeals and review mechanisms within social security administration.
Family and community support networks and underpayment
One common further suggestion in discussion sessions was that many indigenous
unemployment payment recipients who incurred an adverse breach decision and had their
payment terminated, would then turn to family and community support networks for an
extended period of time, rather than returning quickly to the social security system for
income support; even though it is possible to once again become eligible for
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unemployment payments as soon as the day after a breach event. This tendency was seen
as possibly leading to quite large underpayments among the breached indigenous clientele
and to strains on family and community income. It was further suggested that as family
and community support networks became strained by people without income, crime may
also become a means of survival, particularly in urban areas. Finally, on eventual
re-application, it was suggested that periods during which applicants could not point to a
clear means of financial support could lead to suspicion and unsympathetic treatment in
assessment processes. A suspicion was that applicants may be lying about those recent past
periods, perhaps concealing some means of financial support such as employment, which
led to questioning about what they were saying about their current position.
The possibility of underpayment of social security entitlements among the indigenous
clientele is a much broader, and more long standing issue than activity testing and breach
rates. In 1995, allegations of underpayment in Alice Springs town camps led to a
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s report on the issue (Ombudsman 1997). This found that
allegations of underpayment raised by the Financial Controller of the Tangentyere
Council, who assisted town camp residents with tax returns, probably did have some
substance and did reflect adversely on DSS service delivery mechanisms. 
Substantial changes in social security delivery mechanisms have occurred in Alice
Springs since the Ombudsman’s report, such as opening an on-line counter of the
Centrelink office within the Tangentyere community services complex. However, during
the locality visit to Alice Springs, evidence of underpayment noted by Tangentyere’s
Financial Controller was once again referred to. The issue of underpayment remains, and
may to some extent be related to the issue of the length of time it takes indigenous people
to return to the social security system after they have had a payment cancelled because
of a breach. Although, technically, people may re-establish an entitlement as soon as the
next day, it is perhaps unrealistic to suggest that they will. Probably very few people
would return immediately to a service organisation which has just delivered them an
adverse decision. Thus the relevant questions become: how long are people likely to leave
it after breaching before they re-apply for a social security payment? is this leading to
underpayment? and, are there differences in this time period between indigenous and
non-identifier clients, perhaps reflecting other issues such as confidence in and in dealing
with government bureaucracies? As with the appeals issue, here again there is room for
further research, possibly utilising other cuts of social security databases.
Severity of breach penalties
Irrespective of the issue of underpayments due to the time taken to return to Centrelink
after breaching, the severity of breach penalties was also sometimes raised as an issue. It
was generally acknowledged that penalties had been mollified by the shift from non-
payment periods to mainly rate reduction penalties in July 1997. However, as noted in
Chapter 2, some actions which were previously not regarded as breaches became so at
that time. The new activity test breach which occasioned most comment was failure to
correctly declare additional ‘remunerative’ income, derived primarily from casual
employment. Previously this had led, on detection of the undeclared income, to an over-
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payment becoming recoverable and possibly also to an administrative breach for failure
to notify change of circumstance. From July 1997, however, failure to correctly declare
‘remunerative’ income became an activity test breach resulting in termination of payment
and imposition of more substantial penalties on successful re-application for payment.
Perceptions did exist that the pre-July 1997 rules for failure to correctly declare
remunerative income were somewhat too lenient. However the imposition of an activity
test breach was now seen by some as being too harsh. This was seen as being particularly
so for people who had declared that they had done some work and derived some
remunerative income, but had failed to correctly declare that income due to issues such
as the differences between gross and net pay, and difference in time periods between
earning the income, being paid the income and unemployment eligibility periods. These
were seen as complex administrative demands which indigenous people with low levels
of literacy and education, often engaged in very casual occasional work, may have more
trouble meeting than those with higher literacy and education levels engaged in more
formal, regular casual employment.
Those pointing to the harshness of the post-July 1997 treatment, particularly in relation
to people who had declared that they had some casual employment and declared some,
but not correct, remunerative income, may not have been fully aware of the latitude not
to impose an activity test breach in cases where incorrect declaration was not made
‘knowingly and recklessly’.20 However, they were raising a substantial concern about the
breach rate penalties and how in particular circumstances relating to particular people,
such as indigenous people with low education and literacy levels declaring casual
employment but getting the precise amount for the relevant time period wrong, these
penalties may be inappropriately severe. Clearly the severity of breach rate penalties and
their impact on particular types of clients in particular types of circumstances needs to be
constantly under review. 
Postal services
Another issue raised in discussion sessions as a possible source of higher indigenous
breach rates was inadequate postal services to areas in which many indigenous people
live. This was not seen as just a remote area phenomenon, but rather as one which also
sometimes effected indigenous people in urban areas. Sometimes inadequacy was related
to client mobility, but at other times it was not. For example, in Bourke, New South
Wales, it was felt that postal services to the west end of town, with a reasonably stable
predominantly Aboriginal residential population, were not as good or as reliable as to the
east end of town. The predominantly Aboriginal west end of town had few letter boxes
and numerous unrestrained dogs, so was serviced by the post office primarily by people
coming in and picking up mail. This created the problem of the unanticipated review
letter, which unemployment payment recipients might never, or only belatedly, pick up,
leading to them being breached. The issue of similar names and initials among local
indigenous populations who were having to pick up mail was also seen as causing
potential problems, being exacerbated by a lack of concern over these issues among post
office staff.
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In remote areas, the postal service issues raised related more to infrequency or timing of
delivery and collection schedules and how these may have an impact on review cycles
and time-specific administrative requirements within the social security system, which
were increasingly nationally standardised and beyond local office adaptation and control.
This too was seen as leading to disproportionate possibilities for breaching among the
indigenous portion of the clientele. 
Indigenous-identified staff and third-party intermediaries
Issues identified thus far have been primarily concerned to suggest why it is that breach
rates among the indigenous identifying clientele may be considerably higher than among
the non-identifying clientele. However, there was also considerable awareness in
discussion sessions of ways in which social security administration had already been
adapted to the circumstances and local situations of the indigenous clientele. Foremost
among these adaptations are the appointment of indigenous-identified staff and the use
of third-party intermediaries in service delivery processes. Both adaptations were clearly
seen as very significant. But both were also seen as raising further significant issues.
Indigenous-identified staff were clearly seen as making a very significant difference to
the servicing of indigenous customers, including reducing what might otherwise be even
higher breach rates. Their knowledge of the local indigenous clientele was frequently
acknowledged as of great assistance both in avoiding breaching and in sorting out many
differing but related potential administrative problems. However, relations between
indigenous-identified staff and other Centrelink officers were not always easy or well
worked out. On the one hand, there were suggestions that other staff sometimes directed
indigenous clients to indigenous-identified staff without trying to sort out even simple
matters themselves first. On the other hand, there were suggestions that other staff did
not frequently enough refer to indigenous-identified staff for advice and information on
clients and their circumstances. This led to alternate perceptions of indigenous-identified
staff being both under- or over-utilised. 
The role of indigenous-identified staff is sometimes affected by the fact that they have
been recruited and have worked in ‘liaison’ positions within the old DSS, prior to
Centrelink’s formation. These positions did not always involve formal decision making
training or accreditation and officers in them were restricted in their organisational roles
to being adjuncts to other staff, sitting outside the essential decision making processes of
income support administration. Often such officers are cast by others and, to some extent,
by themselves as essentially internal advocates for indigenous clients. Other indigenous-
identified staff have been trained and accredited in decision making and do take on a
fuller role in organisational processes. For them, the issue sometimes raised was how they
could avoid becoming ‘bulk processing’ decision makers and maintain a sense of being an
identified resource for the indigenous clientele. The issue was occasionally raised of
whether it was appropriate for indigenous people to be making eligibility decisions about
members of their own cultural community, but the same was not said about non-
identifying clients and members of their cultural communities.
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These tensions and ambiguities around the roles of indigenous-identified staff were
perhaps captured in the variety of terms used to refer to these staff in different areas.
Having once been known fairly universally as Aboriginal Liaison Officers (ALOs) or
Aboriginal and Islander Liaison Officers (AILOs), the range of terms now used covers
Indigenous Customer Liaison Officer (ICLO), Indigenous Customer Service Office (ICSO)
and Indigenous Network Officer (INO). The second of these terms, ICSO, may be
generally seen as an attempt to place indigenous-identified staff on a par with other
Centrelink decision making staff, now referred to as Customer Service Offices. This term
encourages indigenous-identified staff to become full decision makers and designates
them as being so. ICLO can be seen as either just a historical continuation of ALO/AILO
or as a more conscious attempt to hold back from full integration into decision making.
INO, the term used in New South Wales area South West, can be seen as a conscious
attempt to hold indigenous-identified staff at some distance from extensive, individual
case decision making. It is part of a push within that area, with which not all indigenous-
identified staff agree, to make them more ‘community-based’ operatives, rather than
focused on individual cases. 
These issues relating to the roles of indigenous-identified staff will be returned to in
subsequent chapters. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that indigenous-identified staff
are universally acknowledged as making a major contribution to the servicing of
indigenous clientele and keeping down what might otherwise be higher indigenous
breach rates, but that there are tensions and ambiguities in relations between indigenous-
identified staff and general Centrelink decision makers. 
The other very obvious adaptation within the social security system to the circumstances
of indigenous people is the use of third-party intermediaries to assist in client servicing.
These can be formal paid community agents or more informal contacts with other primary
roles. The use of intermediaries tends to be greatest in rural and remote areas, where
distance creates an additional barrier between Centrelink and indigenous people, and
where levels of English literacy among the indigenous clientele are probably at their
lowest (see DSS 1986). However, intermediaries are also utilised, to some extent, in urban
areas where access to social security for indigenous identifiers can still be difficult and
problematic (see DSS 1985). 
The Alice Springs region claims to utilise over 70 formal and informal community agents
in the servicing of its 3,000 indigenous unemployment payment clients. Almost all of these
intermediaries in this region have received some training from Centrelink in social security
matters, but only about one-third of them are formal paid community agents.
The use of third-party intermediaries raises significant privacy issues in social security
service delivery. The Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner has recently developed a
privacy protocol for Commonwealth agencies handling personal information of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the Northern Territory. This contains
specific guidelines on disclosure of personal information to a third party, emphasising
consent as the basis for disclosure. It notes:
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Consent to disclose does not have to be in writing. Nor does it have to be given
directly by the person concerned, if it can be implied from their actions. Subject to
verification as outlined below, if a person asks for someone to make enquiries for
them, their action in asking them to make the enquiry will generally imply their
consent for the agency to disclose their information (Privacy Commissioner 1998: 8).
The verification procedures then outlined cover obtaining direct consent if possible,
confirming the legitimacy of the intermediary, confirming the relationship of the
intermediary with the person or client and implying consent from any or all of the above.
This seems a practical and realistic approach. The protocol could perhaps be more widely
distributed and used than just in the Northern Territory. Centrelink offices elsewhere
who deal constantly with intermediaries in servicing indigenous clients sometimes
expressed concern about privacy considerations and were looking for such practical,
realistic guidance on how precisely to proceed.
Privacy considerations aside, there can be no doubt that third-party intermediaries
external to Centrelink make an enormous contribution to servicing indigenous clients,
particularly in remote areas. Without this assistance, breach rates among indigenous
people could be considerably higher and indeed the service delivery system could break
down entirely. For that reason, thought could perhaps be given to extending
arrangements such as the paid community agents scheme or expanding the numbers of
small satellite Centrelink offices. Again, these ideas will be returned to later.
Procedural adaptations
Another way in which it was frequently seen that the social security system was already
accommodating indigenous customers, and hence possibly also keeping down their
breach rates, was through procedural adaptations. The Northern Territory’s separate
remote area office codes and RA1 application for continuation of payment procedures are
the most obvious and formalised instances of such adaptation. Their effect on breach rate
statistics has already been suggested in the local/regional and State/Territory statistical
analysis. However, other procedural adaptations also exist and are worth noting.
The Cairns office also makes use of separate office codes to designate different types of
unemployment payment clientele in different circumstances and to modify procedures.
Other local/regional offices do similar things more informally. Major periodic review
forms which would normally be mailed out to clients are sometimes intercepted and taken
out physically to clients in conjunction with field visits. Correspondence that is not
replied to is sometimes referred to indigenous servicing staff to see if they know where
the person might be, rather than just generating a second letter or immediately imposing
a breach. Cases for intensive labour market reviews may be chosen in ways which do not
select indigenous clients known to be living in particular locations with few employment
prospects. While more ad hoc and less systematic than the Northern Territory
adaptations, these procedural modifications can make a difference and would seem also
to be already lessening rates of indigenous breaching. 
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Compliance/review units as a source of breaching
Another major issue raised in discussion sessions was that of compliance/review units as
a source of breaching. To understand this issue, it is necessary first to understand that
Centrelink offices are predominantly ‘process-oriented’ workplaces. Tasks, rather than
clients, are generally what is assigned to officers and groups of offices, known as units.
One unit will do the new claims for unemployment payment and perhaps also the
verification of the regular SU19 reviews. Another unit will do the more intensive, more
occasional labour market and compliance reviews. A common suggestion in discussion
sessions was that much of the breaching of indigenous people may be coming from these
units and officers carrying out more occasional, more intensive labour market and
compliance reviews. These are the ones which generate unanticipated correspondence
and in which clients claims to being unemployed and meeting the activity test are more
closely scrutinised, with a view to getting incorrectly eligible clients off payment. It was
sometimes suggested that some compliance/review units had developed a ‘police culture’
which was chronically distrustful and suspicious of clients, including indigenous clients. 
Beyond local/regional offices, attached to area Centrelink offices, there are also mobile
review teams, who travel the country doing even more occasional, more intensive reviews.
It was often suggested that visits from these teams would push up local/regional office
breach rates quite markedly and cause some ‘destabilisation’ in the working environment.
The statistical analysis undertaken at local/regional office and other geographic levels did
not attempt to differentiate between breaches in terms of where they were originating
among the various types of Centrelink units and teams of officers. This is something
which probably could be looked at further. Given Centrelink’s process-oriented
organisation, it would seem only to be expected that much breaching would be coming
from regional office compliance/review units and from area office mobile review teams,
as these are the points in the administrative process at which clients’ claims to eligibility
are subject to greatest scrutiny. 
Employment service providers as a source of breaching
Another frequent suggestion in discussion sessions was that much breaching may be
coming from employment service providers who are external to Centrelink but have some
links into the social security administrative system. These included both the old
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), which has now been reduced to Employment
National, and new private and community sector employment service providers.
The CES had a long-standing significant role to play in the administration of
unemployment payments. Most unemployment payment applicants were obliged to
register with the CES as part of demonstrating that they were willing to undertake and
actively seeking suitable paid work. CES officers then had the power to impose breaches
on social security clients if, for example, they refused offers of work, did not turn up for
interviews, did not take up training opportunities, or did not reply to correspondence
such as job vacancy advices. In some local/regional offices, it was suggested that within
the two-year period covered by these administrative databases, CES officers had been
102 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
very active among indigenous people in their areas and that this may have contributed
to breach rates; partly simply because of the level of CES activity and partly also because
that activity was sometimes expenditure-driven, or somewhat inappropriate to client
circumstances. It was also noted in some offices that as the CES gradually scaled down its
operation during 1997, in preparation for its closure and transformation to Employment
National in May 1998, this level of breaching sometimes decreased.
Private and community sector employment service providers who have gradually taken
over the role of the CES in the last couple of years were also noted as potential sources of
breaching within the social security system. Such private and community sector
providers do not have the power to make decisions in quite the same ways as CES officers
once had. However, they can still recommend that breaches be imposed on clients for not
meeting employment service related requirements and can therefore still contribute to
rates of breaching. It was also noted that very few of the new private and community
sector employment providers are indigenous organisations and that they may not be very
interested in, or good at, servicing indigenous clients. 
Labour market discrimination and expectations
Another issue raised by clients and intermediaries was that of labour market
discrimination and expectations. It was often suggested that both employment service
providers and Centrelink unemployment payment decision making staff had little
appreciation of the difficulties involved for indigenous people in securing employment.
These difficulties related to matters such as discrimination and unrealistic expectations
among non-indigenous employers, sometimes based in lack of cultural sensitivity. Some
private sector employment service providers in particular were seen as not understanding
these issues and as recommending breaches accordingly.
It was often also noted that indigenous unemployment payment recipients frequently use
indigenous community organisations as the employers they have contacted to show that
they have been actively seeking work. Attitudes to this practice among decision makers
ranged from empathetic acknowledgment that these might be the only places many
indigenous people would feel comfortable working and would have any realistic chance
of getting a job, to a more critical view that job search needed to be wider than this. This
more critical view could again lead to higher breaching.
Variable reporting
One development within unemployment payment administration which was seen as of
considerable relevance to indigenous clients and breach rates was the introduction of
variable reporting; the move away from all unemployment recipients having to
re-establish their eligibility for payment every two weeks to only having to do so every
four, six or 12 weeks, depending on client circumstances. This option has been available
for some time, but was expanded considerably in 1997.
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Since 1997, variable reporting has generally has been embraced by local/regional offices
as allowing them to get rid of a work item which, in relation to the long-term
unemployed, including many indigenous identifiers, was regarded as serving little if any
purpose. One office described the old two-week review cycle as ‘simply unnecessary
churning’, while others noted the freeing up of staff to work on other matters as a result
of the decrease in numbers of SU19 forms being lodged. 
Some offices were somewhat more sceptical or critical of the potential of variable
reporting. They argued that indigenous clients were used to and understood the old SU19
two-weekly review cycle and that, although there was a degree of unnecessary churning
involved, this was not where indigenous people’s problems with unemployment
payment administration primarily lay. Some also noted the potential for clients to receive
larger overpayments through changes of circumstance going unnotified for more
extended periods of time. These were, however, concerns which those offices which had
embraced variable reporting thought could be handled by better targeting of clients to
be placed on longer reporting cycles and, by experience working with the new
arrangements. Overall, the reaction to the introduction of variable reporting in relation
to indigenous clients was positive, though no great direct impact on indigenous breach
rates was generally anticipated.
Teleservices
Another issue raised in discussion sessions was indigenous people’s reactions to
increasing reliance on centralised telephone servicing facilities within Centrelink,
utilising generic phone numbers such as 13 24 68. It was generally suggested that
indigenous people do not like this form of servicing and do not cope very well with it. It
was suggested that indigenous people had difficulty communicating with officers who
had no knowledge of or familiarity with them or their local circumstances and that they
would much prefer to talk to someone they knew and had previously dealt with. Higher
breach rates were suggested as a result of this, but equally concerns were about under
servicing of clients who had difficulties and were uncomfortable with teleservices.
Interestingly, some adaptations of the teleservice idea, with indigenous people in mind,
were already evident within social security administration. Cairns and Westcourt
Centrelink offices had established an indigenous teleservice unit from among indigenous
employees. This took calls from outlying areas with predominantly indigenous clienteles.
Area West in New South Wales had brought together indigenous-identified service staff
as a unit attached to the Mount Druitt regional office and provided them with a 1800
telephone number which indigenous clients from across the area, not just the region, could
access. Alternatively indigenous-identified staff were sometimes giving out their own
direct numbers, if not to individual clients then at least to prominent intermediaries and
organisations within the indigenous community. All these mechanisms and adaptations
were intended to lessen the need for indigenous people to use national, impersonal
teleservices and to provide them instead with greater access to familiar voices and officers. 
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CDEP administrative arrangements as a source of breaching
CDEP was raised as a possible source of breaching for indigenous clients, not only because
of the issue of leaving CDEP, as already discussed, but also because of administrative
arrangements between ATSIC and Centrelink regarding CDEP participant schedules. The
general problem was that ATSIC CDEP participant schedules are adjusted in advance of
CDEP grants for the quarter being made, whereas Centrelink unemployment payments
are paid two-weekly in arrears. People listed on ATSIC-provided CDEP participant
schedules may in fact have left CDEP during the funding period for which the schedule
operates. Equally, others may have joined the CDEP scheme during that period, despite
the fact that their names do not appear on the funding schedule. Hence, the quarterly
schedule was not seen by Centrelink offices as adequate to the task of determining
whether applicants for unemployment payments were ineligible because of participation
in CDEP, as prescribed in s.614A of the Social Security Act. 
Many offices had informal mechanisms operating to supplement the ATSIC-provided
quarterly CDEP participant schedules. These generally took the form of individual CDEP
administrators advising Centrelink directly of interim ‘ons’ and ‘offs’ for the scheme.
However, this advice was not always easily fed into the social security system and it was
seen as both resource intensive and reliant on individual personalised understandings.
There was still always the potential for people to be on both payments at once for
a period, and possibly to be breached when this was revealed, or not to receive either
payment even though listed on a current CDEP participant schedule. These possibilities
do not arise for non-identifying unemployment payments clients, to whom CDEP
participation is not applicable. 
Abstudy administration as a source of breaching
A similar issue to the CDEP schedules problem was also perceived to exist in relation to
applicants for Abstudy who would often remain on unemployment payments after
lodging an Abstudy application and awaiting its determination. If the application was
approved and Abstudy back pay received, unemployment payments already received for
the period would become an overpayment for which the applicant was not eligible and
which Centrelink would normally wish to recover. However, no coordination between
Abstudy and unemployment payments administration was in place to adjust Abstudy
back payments in the light of unemployment payments already received for the
relevant period. This lack of coordination created an unnecessary overpayment and put
indigenous clients in the invidious position of having to pay back entitlements which
would have been better adjusted for directly between Abstudy and unemployment
payments administration. 
At the time when the social security database was examined and when discussion sessions
took place, Austudy also still existed and was somewhat separate from Centrelink’s
unemployment payments administration. Hence a somewhat similar issue could have
arisen for non-identifying people moving between unemployment payments and
Austudy. However, this was not generally seen as anything like as prevalent a problem
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as the transition from unemployment payments to Abstudy. Also, since mid 1998,
Austudy has become more integrated with social security administration, partly
disappearing into Youth Allowance and being integrated onto the common computing
platform for Newstart and other payments. Abstudy, however, has not. Hence the
potential for breaching which can arise through lack of administrative coordination in the
transition from unemployment payments to education payments has probably become
more skewed towards indigenous identifiers in recent months.
Access to disability support pension
In several discussion sessions it was suggested that indigenous breach rates may be high
because some indigenous people who were on unemployment payments would be more
appropriately on Disability Support Pension, but were not because of difficulties accessing
that payment. Difficulties related to issues such as not having treating doctors who knew
them well enough to report on their condition, or once again the issue of the confidence of
the clients in dealing with bureaucratic forms and procedures. Indigenous clients with
disabilities of various sorts who were, somewhat inappropriately, on unemployment
payments were seen as far more likely to breach administrative and activity test
requirements than other unemployment payment recipients.
In other discussion sessions, it became evident that some Centrelink officers had made
conscious efforts to move people, including indigenous people, off unemployment
payments onto Disability Support Pension, if this was seen as possible and more
appropriate for their circumstances. Officers often said that they emphasised to clients that
this should not necessarily be seen as a permanent move. This was in order to attempt to
avoid the idea of disability and being outside the workforce as a permanent state, rather
than just part of a client’s circumstances for the time being. 
Identification
One final issue raised in discussion sessions was that of indigenous identification itself.
Many officers felt that the numbers of indigenous identifiers in the unemployment
payments database for their office areas were low compared with the number interacted
with day to day. This raised issues about whether staff were always asking the indigenous
identification question, whether indigenous people were being encouraged to identify and
whether indigenous identification was then being coded into the computerised database.
There were some suggestions that staff might not be asking the indigenous identification
question and that indigenous clients might not be being encouraged to identify because
identification does not affect eligibility for unemployment payments in any way. There
was also the suggestion that even when asked and responded to positively, indigenous
identification might not find its way onto the computer record because it was not a
‘compulsory’ coding field: that is, the computer system did not require a code to be
entered for that field before decision making could proceed.
It was generally felt that indigenous identification should become a compulsory coding
field within the computing system and that staff should be encouraged to always ask the
identification question, even though it did not directly affect unemployment payment
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eligibility. It was generally recognised that indigenous identification is, and should
remain, voluntary for clients, who may not wish to so identify even though possibly
identifying as indigenous in other contexts. However, indigenous-identified staff in
particular felt that indigenous people should be encouraged to identify in order to
demonstrate more clearly the magnitude of the indigenous servicing task. Just
occasionally it was suggested that indigenous identification could be used against
indigenous clients. However, on balance, indigenous identification within the social
security system was seen as important, of benefit and to be encouraged.
Summary of major findings
Large numbers of reasons why breach rates among indigenous identifiers are higher than
among non-identifiers were suggested in discussion sessions. These ranged from issues
relating to literacy and mobility, confidence, appeals and review, the roles of compliance/
review units and employment service providers, labour market discrimination and
expectations, to CDEP and Abstudy administrative issues. 
It was also generally recognised that significant adaptations already exist within income
support administration to the circumstances and servicing needs of indigenous clients.
These include indigenous-identified staff, the use of third party intermediaries and non-
standard procedures. Without these adaptations, differentials in breach rates between
the indigenous identifying clientele and non-identifiers would probably be significantly
greater. 
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6. Analytic schema of unemployment payments 
administration
The analysis, thus far, has done two things. First, it has examined, from a number of
perspectives, statistics on unemployment payment breaching and activity test exemption
among indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers. Second, it has identified issues which
Centrelink officers, indigenous clients and intermediaries involved in discussion sessions
raised as possible explanations of, and contextualisations for, differences in these
statistics between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers. What is now needed is a
more comprehensive analytic view, a means of integrating the statistical findings and the
more contextual discussion session findings. This chapter aims to develop an analytic
schema, or framework, of the nature of unemployment payments administration which
can provide that integration. The schema has several elements, which are dealt with
under separate subheadings. But these elements are also inter-related and the final section
of the chapter explicitly combines them in a way which emphasises the inevitable scope
for discretion and judgment in unemployment payments administration. 
Tensions and ambiguities in income support administration
The first element of this analytic schema, or framework, is to recognise that there are very
significant tensions and ambiguities in unemployment payments administration, and in
income support administration more generally. Income support administration attempts
to meet the needs of individuals and families for income. But it also attempts to protect
the public purse, only making payments when the need for income is substantial and
substantiated. This attempt to balance the meeting of income needs with the protection
of the public purse is a major source of tension and ambiguity within income support
administration. 
There is also considerable tension and ambiguity in common understandings of the social
security system, as to whether it should be regarded as guaranteeing a minimum income
for all in need, or being somewhat more selective in the provision of income only to those
who ‘deserve’ it. The former would seem to be implied by the common use of the
metaphor of a safety net to describe the social security system and by the existence within
the legislation of a ‘Special Benefit’ which can be paid to people who do not qualify for
other payments and who, for whatever reason, cannot ‘earn a sufficient livelihood’ for
themselves or their dependents.21 Some people also openly worry about leaving people
with no income when the rules don’t seem to include their situation. That cannot be right,
they suggest, as the purpose of the system is to provide people with a minimum income. 
But the current social security system is sometimes distinguished from a guaranteed
minimum income system, implying that the current approach does not guarantee income
without conditions. Also some officers are quite matter of fact about leaving people
without income when their circumstances don’t seem to fit the rules. If they don’t meet
the rules, they don’t get paid-and what they then do for income is not ‘our’ concern.
People who miss out on other payments may apply for Special Benefit-but there is a clear
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reluctance within the system to use this payment widely as a residual, catch all category.
Special benefit is in fact used very sparingly. So tensions and ambiguities abound about
the purposes of social security and are clearly evident both in discussion of the system
and in its day-to-day administration.
If we focus specifically on unemployment payments, the potential for tension and
ambiguity is even greater. These payments are required to meet the income needs of the
unemployed while simultaneously encouraging people of workforce age to seek and gain
employment. This, of course, is the reason for the existence of the activity test, as an
additional eligibility criteria above and beyond that of being unemployed. In this
payment area, perhaps more than others, the idea of providing a minimum income is in
direct tension with another idea altogether; that of encouraging people to seek
employment in order to derive income. 
Another source of tension and ambiguity within social security administration is whether
to accept what applicants say about their circumstances or to attempt to ascertain and
verify circumstances independently. At one level clients are, and have to be, trusted.
Most of what they say about their circumstances is, and has, to be accepted. But where
opportunities for checking information are readily available, through third parties such
as employers or other government agencies, then income support administration will
tend to utilise such sources. Clients, therefore, are both trusted and mistrusted in their
dealings with the administrators, which again is a source of both tension and ambiguity. 
Office cultures and roles
A second element of this analytic schema, or framework, is to recognise that there are a
number of different office cultures and roles within income support administration,
which vary considerably in their perspectives and work practices. 
In local/regional offices, client processing is the focus of office activity. Large numbers of
clients have to be dealt with daily. The aim, at least implicitly, is to stabilise the flow of
clients; get them processed in an orderly fashion and in a way which will be sustainable
over time given existing resources and procedures. Formal legislative rules and associated
administrative guidelines do not loom particularly large in day-to-day office practices.
They are sometimes referred to in order to handle difficult or unusual cases. But they are
largely just ‘known’ from past practice, as a set of constraints or boundaries within which
local/regional administrators know they have to work.
In central office, which nowadays includes most of DSS as policy provider and service
delivery purchaser and Centrelink National Support Office as service delivery provider,
client processing is a minor almost non-existent activity. Clients themselves are never
seen and only the most difficult and indeterminate of cases get referred here. But
legislative rules and their associated administrative guidelines loom much larger. These
are the means by which central office acts in its relations with those lower down the
administrative hierarchy. Rules and administrative guidelines are the tools of the central
office’s trade. Writing rules and devising administrative procedures which are clear,
relevant and can be fairly applied across a large range of individual cases is something of
an ideal in central office administrative culture. 
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Between the central and local/regional levels of income support administration is another
mediating office culture, attached to area and, to some extent, State offices. This brings
together some of the concerns of both client processing and rule and procedure making,
but in many ways acts more as a two-way site for transmission and filtering. One central
administration cannot deal intelligently and comprehensively with over 300 separate
local/regional offices. Thus, small local offices are attached to larger regional offices, and
regional offices are grouped into areas, which articulate with State offices as well as
central office. These groupings of offices share experiences and develop networks of
understanding based on proximity and similarity of working environments. 
Cross-cutting this hierarchy of office cultures are a variety of office roles, sometimes
themselves given the status of office sub-cultures. One of these, mentioned previously, is
the role of compliance/review units. The task of these units is to selectively and more
intensively review clients who are already on a payment, to see if they are still eligible.
It is, by its very nature, an investigative or ‘control-oriented’ task. From the client’s point
of view, it will probably be experienced as mistrustful intrusion, a checking up. Apart
from being left on payment at the existing level, the most worrying and likely outcome
for the client is that they will be cut off payment, or have their payment reduced. There
are, of course, instances of clients payments being adjusted upwards as a result of
intensive reviews, but this does not greatly change general client perceptions of the
control-oriented, cost saving nature of the intensive review process. When it is alleged
that such compliance/review units have developed a sub-culture of their own, it is often
being suggested that they have taken this control-oriented aspect of their work too far,
that they are chronically suspicious of clients and have lost all feeling for their underlying
needs and circumstances.
Those making these sorts of allegations about compliance/review units are not just
clients, but can themselves be from within income support administration. They
represent more ‘client-oriented’ roles or sub-cultures within the administration, which
can draw on people as diverse as initial grant officers, social workers and, in relation to
indigenous-identified clients, indigenous-identified staff. These roles are more concerned
with getting people onto payments, than getting them off. So it is understandable that
they come to see and understand things more from a client perspective than do those
involved in compliance/review work.
Officers can and do move between these more ‘control-oriented’ and more ‘client-
oriented’ roles and sub-cultures within income support administration. Not all income
support administrators can be clearly cast into one sub-culture or the other, and indeed
it would be fair to say that most officers combine elements of both. But there is some
degree of role differentiation and sub-culture development which needs to be
acknowledged as part of income support administration. In many ways this role
differentiation simply reflects the tensions and ambiguities in the social security system,
discussed in the previous section. However, it also derives in part from the process
specialisation inherent in current income support administrative structures.
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Cultural and social content of rules and procedures
A third aspect of the analytic schema is to recognise that rules and procedures, no matter
how simple and apparently unexceptional, are not universal. Rather, they are imbued
with the cultural and social content of the dominant circumstances from which, and for
which, they were derived. No rule or procedure comes from nowhere, and every rule or
procedure reflects in many subtle and complex ways the cultural and social
circumstances in which it arose.
Take, for example, the rule that clients will be corresponded with when decisions are
made about their payments. At one level, this seems unexceptional, good administrative
practice derived from a legislative requirement. But is it in fact a legislative requirement
and is it always good administrative practice? What does it assume about the clients, are
these assumptions valid and are they really relevant to the payments being made?
Corresponding with clients assumes a number of different things: that they have a
reasonably stable and sure address, that they have reasonable access to postal services,
that they are literate enough to deal with social security letters,22 or alternatively, have
access to someone helpful who is, and that they are confident enough with social security
administration to then make contact with Centrelink and have the matter progressed. 
While these assumptions may seem reasonable and unexceptional in relation to most non-
indigenous clients, they may not be so reasonable or unexceptional in relation to many
indigenous clients. This is evident from the analysis of issues raised in discussion sessions
detailed in Chapter 5. Many of these issues call into question just the sorts of assumptions
that are being made in sending out a piece of correspondence and expecting it to be
received, comprehended and responded to. These are all assumptions which come from
the dominant non-indigenous context around which the Australian social security
system has been conceived and designed. They reflect that context very strongly and
cannot be simply transposed without adjustment or adaptation to other cultural or social
circumstances, such as those of many indigenous Australians.
Corresponding with clients may be as much an assumed procedure of social security
administration as a definitive legislative rule.23 But definitive legislative rules are also
derived from specific social and cultural contexts and are also not always easily transposed
to other contexts. Take, for example, the central eligibility criteria of unemployment
payments, those of being unemployed and being willing to undertake and actively seeking
suitable paid employment. What does it mean to be unemployed? And what does it mean
to be willing to undertake and actively seeking suitable paid work? The answers to these
questions are not self-evident. They are derived from the context and norms of dominant
labour market and industry structures in Australian society. 
Being unemployed, for example, is not necessarily taken within the social security system
as meaning having no work at all. S.595 of the Social Security Act empowers social security
administrators to disregard some paid work undertaken by an applicant, because of its
‘nature’, ‘duration’ or for other reasons, and to treat the person as unemployed. But there
are limits imposed. Being unemployed is taken as meaning only having fairly short, casual
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hours of work and having large amounts of additional time free to take up other work. One
cannot, for example, be a full-time student or the proprietor of a time-consuming self-
employed business, no matter how unprofitable, and also be unemployed.
Being willing to undertake and actively seeking suitable paid work is a similarly complex
issue derived from the norms of Australian society. How willing and active must one be?
What is a reasonable level of actively seeking work? Is one, two, five or six employer
contacts per week reasonable? What other sorts of activities, such as training or
community work, might also be taken as indicating willingness? How should numbers of
employer contacts be adjusted in light of these other activities?
Finally, there is the equally complex and equally socially constructed issue of what
constitutes suitable work. S.601(2A) of the Social Security Act attempts to delineate types
of work that may be unsuitable-such as work for which the person lacks skills,
experience or qualifications, work that would aggravate a disability or injury or
constitute a risk to health, work that is offered at less than award rates of remuneration
or work that would involve unreasonable commuting. All of these provisions emphasise
the socially constructed nature of the concept of unsuitable work – and even the addition
of a provision which allows work to be regarded as unsuitable for any other reason still
does not overcome the need for social construction in order for the rules to make sense.
Even in the dominant Australian industrial and labour market context then, these central
eligibility rules for unemployment payments may be somewhat contentious and
indeterminate. And this is the context for which these rules were designed and from
which they were derived. How much more contentious and indeterminate might these
same rules be in the industry and labour market structures in which indigenous people
are involved and which differ significantly from these dominant industry and labour
market norms? 
Take, for example, the remote area pastoral industry and, in particular, the recently
growing sector within that industry of Aboriginal-owned pastoral properties. Whereas a
pastoral property in non-indigenous ownership may have provided employment and
income for perhaps one non-indigenous family and some seasonal contractors, on
acquisition by Aboriginal interests it may be expected to support a somewhat larger
ownership group, often referred to as the Aboriginal ‘community’. What will happen to
the pastoral property’s commercial and labour market structure in this new
circumstance? The answer is probably that both the commercial viability and the labour
market structure will be somewhat diluted. Work will be spread more widely among the
larger ownership group and be done more in line with indigenous people’s social norms.
Cattle will be used for larger amounts of ‘owner-consumption’ and lesser amounts for
commercial sale. The enterprise will probably become more commercially marginal,
though also, from an indigenous perspective, more socially useful. It will become part of
a different, more commercially marginal industry and labour market structure.
The question which arises for social security administration is what does employment
and unemployment mean in this different, more commercially marginal industry and
labour market structure. If people living on such a pastoral property apply for
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unemployment payments and say that they are doing a bit of work on the property, and
occasionally getting paid something for it, are they unemployed? If they say they only
really want to work on that pastoral property because they are members of its ownership
group, then are they available for and willing to undertake suitable paid work? If the
answer to both these questions is yes, then what should such people do to show that they
are actively seeking suitable paid work? Would working voluntarily or engaging in
training with the pastoral enterprise be taken as an appropriate activity. If again the
answer is yes, then the person appears to have met the eligibility criteria for
unemployment payments. But if the answer given to any of these three questions by the
local Centrelink office is no, then unemployment payments will not be payable. The
person will be seen as either not unemployed, not available for work, or not actively
seeking and willing to undertake suitable paid work. 
During locality visits, it became evident that numerous circumstances like the above
existed in pastoral areas of Australia. In most instances unemployment payments were
being paid and were effectively providing some wage subsidy for these marginal
Aboriginal-owned pastoral enterprises/communities. In some instances, however,
unemployment payments were not being paid, since those involved were seen as failing
in some way to meet one of the three eligibility criteria. In yet other instances, the
questions were elided because the Aboriginal-owned pastoral enterprise had a CDEP. But
if the enterprise lost that CDEP support, as at least one recently had, what then was the
employment/unemployment status of their residents/workers/owners?
These issues about employment, unemployment and eligibility or ineligibility for
unemployment payments on Aboriginal-owned pastoral properties are not new. Writing
on unemployment payments to Aboriginal people in 1985, a similar example was used
drawn from 1981–82 (Sanders 1985: 159–60). What was notable about cases which were
identified during locality visits in 1998 was their essential similarity to this earlier one.
The number of cases had grown, with the further development of the Aboriginal-owned
sector of the pastoral industry and its somewhat different commercial and labour market
structure from the non-indigenous-owned sector of the industry. But the essential
elements of the cases had not greatly changed. 
This new indigenous-owned pastoral industry sector provides a very clear illustration of
the cultural and social content of unemployment payment rules, and the scope for
indeterminacy in social security decision making when rules are applied to unanticipated
and different industrial and labour market contexts from the ones from which and for
which they were derived. Other examples of relevance to indigenous people are various
forms of fishing and diving for sea foods, or mutton birding, which lead to some income.
At what level does commitment to such activities become self-employment and affect
basic eligibility for unemployment payments?
ANALYTIC SCHEMA OF UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION ♦  113
Diversity of the unemployed
The fourth aspect of the analytic schema of unemployment payments administration is
the diversity of the unemployed. Unemployed people are, for many social security
purposes, categorised together. They are dealt with by the same teams/units of
administrative officers, placed in the same administrative databases and granted the
same types of payments. But they are, in reality, a very diverse group. This diversity
needs to be recognised and understood if we are to comprehend and analyse the
dynamics of unemployment payments administration, including breach rate patterns
and related issues. 
In Chapter 2, it was noted that the dominant income unit type among unemployment
payment recipients is the unpartnered person with no dependent children, accounting
for slightly over 70 per cent of unemployment payment income units among both
indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers (see Tables 2.7a and 2.7b). Although dominant,
this income unit type is itself internally diverse, divided into young and old, male and
female, skilled and less skilled, experienced and less experienced, long-term and short-
term unemployed, residents of urban, rural and remote areas. Once these dimensions of
diversity are acknowledged and the partnered income units types are included as well,
the supposedly unified body of unemployment payment recipients starts to look like a
large number of smaller categories of payment recipients, with significantly different
characteristics and likely propensities to find employment. 
A young, inexperienced, single, unemployed person is very different from the skilled,
experienced 45 year-old casualty of industrial restructuring with a dependent spouse and
children. And they are even more different if the former is an indigenous person living
in a rural or remote area. These unemployed people are all, in turn, very different from
the single parent in their late thirties or forties, whether indigenous or non-indigenous,
attempting to enter or re-enter the workforce after some years of full-time childcare
responsibilities. Even this group will be internally diverse, ranging from those with good
pre-child-rearing education and skills on which to build, to those with few or no such
skills and education. These again will be different from the long-term unemployed person
with drug, alcohol or other health problems trying to re-establish themselves in the
workforce, or the person in their late 50s with a grown-up family retrenched from an
industry which is contracting its employee numbers. 
These images of the diversity of the unemployed and the different challenges and
circumstances they face could be elaborated considerably. Their purpose here is merely
illustrative and suggestive. What they suggest most strongly is that a ‘one size fits all’
approach to unemployment payments administration is unlikely to work particularly
well. Standard procedures applied to all unemployment payment recipients are unlikely
to have an equal impact on all or to be equally appropriate for all. This, arguably, was the
case in the past, when all unemployment payment recipients were required to lodge an
SU19 every two weeks giving names and addresses of two employers they had
approached for work during the period. For those among the unemployed who had little
prospect of finding work in their current circumstances and local labour market, this
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requirement was often met in a most cursory fashion. It was seen as unrealistic in their
circumstances and so virtually any answer to the question was generally accepted. In a
sense, this procedure taught these types of unemployed people to lie in their dealings
with the social security system. 
What is needed in unemployment payments administration is a more diversified
approach, which imposes different procedural activity test requirements on individual
applicants depending on their circumstances. To a large extent existing legislative
provisions and administrative law principles allow and support such an approach.
However, the tendency in administration is often to standardise and routinise such open-
ended individualised procedures in order to reduce variability and to cope with large
case loads. This issue of the diversity of the unemployed, and the need for further
development of appropriate individualised activity test procedures and requirements is
crucial and will be returned to in the final chapter of this monograph.
Combining elements: indeterminacy, discretion and judgement in 
unemployment payments administration
Four elements of an analytic schema, or framework, for understanding unemployment
payments administration have now been outlined: general tensions and ambiguities in
income support administration, different office cultures and roles, the cultural and social
content of rules and procedures and the diversity of the unemployed. If all these elements
of the analytic schema are combined, they lead to the suggestion that levels of
indeterminacy, discretion and judgement involved in unemployment payments
administration are very substantial and significant. Applying rules and procedures to the
circumstances of applicants for unemployment payments is no easy, automatic or
uncontested task. The potential is high for different interpretations of rules and
procedures to emerge in different social and cultural contexts, different industry and
labour market structures and different Centrelink offices. Different adaptations of rules
and procedures to make them workable in diverse real life contexts are also likely to
emerge. Discretion and judgement, in the broadest senses of those terms, are both ever
present and inevitable in unemployment payments administration and can be used very
differently in different settings. 
This combining of elements of the analytic schema and recognition of the inevitably high
levels of discretion, judgment and indeterminacy in unemployment payments
administration leads back to where this study began: to concerns about difference and
equality between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers in unemployment payments
administration, as reflected in social security databases. It is to these issues of difference
and equality that the study now returns, before focusing finally on ideas for further
action in better managing indigenous identifier breach rates and related issues.
 ♦  115
7. Issues of difference and equality
When the Activity Test Section within DSS national administration approached CAEPR to
undertake this study, it was concerned about the differences that were showing up in
national unemployment payment breach rate statistics between indigenous identifiers and
non-identifiers. The Activity Test Section staff seem to have expected, and hoped for, an
equality or close similarity of statistics across the identification categories. This would
have been taken as a significant indicator of fairness within unemployment payments
administration between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Alternatively, the
Activity Test Section staff wanted to be able to understand the differences in statistics that
were evident in order to ensure that these differences were appropriate and justifiable.
Was this expectation of statistical equality or similarity a reasonable one? Was the
implied equation of equal statistics with fairness also reasonable? Were differences in
statistics appropriate and justifiable, or were they indicating some unfairness in the
system? These are all questions about issues of difference and equality between
indigenous and non-indigenous people and how we should react to these key concepts in
the context of unemployment payments administration. 
The relationship between issues of difference and equality in government policy and
administration relating to indigenous Australians is by no means simple or
straightforward. The concepts are often somewhat in tension with one another and need
to be reconciled, or balanced, for the particular context in which they are being applied
(see, for example, Sanders 1998). 
During the course of this study, two other dimensions of statistical difference emerged,
besides that between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, which were also of some
concern to central office administrators within DSS and Centrelink. These were
differences among Centrelink offices and differences over time. From the cultural
perspective of income support central office administrators, differences in statistics are
inevitably matters of concern. The possibility that they may represent organisational
failings, such as unnecessary variations in rank and file practice or unjustified treatment
of indigenous identifiers in comparison to non-identifiers, is immediately recognised.
However, organisational failings need not be the necessary conclusion of any observation
of statistical difference. Differences need to be interpreted and understood, and the idea
of equality of statistics as a standard of organisational fairness needs to be adjudged and
contextualised.
This chapter argues that, in the light of the analytic schema of the previous chapter, the
extent of difference observed in unemployment payments breach and activity test
exemption statistics between indigenous-identifiers and non-identifiers, between various
Centrelink offices and over time, is not all that great. The statistics drawn from the two
databases may, in fact, be more notable for their restricted variability than for their acute
differences. The chapter also argues that there are already very significant adaptations
within the social security system which take considerable account of indigenous
identifiers circumstances and that without these adaptations statistical differences,
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between different offices and between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, could
well be far greater. Finally the chapter argues that the ideal of equality of breach rate
statistics as a indicator of fairness is a reasonable one, if suitably qualified and
contextualised. Arriving at these three evaluative positions in relation to issues of
difference and equality requires some further elaboration.
Interpreting difference
Differences in statistics, like unemployment breach rates and activity test exemption
rates, do not speak for themselves. They need to be interpreted. The analytic schema of
the previous chapter would seem to suggest that there is very considerable potential for
differences in unemployment payments administration statistics both between
indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, between offices and over time. All four
elements of the schema point in various ways to the indeterminacy of unemployment
payments administration and the high levels of discretion and judgment necessarily
involved. Discretion and judgment may be used very differently in different offices and
over time to resolve the many tensions and ambiguities that are inherent in
unemployment payments administration. The indeterminacy of rules and procedures will
be particularly high when applied to indigenous people’s circumstances which are
significantly different from the cultural and social circumstances from which, and for
which, those rules and procedures were originally derived. The diversity of the
unemployed can also contribute to differences in statistics since, however that diversity
is conceptualised and defined, it is bound to be the case that indigenous people served by
particular offices will not be a representative cross-section of unemployment payments
recipients. Differences between the indigenous clientele and the non-identifying clientele
should be expected, to some extent, to be reflected in differences in indigenous-identifier
and non-identifier breach and activity test exemption statistics, whether at the national,
local/regional or other geographic levels.
There is a strong argument to be made, therefore that, in the light of the analytic schema
of the previous chapter, the extent of differences in breach and activity test exemption
statistics between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, between Centrelink offices
and over time, are not that surprising. The statistics may indeed be more notable for their
relative lack of variability than for the acuteness of differences. The one exception to this
would seem to be the Northern Territory, which does seem to have some quite distinctive
unemployment breach and activity test exemption statistics. 
The Northern Territory social security administration does clearly have a quite
distinctive geographically based office culture which is highly aware of servicing,
workability and appropriateness issues in relation to indigenous identifiers. This is
unsurprising. The proportion of indigenous unemployment payment clients in the
Northern Territory is up towards a half, unlike anywhere else. As a result of this
awareness, Northern Territory breach and activity test exemption statistics are unlike
anywhere else. Indigenous identifier breach rates are roughly equal to those of non-
identifiers in Northern Territory urban areas, while in remote areas they are actually
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lower than non-identifier breach rates, built on higher activity test exemption rates (see
Chapter 4). These Northern Territory patterns of statistics are quite exceptional, but also
quite understandable. 
Being both exceptional and understandable, these Northern Territory statistics point to
the lack of variability in statistical patterns elsewhere. Outside the Northern Territory,
the statistics are notable for their consistency. In almost all other geographic areas, no
matter how locally defined, indigenous-identifier breach rates are higher than non-
identifier breach rates. Nationally, in almost every age and gender group, every income
unit type and both time series, indigenous-identifier breach rates are higher than non-
identifier breach rates by about the usual factors of one-and-a-half times for activity test
breaches and twice for administrative breaches. 
Observing adaptations
This consistency in breach and activity test exemption statistics outside the Northern
Territory suggests that there are already very substantial adaptations that have been
made in social security administration to the circumstances of local indigenous
populations. The most significant of these adaptations, as noted in Chapter 5, is the
appointment of indigenous-identified service/liaison officers and the use in service
delivery of both formal and informal external intermediaries. Without these two major
adaptations, differences in breach rate statistics would almost certainly be much greater
than they are, both between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers and between
local/regional offices. In remote areas, where reliance on external intermediaries and
indigenous-identified staff is greatest, breach rates among the indigenous identifying
clientele would almost certainly increase dramatically without these existing adaptations.
But indigenous breach rates in other areas could also increase significantly, were these
adaptations not present.
The Northern Territory income support administration’s distinctive procedures for
remote area unemployment payment clients can also be seen as a major adaptation of the
system to the circumstances of a significant element of the indigenous clientele. This
adaptation has been so successful that it has in fact led to breach rates among indigenous
people in remote areas of the Northern Territory being lower than among non-identifiers,
unlike anywhere else. However, it has also driven up activity test exemption rates to
unusual levels, so that the image of statistical difference between indigenous identifiers
and non-identifiers is at one level lessened and at another level reinforced. 
The Northern Territory administration’s approach is, in many ways, very open and
honest. It confronts the standardising tendencies of general rules and procedures and
insists that rules and procedures need to be developed and interpreted differently for
different working environments. This is an approach which is to be lauded and
monitored, rather than criticised or censored. It openly confronts the cultural and social
content of rules and procedures in unemployment payments administration and the
diversity of the unemployed, including among indigenous people. The current Northern
Territory approach may, however, have a down side, in that it relegates virtually all
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people in remote localities to the status of having few employment prospects. Even in
these localities there may be some individuals among the indigenous unemployed who do
have some chances of gaining employment.
Many significant adaptations to the circumstances of indigenous people do, clearly,
already exist within income support administration and need to be understood and
analysed. Generally these adaptations can be seen as lessening what might otherwise be
starker statistical differences between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers in social
security administrative data sets. However in some cases, such as in Northern Territory
remote area unemployment payment procedures and activity test exemption rates,
adaptations may, in fact, show up as even starker differences in statistics. 
Equality and fairness: outcomes and processes
Implicit in the DSS Activity Test Section’s original concern about national breach rate
statistics was some sense that equality of statistics may be an indicator of system fairness.
If breach rates were the same for indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers, then the
social security system could be argued to be working justly between the two groups. As
an ideal, there is nothing wrong with this approach. However, equality of statistics may
need to be modified somewhat in practice, even as a goal towards which social security
administration should be working. 
The pursuit of statistical equality can, in some instances, involve an oppressive and
inappropriate insistence on sameness. Dealing with the difference and diversity of the
indigenous unemployed should not become a matter of insisting on sameness at the cost
of distinctive indigenous ways. Insisting on equal employment and unemployment
outcomes among indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers may be an instance of
imposing such inappropriate sameness and of denying indigenous people their right to
self-determination in relation to employment and economic status (see, for example,
Sanders 1991). However, this is not so much of a concern here, since what is being
projected as the ideal towards which social security administration should be working is
more a matter of equality of process.
Breach rate statistics identify what is happening to indigenous identifiers and non-
identifiers once they enter the unemployment payments system. The ideal of achieving
procedural equality within that system is quite a good one. It does not insist on
substantive sameness, but it does monitor administrative processes to see if they are
having unequal impacts on particular categories of clients. In the light of the cultural and
social content of rules and procedures and the diversity of the unemployed, unequal
impacts of unemployment payments administration are to be expected, and indeed are
likely to prove reasonably intractable. However, some movement towards procedural
equality over time might be taken as indicating some success in coming to grips with both
the diversity of the unemployed and the cultural and social content of rules and
procedures. It may indicate that more appropriate rules and procedures for particular
unemployed people’s circumstances have indeed been devised.
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It should, perhaps, be noted in closing that it is the Northern Territory social security
administration which comes closest to achieving the implicit ideal of procedural equality
between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers. There, in urban areas, indigenous
identifier and non-identifier breach rates are close to equal. In remote areas, however, the
Northern Territory social security administration appears to have somewhat over-
reached the procedural equality standard. Through exempting large numbers of remote
area clients from any job search aspects of the activity test, the Northern Territory
administration has driven down indigenous identifier breach rates in these areas to well
below those of non-identifiers.
This return to the Northern Territory situation serves to reinforce the point that even
procedural equality within unemployment payments administration is an ideal which
needs to be monitored and contextualised. It is a good ideal towards which to be working,
but even as it is approached or achieved in certain areas, the reasons for this need to be
analysed and the ideal itself re-assessed. Applying the activity test appropriately and
reasonably to the diverse individual circumstances of unemployment payment applicants
may well always generate different statistics for indigenous identifiers and non-
identifiers, and this needs to be acknowledged and accepted.
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8. Ideas for further action
This final chapter suggests some ideas for further action which may help to better manage
the involvement of indigenous identifying people in unemployment payments
administration and reduce statistical differences between indigenous identifier and non-
identifier breach rates. It does so from the basis of the perspective established in the last
two chapters: that is that some differences in breach rates statistics between indigenous
and other Australians are to be expected as a result of the diversity of the unemployed,
the cultural and social content of unemployment payment rules and procedures, different
office cultures and roles, and tensions and ambiguities in social security administration;
that these differences in statistics are likely to prove fairly intractable, but that the ideal
of achieving procedural equality within unemployment payments administration
between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers is a good goal still worth pursuing.
This perspective also acknowledges that substantial adaptations to indigenous people’s
circumstances are already built in to income support administration. The ideas in this
chapter, therefore, would be contributing to further adaptive action within the social
security system, rather than beginning anything new or unprecedented. Indeed, some of
the ideas for further action suggested here have already been progressed further during
the course of the research. 
These ideas for further action are discussed under a number of sub-headings, as discrete
topics. However, their greatest effect would be through interaction and mutual
reinforcement. They need, therefore, to be considered together, as well as separately.
Further recognising diversity of the unemployed 
(or not teaching applicants to lie)
The first idea for further action relates to the end point of the analysis arrived at in
Chapter 6; recognising the diversity of the unemployed. This is not a new theme in
discussions of unemployment payments administration. The Social Security Review of
the late 1980s identified the diversity of unemployment payment recipients as a major
issue and suggested very strongly that different approaches were required for different
types of unemployed people (Cass 1988). That Review noted some movements in the mid
1980s in this direction, such as the introduction of Job Search Allowance for 16 and
17 year-olds in January 1988, and the 1986/87 budget’s relaxation of the frequency of
reporting requirements for unemployment payment recipients over age 55 with payment
durations over 12 months (Cass 1988: 199, 219). Since then, much more has been done to
recognise the diversity of the unemployed within unemployment payments
administration. The activity test has been broadened beyond job search, a distinct youth
allowance has been introduced, variable frequency reporting has been introduced for all
age groups of unemployment payment recipients depending on other characteristics such
as the extent of other earnings and duration of unemployment payments, a job seeker
classification index has been introduced and so too have different categories of
employment service providers. 
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These reforms do not yet go far enough in recognising the diversity of the unemployed.
There are still unemployment payment recipients being asked to meet job search
requirements which are not particularly realistic, given the state of their local labour
markets and their own skill and experience levels. It is still common to observe people
with few immediate employment prospects filling in forms asking for substantial numbers
of employer contacts. Contacts listed by such people are likely to have been made fairly
cursorily, and in some instances are unlikely to have occurred at all. The lists seem to be
only minimally scrutinised by customer service officers and to serve little if any purpose
in unemployment payments administration in relation to these people. The only thing
these unrealistic job search requirements may achieve, as suggested in Chapter 6, is to
teach applicants to lie in their dealings with unemployment payments administrators. This
is not a good outcome, as it may have implications for the other aspects of information
gathering and scrutiny involved in income support administration.
The choice for unemployment payments administration seems clear. Either it must make
activity test requirements imposed on diverse individual unemployment payment
recipients a realistic reflection of their particular labour market position, experience and
skills, or it will continue to teach applicants to lie in their dealings with income support
administrators. Standard procedures which impose unrealistic job search requirements
on particular unemployed individuals will end up undermining respect for and truthful
dealing with the social security system as a whole. This is a fairly stark characterisation
and prognosis. But it is one that can be addressed and rectified through mechanisms
already in place, such as individualised activity test agreements. These have the potential
not only to tailor activity test requirements to individual circumstances and local labour
market conditions, but also to engender trust in the officer/client relationship. Clients
would be making an agreement with Centrelink on realistic activity test requirements for
their own particular circumstances and skills and would then be judged against their
own agreed requirements. This gives clients an active role in the administrative process.
They are involved in identifying activity test requirements that are realistic and
appropriate for them, and then also in the enforcement of those requirements. This may
be fairer, more efficient and more trust-building than applying standard procedures
which may not be very appropriate to particular applicants’ circumstances. The facility
for individualised activity test agreements already exists within social security
legislation and administration, but has perhaps not yet been used widely and
innovatively enough to reflect the full range of diversity of the unemployed and to build
reciprocal trust with clients.
A No Correspondence Client facility
A second idea for further action is the development of a No Correspondence Client
facility. This is intended to address a range of issues which arise in relation to indigenous
identifiers and their higher breach rates, such as low levels of literacy, high levels of
residential mobility and poor access to postal services. Such a facility could, however, be
applied to some non-identifiers as well.
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The No Correspondence Client facility would require customers to ‘check in’ with
Centrelink administrators at regular intervals. But in between times no unanticipated
changes would be made to their unemployment payments and no correspondence would
be sent out. At check in, review procedures would be carried out and agreement reached
for a payment and activity test regime until the next check in/review. 
This No Correspondence Client facility may be seen as offending requirements in the
Social Security Act that clients be advised in writing of decisions being made about their
payments (see Social Security Act s.1302). However, such an interpretation need not
prevail. Clients could be advised in writing at the time of their check-in/review in order
for this formal requirement to be met. What is being avoided by the No Correspondence
Client facility is the cycle of unanticipated letters to unstable addresses evoking no, or
uncertain, responses. 
During interviews and discussion sessions, it emerged that Centrelink’s National
Indigenous Consultative Group was exploring a similar idea to the No Correspondence
Client facility, referring to it as a ‘Physical Lodgment/Review Client’ facility. The idea
clearly has some merit and needs to be explored more fully. If implemented, these ideas
would be a major service delivery innovation in income support administration. New
arrangements may take some getting used to, both for clients and for local/regional office
administrators. But they may also have very significant potential to address some of the
issues raised in discussion sessions as driving up indigenous identifier breach rates,
particularly the administrative breach rates. Such a facility could be seen as a major step
towards making the procedures of income support administration more sympathetic and
appropriate to the cultural and social circumstances of indigenous people, rather than
simply imposing on indigenous people procedures and norms drawn from very different
non-indigenous circumstances.
No correspondence clients would still be able to be breached, either administratively for
not turning up for their regular check in/review or more substantially for not meeting
their activity test requirements. But if check-in/review arrangements and activity test
requirements are both organised with client consultation and agreement, Centrelink will
at least be in the defensible position of having attempted to service clients in a manner of
their choosing which is appropriate to their circumstances. Breaching may in fact
decrease simply as a result of clients feeling that they have been part of the process of
designing an administrative regime which is appropriate for them.
The No Correspondence Client idea generally attracted positive reactions when raised in
discussion sessions. It was seen by some officers as also having potential for saving
Centrelink considerable time and money. Less correspondence could be sent out and
much less would be returned. There would also be less potential for clients to claim that
they hadn’t received advices sent to them. 
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Tying correspondence to reporting
Another innovation, which would not be quite as large a change in servicing approach
as the No Correspondence Client facility, would be the tying of all correspondence to pre-
arranged and anticipated reporting cycles. This avoids the unanticipated letter or review,
by coordinating it with the anticipated letter or review. This could be used, alongside the
No Correspondence Client facility, for clients for whom low literacy, high residential
mobility or poor postal services were not such acute problems, but who still found
unanticipated advices difficult to cope with. 
More of a case officer approach
All of the above suggestions, require more understanding to be built up between clients
and administrators about the particularities of individual client situations and how these
can be realistically accommodated in unemployment payments administration. Such a
build up of understanding would probably require more of a case officer approach, and
less of a process approach, than is currently adopted within income support
administration. Particular officers would have to take on responsibility for particular
clients and see those clients through most stages of the administrative process. Clients
often express the desire to deal with officers they have dealt with previously, and in this
way both trust and better understanding of client circumstances can perhaps be built up. 
Adopting more of a case officer approach and less of a process approach to administrative
organisation should not detract from Centrelink’s ability to service clients when officers
are absent, nor to engage from time to time in selective, more stringent, more detached
client reviews. A process approach and a case officer approach are not mutually
exclusive, but rather are matters of relative emphasis. Hence, the framing of this idea in
terms of adopting more of case officer approach, rather than in absolute terms. Some
considerable process elements of administrative organisation will inevitably remain. 
One effect of adopting more of a case officer approach within unemployment payments
administration may be a lessening of separate ‘control oriented’ and ‘client oriented’ roles
and subcultures which are presently identified with different process oriented units, such
as the initial assessment and compliance/review units. All officers would have to ‘walk the
tight-rope’ of unemployment payments administration between the client and control
orientations, using their discretion and judgement openly, fairly, and in a balanced
manner in relation to their clients. This may be good for organisational morale and unity,
as well as for building trust with clients and for more informed decision making.
More small satellite offices
In conjunction with more of a case officer approach, more individualised tailoring of
activity test procedures to the diversity of the unemployed and a No Correspondence
Client facility, a related further action could be the development of more satellite local
officers. At present, offices with almost 100 Centrelink employees dominate the customer
service network, with smaller satellite offices being relatively few in number. Most large
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Centrelink offices have no small satellite offices attached to them and those that do
usually have only one or two. This places some social and geographical distance between
income support administrators and clients living outside the urban centres in which these
large Centrelink offices are located. The knowledge and understanding that Centrelink
officers have of the local labour market and other circumstances of these clients is not
always that great.
Were more income support administrators to be located in small satellite Centrelink
offices and to adopt a more case officer approach to their clientele, their knowledge of the
local labour market and other circumstances of clients would increase considerably.
Increased knowledge of clients and local circumstances should, arguably, lead to more
appropriate use and development of procedures, better, more informed decision making,
better judgements about whether people are being truthful in their dealings with
Centrelink and better use of discretion. 
The Normanton Centrelink office, in Queensland’s Gulf country, is a useful example of a
small satellite office which already tends towards a case officer approach. With only three
Centrelink officers and doing its own compliance and review work, it cannot but
effectively adopt a case officer approach. The Normanton office’s indigenous and non-
identifier breach rates were, it will be recalled from Chapter 3, quite unusual. Its
administrative breach rates for indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers were very close
to equal, suggesting an office which knew and could keep track of its local indigenous
and non-identifier clienteles equally well. Normanton’s activity test breach rate was
considerably higher among indigenous identifiers than non-identifiers but, as suggested
in Chapter 3, this could probably be explained primarily by the issue of leaving CDEP,
which is specific to indigenous people. This issue aside, Normanton may provide some
indication of what can be achieved through more small satellite officers and more of a case
officer approach. 
The approach within income support administration to small satellite local offices appears
to have been somewhat ambivalent over recent years. Not many have been added to the
network and those that do exist, through various historical episodes, have sometimes felt
threatened with closure. Clearly there are problems with small offices, relating to issues
such as levels of staff knowledge and training, staff turnover and continuity, etc. Many
of these problems can, however, be lessened by maintaining strong relations with larger
overseeing offices. Further development of large regional office/small local offices
relations would clearly be necessary were a clear commitment to more small satellite local
offices to be put in place. Some regional offices visited, like Dubbo in New South Wales,
seemed keen on this idea and saw themselves potentially becoming managers of a quite
extensive ‘hub and spoke’ multi-office network. 
Upgrading and further recognising community agents
Some additional small satellite Centrelink offices could be created by upgrading
community agent’s positions that have proven successful and have shown a demand for
their services. This has already occurred at Tangentyere in Alice Springs and is being
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explored by regional office managers elsewhere as well. It is also possible that paid
community agents could be upgraded, through more training and payment for longer
hours, without becoming Centrelink officers/offices. There are, however, limits to what
paid community agents can do without becoming Centrelink officers.
At the other end of the scale of community agents are the many unpaid informal
intermediaries. Some of these already receive training and there is clearly considerable
scope to expand the number of external intermediaries formally paid and recognised as
Centrelink community agents. Such people already play a very important role in linking
Centrelink with its indigenous clientele and the quality of that role can only improve
through more formal training, payment and recognition. 
Self-serve kiosks and regional/area teleservices
Some Centrelink offices have begun to experiment with self-serve kiosks through which
clients in small communities can have direct telephone access to the regional Centrelink
office, while also making forms and information pamphlets available on site. The
potential for this form of servicing in small communities with predominantly indigenous
populations is at this stage unknown. They may provide useful adjuncts or alternatives
to community agents, where these are not available or feasible, and to national
teleservices, which are clearly not always liked by clients. Experiments with kiosks in
small communities with significant indigenous populations, such as those being
conducted by the Mount Isa Centrelink office, should be monitored and their potential
for further development and application elsewhere carefully evaluated. 
Regional or area, rather than national, teleservices are another model of servicing which
is being tried. The Cairns/Westcourt combined regional teleservice for predominantly
indigenous outlying areas, using indigenous staff, could be looked to as a model with
potential wider applications, as too could the New South Wales area west indigenous unit
and 1800 telephone access service based at the Mount Druitt Centrelink office.
Encouraging indigenous identified staff to be decision makers
Another idea for further action relates to the role of indigenous identified staff within
Centrelink. Chapter 5 noted the important contribution these staff already make in
servicing indigenous clients and keeping down what could otherwise be even higher
indigenous breach rates. However, it also noted tensions between indigenous identified
staff and other staff over their respective roles in relation to indigenous clients. These
tensions may never be fully resolved, but they may be alleviated, to some extent, by
indigenous identified staff being encouraged to become fully accredited income support
decision makers. Making decisions about applicants’ entitlements is the core business of
income support administration and any officer within Centrelink who is not accredited
to make and does not make those decisions is inevitably regarded as somewhat marginal
to the organisational enterprise. Such officers will not be fully respected by their peers as
full participants in organisational processes.
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Because of the diverse ways in which indigenous identified staff have been recruited into
and deployed within income support administration, some are currently accredited
decision makers, while others are not. It is those who are not accredited decision makers,
and who, hence, can only play an adjunct role to others in the organisation, who seem to
express the greatest degrees of tension over respective roles. Those who are accredited
decision makers still worry about being swamped with work through indigenous clients
being directed to them unnecessarily, or through becoming bulk decision makers for all
clients and losing any sense of being a dedicated resource for indigenous people. But
these are lesser tensions and concerns than being unable to make decisions at all and
having always to explain one’s understandings of client circumstances to others who are
the decision makers.
A recent review of Centrelink’s recruitment and career development of indigenous staff
noted that, of the organisation’s 24,000 employees, some 1,000, or 4.2 per cent identified
as indigenous. Of these 1,000, only 170 occupied indigenous identified social security
positions and 100 occupied Abstudy positions newly transferred from the Department
of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs. The remaining 730 indigenous
identifying staff were spread across the agency in general positions (Lewis 1998). This
pool of indigenous staff is a major organisational resource and should be considered in
its entirety, rather than just focusing on indigenous identified positions. Indigenous
staff can be usefully moved between general and indigenous identified positions as a
way of providing them with broader training and experience, better integrating them
into the organisation and relieving stresses on them which may be built up when they
are in dedicated indigenous service positions. Recruiting indigenous identified officers
from outside the organisation and then leaving them in identified positions over
extended periods of time, unaccredited as formal Centrelink decision makers, is not a
useful model and should be a thing of the past. Indigenous identified officers should be
fully trained and accredited, broadly experienced Centrelink decision makers moving
on a career path through various positions in the organisation; though not so quickly as
to leave indigenous clients with an ever changing array of local or regional indigenous
identified staff. 
Encouraging and monitoring area/regional/local office 
adaptation and experimentation
Another issue which needs to be raised in the context of ideas on which to base further
action is the attitude of central office to area, regional and local office adaptation and
experimentation with procedures and servicing arrangements. Generally this should be
encouraged and monitored, rather than either discouraged or ignored. Adaptation and
experimentation at the ‘client processing’ level of the organisation reveals much about
the day to day realities of income support administration and should be regarded as a
primary source of knowledge for further development of procedures and service delivery
arrangements. Such adaptation and experimentation will, if attended to, reveal much
about the diversity of the unemployed and the cultural and social content of existing
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rules and procedures. To deny or disapprove of adaptation and experimentation would
be to deny the complex discretionary and judgmental reality of unemployment payments
administration and to cut central level administrators off from the social reality they need
to understand in order to develop workable and appropriate rules and procedures
covering diverse social and labour market circumstances. 
In this context, it may be worth returning once more to the instance of the Northern
Territory. With almost half of its unemployment payment clients identifying as
indigenous and the vast majority of these being resident in rural/remote areas with very
rudimentary, almost non-existent labour markets beyond CDEP, and with few vocational
training facilities, the Northern Territory social security administration clearly faces a
starkly different social and labour market reality to that experienced in southern
metropolitan or even rural areas. It would be surprising, therefore, if the Northern
Territory social security administration did not feel the need to adapt standard
procedures developed in southern contexts in order to make them more relevant and
realistic to its social and cultural circumstances. Arguably, the current social security
legislation together with administrative law principles not only allows, but also requires,
service deliverers to adapt procedures to their working environment.
Other milder forms of adaptation and experimentation are present elsewhere within the
social security system outside the Northern Territory, but do not show up so clearly in
breach rate and activity test exemption statistics. These other milder forms of adaptation
and experimentation also need to be recognised and encouraged. Monitoring and learning
from these adaptations and experiments is a far more constructive and realistic approach
for central administrators to adopt than either denial or discouragement of their existence.
A suspension and re-instatement facility
During the early phases of this research it was sometimes noted that to overturn a breach
and restore a client to unemployment payments required a full new application
procedure. It was often suggested that a suspension and re-instatement facility which did
not require full new application procedures may be useful and appropriate, particularly
in the case of minor administrative breaches which had a reasonably high probability of
being overturned by original decision makers when the client made contact.
By the end of the research period, with the introduction of a new common computing
platform for unemployment payments, youth allowance and Austudy administration,
such a suspension and re-instatement facility did then exist. Awareness of it was slowly
spreading and so too, presumably, was the use of it to avoid full re-application
procedures after breaches had been overturned. Further monitoring of this facility to see
if it is meeting the requirements of original decision makers overturning breaches may be
worthwhile. 
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Integration of CDEP participant schedule administration
The potential for breaching due to administrative mismatch between unemployment
payments administration, carried out by Centrelink, and CDEP participant schedule
administration, carried out by ATSIC, could be reduced considerably by the integration
of CDEP participant schedule administration into Centrelink’s computer-based
administrative system and program delivery workload. This may begin to occur through
the payment by Centrelink, from March 1999, of a CDEP participant supplement, similar
to the work-for-the-dole supplement, as announced in the 1998 budget. However,
irrespective of the implementation of the 1998 budget decision, there is still a clear need
for ongoing efforts to better integrate CDEP participant schedule administration and the
Centrelink unemployment payment administrative database. A multiple entitlement
exclusion applies between the two, yet no adequate administrative mechanism for
maintaining that exclusion currently exists. This is not good administrative practice and
it may be leading to both underpayment and overpayment, as well as unnecessary
breaching among the indigenous clientele. 
Integration of Abstudy administration
The current lack of integration between Abstudy administration and unemployment
payment administration may also be leading to unnecessary overpayment, debt recovery
and breaching. As Centrelink now administers Abstudy, this should be able to be
overcome by better integrating Abstudy administration with the common computing
platform for unemployment and other related payments. Time periods for eligibility
assessment and payment should be able to be commonly identified and adjustments
appropriately made when switching from one type of payment to the other. 
Further statistical monitoring and research
Indigenous identifier and non-identifier statistics derived from the social security
administrative system provided the starting point for this research. This is, to our
knowledge, the first time such statistics have been used as a research tool. Together with
contextualising locality-based discussion sessions and interviews, these statistics have
proven to be a useful and insightful way of opening up issues about the different ways
in which indigenous identifying and non-identifying clients may experience income
support administration and ways in which those experiences may be made more fair and
equal. Further statistical monitoring, similar to that undertaken here, will clearly be
necessary in the future in order to assess the impact of further actions taken within
income support administration. As a first step, it may be useful to carry out a similar
statistical exercise at July 1999, when a full two-year history of breaching under the new
penalty regime of July 1997 will be in place, or at May 2000, when a two-year history of
breaching on the new common computing platform for unemployment and related
payments will be in place. 
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It should not be anticipated that these further statistical monitoring exercises will show
dramatic change from the present situation. Differential breach rates between indigenous
identifiers and non-identifiers are likely to prove fairly intractable and difficult to
change. However, some changes in statistics may become evident, particularly at more
detailed levels of analysis, and these may point to changes occurring in administrative
practice. Some further discussion sessions and interview research may also be required,
though probably not to the extent necessary in 1998. The general range of issues that
relate to indigenous breach rates are now reasonably well known and should be able to
be monitored on an ongoing basis largely within Centrelink and DSS. 
There are, however, some other types of research on related topics which could also be
undertaken as a way of further exploring indigenous people’s experience of
unemployment payments administration. One criticism made of this research was that it
did not look in detail at particular cases of indigenous people’s experience, examining the
quality of decisions made. This could certainly be usefully done. It has also been
suggested in passing, that there is scope for further research on indigenous people’s use
of review and appeals mechanisms and on issues such as underpayment through lack of
willingness to return to Centrelink after adverse decisions. There is also further scope for
research on the articulation of CDEP and unemployment payments administration, and
the implication of each in emerging indigenous labour market and industry contexts,
such as Aboriginal-owned pastoral enterprises, the indigenous art and craft industry or
indigenous fishing and wildlife harvesting. In all these contexts, examination of the social
security database by indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers for different geographic
areas, ages, genders, income unit/family types, breaches and breach types may contribute
information. Having opened its administrative database to research purposes, while not
in any way compromising the confidentiality of its records, we would encourage the DSS
to take this process further.
Prioritising action
This final chapter began by suggesting that these ideas for future action, while discussed
separately, would have their greatest impact through interaction and mutual
reinforcement. To conclude, however, it may be useful to indicate some order of priority
among these various ideas for further action. perhaps the two most important ideas in
relation to indigenous unemployment payment recipients are those discussed first in this
chapter: further recognising diversity among the unemployed and the No
Correspondence Client facility.
Further recognising diversity among the unemployed provides a broad philosophical
base from which to build greater realism and trust into unemployment payments
administration. From this philosophical base, unemployment payments administration
can work to develop procedures and activity test requirements which are appropriate to
the diverse circumstances of the unemployed, including the indigenous unemployed.
Unemployment payment recipients are a very diverse group of people with vastly
differing prospects for finding working and hence vastly differing requirements for
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activity testing. Procedures and activity test requirements should reflect this diversity
far more than they yet do, and this may in turn build a more trusted, fairer and more
legitimate unemployment payments system.
The No Correspondence Client facility attacks another range of issues relating to the social
and cultural content of current mail out procedures; such as indigenous people’s low
levels of literacy, high levels of mobility, poor access to postal service and relative lack of
confidence in, and in dealing with, government bureaucracies. Together with further
recognition of the diversity of the unemployed, and perhaps also moves towards a more
case officer approach within unemployment payment administration, the No
Correspondence Client facility would seem to have considerable potential for working
towards a more culturally appropriate, trusting and locally informed approach to
unemployment payment administration for indigenous Australians. 
Not all differences between indigenous identifiers and non-identifiers within
unemployment payments administration processes and statistics will be removed by
measures such as these. But at least their implementation would represent some
recognition of the differential cultural and social impacts of unemployment payment
rules and procedures, and some concerted attempt to appropriately adapt these rules and
procedures to the circumstances of indigenous Australians.
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Appendix
Locations visited for interviews and discussion sessions
Alice Springs (Northern Territory)
Broken Hill (New South Wales)
Broome (Western Australia)
Bourke (New South Wales)
Cairns (Queensland)
Derby (Western Australia)
Dubbo (New South Wales)
Fortitude Valley, Brisbane (Queensland)
Karratha (Western Australia)
Launceston (Tasmania)
Mt Druitt, Sydney (New South Wales)
Mt Isa (Queensland)
Normanton (Queensland)
Nowra (New South Wales)
Port Augusta (South Australia)
Redfern, Sydney (New South Wales)
South Hedland (Western Australia)
Tennant Creek (Northern Territory)
Thursday Island, Torres Strait (Queensland)
Victoria Park, Perth (Western Australia)
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Notes
1. In the administrative reorganisation following the October 1998 Federal election, DSS
ceased to exist as a separate administrative entity, becoming instead part of a larger
Department of Family and Community Services. As this research was undertaken
before that change, the pre-October 1998 terminology has been retained.
2. The format adopted throughout this paper is that ‘a’ tables refer to the June 1997
data set and ‘b’ tables refer to the March 1998 data set. Where for some reason there
is only one set of figures available, ‘a’ and ‘b’ are not used. 
3. The distinction between breach rates and breach penalties is added here because as
at July 1997 when new rate reduction penalties were introduced (replacing non-
payment period penalties), a ‘clean slate’ policy was also introduced. Under this
policy, pre-July 1997 breaches do not count towards penalties, although they do
remain on the administrative record. Hence, breach penalties imposed will not
reflect a full two-year history of activity test breach rates until July 1999. 
4. Legislatively these people are generally deemed as being ‘taken to satisfy’ the
activity test, rather than formally being exempt from it. In administrative practice,
however, as reflected in these data sets, they are classified as ‘exempt’ from the
activity test, and this is in many ways a reasonable common sense characterisation.
5. Since the vast majority only have one breach on their record, the addition of ‘latest’
here is fairly insubstantial. 
6. Work-for- the-dole pilots commenced progressively from October 1997.
7. Jobseeker diaries were introduced as a new administrative measure in July 1996.
8. In the remainder of this report, wherever the March 1998 data set is adjusted from
gross to net breach rates by deleting breaches subsequently overturned by original
decision makers, the resulting new table maintains its number but changes its letter
from ‘b’ to ‘c’.
9. Table 3.2a contains 50 offices, whereas Tables 3.2b and 3.2c contain 49. Three
offices fell below the 200 threshold between June 1997 and March 1998, Derby,
Innisfail and Carnarvon, and hence appear in Table 3.2a, but not Tables 3.2b and
3.2c. Two offices, however, Lismore and Knuckey Street, rose above the 200
threshold during this time and hence appear in Tables 3.2b and 3.2c but not
Table 3.2a.
10. This sometimes includes three offices in northern Western Australia, Kununurra,
Derby and Broome, which are part of Centrelink’s area north Australia
administration. 
11. This cluster includes Broken Hill which, although it is in New South Wales, is part
of Centrelink’s area South Australia administration.
12. See Social Security Act s.1296c.
136 ♦  UNEMPLOYMENT PAYMENTS, THE ACTIVITY TEST AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
13. See 1997 and earlier versions of the Guide to the Administration of the Social Security
Act s.12.301–s.12.303.
14. See 1997 and earlier versions of the Guide to the Administration of the Social Security
Act s.12.307. See Sanders (1997) for a fuller discussion of DSS’s treatment of CDEP
participants up to 1997.
15. Exceptions included ‘where a person or couple would be financially worse off by
remaining on CDEP than they would be on NSA [Newstart Allowance]’, where ‘the
person’s CDEP place is taken by another CDEP participant’ and ‘there is no work
available on the CDEP’ and where ‘the person is leaving to take up other paid work’.
16. This figure includes two of the offices in northern Western Australia which are part
of Centrelink’s area north Australia administration.
17. The designation DO stands for District Office and RO for Regional Office. These
terms are no longer officially used, with all offices now being referred to as
Centrelink Customer Service Centres. The designations are, however, still in the
administrative record and are a good indicator of whether an office is a small satellite
or a larger stand-alone operation.
18. As noted above, the Broken Hill office is part of Centrelink’s South Australian area
administration. This can be seen by its area office designation in Tables 3.2a–c and
3.3a–c. 
19. There are a few other negative figures outside the Northern Territory in these
columns. Most relate to Australian Capital Territory rural areas, where numbers are
small, and hence the figures are not statistically significant. The only negative figure
of any statistical worth relates to activity test breaching in Tasmanian urban areas
in Table 4.3a and this is only negative by 0.6 per cent.
20. See Social Security Act 1991 s.630AA (1)(b).
21. See Social Security Act 1991 s.729 (2) (e). Other parts of s.729 of the Act limit the
payment of Special Benefit in various ways.
22. It has already been noted in Chapter 5 that social security letters can, because of
administrative law requirements, be quite complex and somewhat ambiguous in
their tone. 
23. The legal/administrative status of corresponding with clients will be returned to in
Chapter 8.
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National level statistics indicate that unemployment payment recipients who identify as indigenous
are ‘breached’ more frquently than other recipients for not complying with the ‘activity test’ or other
administrative requirements. This monograph attempts to understand why this is so and what can be
done about it. It does so by further interrogating the administrative statistics, by age, gender and sub-
national geographic levels and by drawing on discussion sessions convened in 20 localities across
Australia.
The research observes consistently higher indigenous breach rates across age groups and genders,
but some degree of regional and State/Territory variation. It argues that this geographic variation is to
be expected given the different operating environments and economies of various areas. It argues
that there are inevitable tensions and ambiguities, as well as different office cultures and roles within
income support administration, and that there is a cultural and social content to all social security
rules and procedures, plus a great diversity of unemployed people; all of which may contribute to
differences in breach rates.
The analysis identifies a number of issues raised by participants in discussion sessions which may be
contributing to higher indigenous breach rates, such as literacy and mobility, confidence in and with
government bureaucracies and CDEP scheme administrative arrangements. It also identifies
adaptations to the circumstances of indigenous people which have already been made within social
security administration, in particular the appointment of indigenous-identified staff and the use of
third-party intermediaries in service delivery. The research makes a number of suggestions for further
adaptations which may help lower indigenous breach rates, including a ‘no correspondence client’
facility, more of a case officer approach, more small satellite offices and greater use of more individually-
tailored activity test agreements.
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